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Resumen en Castellano
Esta tesis consta de tres art´ıculos sobre el impacto de distintas pol´ıticas para la
disuasio´n de delitos corporativos en el comportamiento estrate´gico de los agentes
econo´micos. Combina temas de Organizacio´n Industrial, Derecho y Economı´a,
con fundamentos teo´ricos de microeconomı´a. El primer art´ıculo analiza el im-
pacto de la pol´ıtica de defensa de la competencia en la disuasio´n de la colusio´n
y en la eficiencia productiva de los ca´rteles que sobreviven, en contextos en
donde ocultar la colusio´n es costoso. En este art´ıculo se considera una pol´ıtica
de defensa de la competencia basada en multas, inspecciones y programas de
clemencia.1 El segundo art´ıculo analiza el impacto de la divulgacio´n de informa-
cio´n sobre pro´ximas inspecciones en la sostenibilidad de los ca´rteles. El tercer
art´ıculo analiza la efectividad de recompensar la denuncia de irregularidades en
la disuasio´n de delitos empresariales, as´ı como su impacto en el contrato o´ptimo
entre el duen˜o de la empresa y el empleado denunciante.
En el primer cap´ıtulo, titulado ¿Que´ pasa si las multas por colusio´n no son
lo suficientemente altas? Implicaciones en la disuasio´n y la eficiencia productiva,
se analiza el impacto de la pol´ıtica de defensa de la competencia en las decisiones
de las empresas relacionadas a la colusio´n y a la produccio´n. En el modelo, las
empresas del ca´rtel dedican esfuerzo costoso a actividades relacionadas con la
eficiencia productiva y la ocultacio´n del ca´rtel: lo primero reduce los costes
marginales de produccio´n y lo segundo reduce la probabilidad de deteccio´n. El
esfuerzo es costoso, y por ello limitado, por lo que las empresas del ca´rtel deben
decidir respecto de su distribucio´n entre eficiencia productiva y ocultacio´n. En
este contexto, un primer ana´lisis se refiere a co´mo la pol´ıtica de defensa de la
competencia distorsiona el intere´s de las empresas en la eficiencia productiva
con respecto a la ocultacio´n. Se demuestra que cuando las multas son bajas y/o
1Los programas de clemencia ofrecen una reduccio´n de multas a la empresa del ca´rtel
que brinde pruebas fehacientes del mismo a la autoridad de defensa de la competencia y que
coopera con ella a lo largo de la fase de enjuiciamiento. La efectividad de estos programas
reside en incrementar la tentacio´n al desv´ıo.
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la probabilidad de inspeccio´n es baja, las empresas encuentran rentable destinar
la totalidad de sus esfuerzos a la eficiencia productiva. Sin embargo, a medida
que las multas o las inspecciones suben, las empresas sustituyen esfuerzo desde
la eficiencia productiva a la ocultacio´n. Esta reasignacio´n de esfuerzos hace que
la colusio´n sea sostenible en industrias en las que no lo es de otra manera y crea
ineficiencias no consideradas en modelos tradicionales de colusio´n.
A la luz de estos resultados, un segundo ana´lisis se refiere al impacto de
un cambio de pol´ıtica en la disuasio´n del delito y en el bienestar. Se demuestra
que un aumento de la multa puede tener dos efectos opuestos sobre el bienestar,
mientras que lo puede mejorar a trave´s de un menor nu´mero de ca´rteles, tam-
bie´n lo puede reducir a trave´s de una mayor ineficiencia productiva de aquellos
ca´rteles que sobreviven a la pol´ıtica. En particular, para niveles intermedios
de la multa, un aumento de e´sta puede conllevar a un aumento de bienestar
derivado de un menor nu´mero de ca´rteles que no compensa la pe´rdida de bien-
estar derivada de una mayor ineficiencia productiva de aquellos que sobreviven.
A ra´ız de este resultado, se recomienda la fijacio´n de multas muy elevadas tal que
ningu´n ca´rtel sobreviva. Sin embargo, en la pra´ctica esto no siempre es cre´ıble
o posible de implementar. En este contexto, se demuestra que la disuasio´n no es
mono´tona ni en el nivel de multas ni en el de inspecciones considerados en forma
individual: un aumento en cualquiera de estos instrumentos puede mejorar la
sostenibilidad de la colusio´n en lugar de su disuasio´n, si el otro instrumento no
se ajusta en consecuencia. Por lo tanto, el mensaje principal en cuanto a la
pol´ıtica de defensa de la competencia es que e´sta debe ser cuidadosamente dis-
en˜ada, combinando cuidadosamente ambos instrumentos, multas e inspecciones.
Finalmente, el ana´lisis recomienda el uso de programas de clemencia. Dado
que estos programas exigen plena colaboracio´n por parte de la empresa infor-
mante, una solicitud de clemencia implica que esta empresa no destina esfuerzo
a la ocultacio´n de evidencia, lo que a su vez implica mayor eficiencia productiva
durante la fase de persecucio´n y enjuiciamiento.
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En el segundo cap´ıtulo, titulado Un inspector llama: Sobre la optimalidad
de inspecciones anunciadas, se ampl´ıa el modelo anterior con la introduccio´n
de una nueva pol´ıtica: ahora, la autoridad de defensa de la competencia puede
revelar fehacientemente informacio´n sobre la probabilidad de inspeccio´n en el
per´ıodo vigente antes de que las empresas tomen decisiones estrate´gicas sobre
precio, produccio´n y actividades asociadas a la colusio´n. Se considera que esta
pol´ıtica se lleva a cabo a trave´s del envio de sen˜ales a aquellas empresas con
alta probabilidad de inspeccio´n en el per´ıodo en curso.
La posibilidad de tomar decisiones sobre la base de una probabilidad de
inspeccio´n ma´s precisa afecta los incentivos a la colusio´n en dos formas opuestas.
Por un lado, aumenta la rentabilidad de la colusio´n: informacio´n precisa respecto
de la probabilidad de inspeccio´n en curso permite a las empresas minimizar
pe´rdidas de beneficios por (i) dedicar esfuerzo costoso a la ocultacio´n en per´ıodos
en donde no se recibe una alerta de inspeccio´n, y (ii) asignar demasiado esfuerzo
a la eficiencia productiva en per´ıodos en donde s´ı se recibe tal alerta. Ambos
efectos conllevan a mayores incentivos a la colusio´n. Sin embargo, por otro
lado, la firma que se desv´ıa se beneficia igualmente de esta informacio´n, lo que
aumenta los incentivos al desv´ıo y, por tanto, dificulta el sostenimiento de la
colusio´n.
En este contexto, la pregunta principal es si la introduccio´n de un pro-
grama de alerta puede mejorar la disuasio´n (es decir, si el u´ltimo efecto descrito
anteriormente puede prevalecer sobre el primero). Se demuestra que este caso
ocurre cuando la multa y la probabilidad de inspeccio´n son altas. Para tales
valores de los para´metros, el programa apenas distorsiona el comportamiento
de la empresa que sigue el acuerdo de colusio´n, pero, sin embargo, distorsiona
ampliamente el de la empresa que se desv´ıa. Con altos costes esperados, el pro-
grama no implica mucho para la empresa que sigue el acuerdo de colusio´n: e´sta
asigna todo su esfuerzo a la ocultacio´n (a) siempre, si no hay un programa de
alerta, y (b) casi siempre, si lo hay. Sin embargo, el programa implica mucho
v
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para la empresa que se desv´ıa. Dado que los per´ıodos de no inspeccio´n son
pocos, informacio´n precisa acerca de cuando se esta´ en uno de ellos es de gran
relevancia: los beneficios del desv´ıo se maximizan si la empresa se desv´ıa en uno
de estos per´ıodos porque los costes de deteccio´n son mı´nimos (nulos).2 Por lo
tanto, en este contexto, la introduccio´n del programa de alertas conlleva una
mejora en la disuasio´n de la colusio´n.
En el tercer cap´ıtulo, titulado Premiando la denuncia de irregularidades
en un modelo de principal-agente, se analiza el impacto de recompensar a em-
pleados que denuncian delitos corporativos en la disuasio´n del delito y en la
eficiencia productiva interna de las empresas. En el modelo, hay un principal
que posee una empresa con dos empleados. Ambos empleados son contratados
para dedicar esfuerzo costoso a la produccio´n, pero uno de ellos tambie´n puede
dedicar, secretamente, esfuerzo a cometer un delito corporativo (el delincuente),
y el otro a reunir pruebas de tal acto (el agente). El crimen no so´lo produce
beneficios privados para el delincuente, sino tambie´n una externalidad para el
principal.
En este contexto, se demuestra que es posible disminuir la existencia de
delitos corporativos a partir de la introduccio´n de programas que recompensan
a empleados que, siendo ajenos al delito, exponen pu´blicamente evidencia del
mismo: las recompensas inducen a estos empleados a reunir pruebas del delito,
lo que aumenta la probabilidad de deteccio´n del mismo; frente a una mayor
probabilidad de deteccio´n, los beneficios de delinquir disminuyen y con ello los
deseos del delicuente de comenter tal acto. Sin embargo, tambie´n se observa
que esta pol´ıtica de recompensas tiene efectos secundarios sobre la eficiencia
productiva de las empresas: si las externalidades netas que el principal percibe
por el delito son elevadas, e´ste retribuira´ en exceso el esfuerzo destinado a la
produccio´n, en un intento de sesgar la asignacio´n de esfuerzo del agente en detri-
2El supuesto clave en este resultado es que la evidencia de la colusio´n dura un so´lo per´ıodo,
el actual, de tal manera que la empresa que se desv´ıa no puede ser castigada por haber
pra´cticado la colusio´n en per´ıodos anteriores. Este supuesto es habitual en modelos de colusio´n.
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mento de la recopilacio´n de evidencia del delito. Lo contrario acontece cuando
las externalidades netas que el principal percibe por el delito son muy bajas (al-
tamente negativas). Se destacan dos casos extremos: uno en el que el principal
contrata al agente so´lo por sus actividades relacionadas con la recopilacio´n de
pruebas del delito, y otra en el que, para minimizar la probabilidad de deteccio´n
del delito, el principal no contrata al agente. Este u´ltimo implica una pe´rdida
total de bienestar derivada de los programas de recompensas.
Por u´ltimo, se demuestra que el principal puede estar enteresado en intro-
ducir un programa de recompensas de accionar interno a la empresa, independi-
entemente de la existencia de un programa de recompensas externo a la misma.
Se observa tal intere´s cuando el delito corporativo en cuestio´n es altamente per-
judicial para el principal y, en el caso de existir un programa de recompensas
externos, cuando adema´s la recompensa que ofrece el programa externo no es
lo suficientemente alta como para disuadir el delito tanto como desea el princi-
pal. Adema´s, se demuestra que el uso de un programa interno de recompensa
ma´ximiza la disuasio´n del delito. Este resultado sugiere la implementacio´n de
programas pu´blicos de recompensa solamente para la persecucio´n de delitos que
favorecen los intereses de los propietarios de las empresas (fraudes impositivos,
colusio´n y delitos ambientales, entre otros).
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of three papers on the impact of deterrence policies for
corporate crimes in the strategic behavior of economic agents. It combines
topics from Industrial Organization and Law and Economics, with theoretical
grounds from Microeconomics. The first chapter analyzes the impact of the
antitrust policy on deterring collusion and the productive efficiency of surviving
cartels when concealing collusion is costly. This chapter considers an antitrust
policy based on fines, inspections and leniency programs.1 The second chapter
analyzes the impact of disclosing information on the likelihood of inspections
on the sustainability of cartels. The third chapter analyzes the effectiveness of
rewarding whistle-blowing to deter occasional corporate crimes, as well as its
impact on the optimal contract between the firm owner and the whistle-blower.
In the first chapter, entitled What if Fines on Collusion are not high enough?
Implications on Deterrence and Productive Efficiency when Concealment is
Costly, I analyze the impact of the antitrust policy on the firm’s decisions over
crime and production. In the model, cartel firms devote costly effort to activities
1Leniency programs reduce sanctions against the cartel firm that reports evidence of the
cartel to the antitrust authority and cooperates with it along the prosecution phase. The
effectiveness of these programs to improve deterrence lies in enhancing the temptation to
deviate.
1
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related to productive efficiency and concealment, as the former reduces marginal
costs from production and the latter reduces the probability of detection. Ef-
fort is costly, and so that limited; thus cartel firms have to decide on how to
allocate it among productive efficiency and concealment. In this context, a first
analysis refers to how the antitrust policy distorts firms’ interest in productive
efficiency with respect to that in concealment. I show that when fines are low
and/or the probability of inspection is low, firms find it profitable to allocate
all effort to productive efficiency. However, as fines or inspections go up, firms
substitute effort from productive efficiency to concealment. This reallocation of
effort makes collusion sustainable in industries where it wouldn’t be otherwise
and create inefficiencies not considered in standard models of collusion.
In the light of these results, a second analysis refers to the impact of a
policy change in deterrence and welfare. I show that a fine increase can have two
opposite effects on welfare, while it can improve welfare through fewer cartels,
it can also reduce it through more inefficient surviving ones. Particularly, for
intermediate fine levels, a fine increase can imply a welfare gain from fewer
cartels that does not compensate the welfare loss from more inefficient surviving
ones. This result favors setting very high fines such that no cartel survives.
However, in practice this is not always credible or possible to implement. In this
context, I show that deterrence is non-monotonic neither in the level of fines nor
in that of inspections individually considered: an increase in any of them may
enhance collusion sustainability rather than deterrence if the other instrument
is not changed accordingly. Therefore, the main policy recommendation is that
the antitrust policy has to be carefully designed, such that combining both
instruments, fines and inspections, conveniently.
Finally, the analysis favors the use of leniency programs. Since leniency
programs demand full collaboration from the reporting firm, a leniency appli-
cation implies no effort on concealment from that firm, and thus an efficiency
gain under deviation.
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In the second chapter, entitled An Inspector Calls: On the Optimality of
Warning Cartel Firms before an Inspection, I extend the previous model by
introducing a new policy in the game: the Antitrust Authority can credibly
disclose information on the likelihood of a current inspection before firms take
strategic decisions on price, production and cartel activities. I consider that the
Antitrust Authority performs this policy by sending warnings to firms with a
high probability of a current inspection.
The possibility to take decisions on the basis of a more accurate probability
of inspection affects cartel firms incentives to collude in two opposite ways. On
the one hand, it raises collusion profitability: with accurate information on
the likelihood of a current inspection, firms can minimize profit losses from (i)
devoting costly effort to concealment anytime that they do not receive a warning,
and from (ii) an unprofitable effort allocation towards productive efficiency each
time that they receive a warning. In this case, incentives to collude go up and
collusion is facilitated. However, on the other hand, the deviants also benefit
from this information; this enhances incentives to deviate and makes collusion
harder to sustain.
In this context, the main question is whether the introduction of a warning
program can improve deterrence (i.e., whether the latter effect described above
can prevail over the former). I show that disclosing information on the likeli-
hood of a current inspection improves deterrence when both the fine and the
probability of inspection are high. For such parameter values the program does
not distort much the behavior of a firm that follows the collusive agreement, but
it does so for a deviant. Indeed, faced with high expected costs, the program
does not imply much for the former: this allocates all its effort to concealment
(a) always, if there is not a warning program, and (b) almost always, if there
is. However, for a deviant the program implies a lot. Since periods of no in-
spection are few, accurate information about when one is in one of these is of
huge relevance: in these periods deviation not only implies the standard higher
3
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gains from sales, but also minimum (no) detection costs.2 Hence, in this con-
text, whereas firm’s benefits derived from the program are little under collusion,
there are huge under deviation; and so the program implies an improvement in
deterrence.
In the third chapter, entitled Rewarding Whistle-Blowers: Implications on
Deterrence and on Principal-Agent Contracts, I analyze the impact of rewarding
whistle-blowers on the deterrence of corporate crimes and the internal efficiency
of firms. In the model, there is a principal that owns a firm with two employees.
Both employees are hired to devote costly effort to production, but one of them
can secretly devote effort to commit corporate crime (the offender) and the other
to gather evidence of such an act (the agent). The crime not only yields private
gains to the offender employee, but also an externality to the firm owner.
In this context, I demonstrate that whistle-blower programs that offer a
reward to non-offender employees for the public exposure of corporate crimes
can improve deterrence: rewards induce non-offender employees to gather crime
evidence, which raises the probability of crime detection; faced with a higher
probability of detection (and thus with lower net gains from crime), the of-
fender’s willingness to commit crime go down. However, I also show that this
reward policy has side effects on the productive efficiency of firms: if the princi-
pal’s net externalities from crime are very high, this will overpay effort devoted
to production in an attempt to bias the agent’s effort allocation away from
crime detection. The opposite will hold when the principal’s net externalities
from crime are very low (highly negative). Two extreme cases stand out: one
in which the principal hires the agent only for his activities related to gathering
crime evidence, and other in which, to minimize crime detection, he does not
hire the agent. The latter one implies that rewards create a total loss of welfare.
Finally, I demonstrate that it may be in the principal’s interest to create
2A key assumption in this result is that evidence from collusion lasts for one period, such
that a deviant can not be punished from colluding in past periods. This is a usual assumption
in models of collusion.
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a reward-program private to the firm, regardless of the existence of a (public)
whistle-blower program. A program of this type arises when crime is highly
detrimental to the principal and, if there exists a whistle-blower program, when
also the public reward is not high enough to deter crime as much as the principal
would like. Moreover, I demonstrate that the use of a private reward-program
implies maximum deterrence. This result suggests the implementation of public
whistle-blower programs to prosecute crimes that work in favor of the interest
of firm owners (e.g., tax-frauds, collusion, environmental crimes, etc.).
5
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Chapter 2
What if cartel fines are not
high enough? Implications
on deterrence and
productive efficiency
2.1 Introduction
To succeed, cartels concentrate on two targets: profit maximization and con-
cealment. To achieve these, cartel firms devote resources to productive efficiency
and to concealment. When resources are limited, firms face the challenge to al-
locate them optimally, sacrificing productive efficiency in favor of concealment,
or vice versa. In this decision, the antitrust policy has a key role, as it affects
the expected detection costs, and through it, the relative importance of the tar-
gets. In this context, very large fines achieve full deterrence and, therefore, also
productive efficiency. But, what if fines are not high enough? How do low and
7
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moderate fines distort cartel firms’ effort allocation? What are the implications
on deterrence and on firms’ productive efficiency? And on social welfare? This
paper sheds light to these questions.
I develop a model in which cartel firms devote effort to productive activities
and to concealment: effort devoted to production reduces marginal costs and ef-
fort devoted to concealment reduces the probability of detection. Effort is costly
and limited, thus firms have to decide on how to allocate it among productive
efficiency and concealment. The intuition goes as follows: cartel survival de-
pends on the success of each of its member firms, not only as firms that collude
in a cartelized market, but also as firms that individually operate in complex
markets. Thus, in a cartel, senior executives have to be cautious on how to al-
locate their time, effort and attention among the own productive efficiency and
the cartel organization, in order to guarantee a balanced success on both.1 For
simplicity purposes, among the activities related to the cartel organization, I fo-
cus on concealment activities. These include the attendance to secret meetings
all over the world and the conduct of a joint sales agency, among other activ-
ities.2 For further simplification, I reduce the three dimensions of care (effort,
time and attention) to one: effort.
In this setup, cartel firms’ effort allocation depends on fines and inspec-
tions. When fines are low and/or the probability of inspection is low, firms find
it profitable to allocate all effort to productive efficiency. However, as fines or
inspections go up, firms substitute effort from productive efficiency to conceal-
ment. This reallocation of effort makes collusion sustainable in industries where
1Aware of how time and effort-consuming are cartel activities (not only concealment),
cartel members create complex hierarchical structures that set the role of each member in
the cartel, as well as the rules to follow in case of eventual problems. In this way, the
cartel is intended to be conducted as efficiently as a legal organization. For evidence on the
hierarchical operativeness of cartels, see Baker & Faulkner (1993), Griffin (2000), Levenstein
& Suslow (2006) and Harrington (2006).
2Using data from 19 discovered cartels, Levenstein & Suslow (2006) show that cartels
that used joint sales agencies were among the more successful cartels in terms of their long-
lastingness and fewer coordination problems. They find evidence on the use of a joint sales
agency to conceal cartel practices in the following cartels: bromine (1885-1895), cement (1922-
1962), diamonds (1870s-1970s), ocean shipping (1870-1924), oil (1871-1874), potash (1877-
1897), and European steel (1926-1939).
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it wouldn’t be otherwise and create inefficiencies not considered in standard
models of collusion. In the light of these results, a fine increase can have two
opposite effects on welfare, while it can improve welfare through fewer cartels,
it can also reduce it through more inefficient surviving ones. Particularly, for
intermediate fine levels, a fine increase implies a welfare gain from fewer cartels
that does not compensate the welfare loss from more inefficient surviving ones.
This analysis suggests a carefully design for the antitrust policy, as deterrence
is not monotonic in the level of the fine. Indeed, a fine increase may enhance
collusion sustainability and a welfare loss rather than deterrence if inspections
are not set accordingly.
In the analysis I also consider the effectiveness of leniency programs. These
programs reduce sanctions against the cartel firm that reports evidence of the
cartel to the antitrust authority (AA) and cooperates with it along the prose-
cution phase.3 The effectiveness of these programs to improve deterrence lies
in enhancing the temptation to deviate. In terms of my model, the prospect of
an amnesty enhances deviation incentives more than in models without effort
on concealment, as the firm that deviates saves effort costs associated to con-
cealment (a deviant that applies for leniency has no incentives to devote costly
effort to concealment).
The paper continues as follows. In Section 2, I provide a brief description
of the related literature. In Section 3, I set up the model. In section 4, I solve it
without effort on concealment (benchmark case), and in Section 5, I solve it with
effort on concealment. In Section 6, I discuss the implications of a fine increase
on deterrence and on firms’ productive efficiency. In Section 7, I analyze the
welfare implications of using leniency programs. I conclude in Section 8.
3Spagnolo (2008) provides an extensive review of literature on leniency in collusion.
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2.2 Related Literature
This paper is closely related to studies on collusion that analyze productive inef-
ficiencies created by antitrust policies. Aubert, Kovacic & Rey (2006) show that
whistle-blowing programs improve the deterrence effect of high fines, but that,
however, may induce (i) cartel firms to bribe informed employees and hold their
under-performance to avoid possible crime reports, and (ii) non-cartelized firms
to deter good cooperation between them when this can not be distinguished
from the type of communication involved in price-fixing agreements. There-
fore, although these programs can improve deterrence, they can also reduce the
productive efficiency of surviving cartels and of non-cartelized firms.
Within a principal-agent model, Aubert (2009) achieves this result for indi-
vidual leniency programs. Under the assumption that competition requires less
managerial effort than collusion, and this, in turn, less than deviation, a man-
ager that privately chooses market conduct and productivity-enhancing effort
may opt for an anti-competitive conduct to save costly effort. With the same
logic, a manager that colludes is highly tempted to deviate from the collusive
agreement. Thus, to avoid cartelization or, under collusion, to prevent devi-
ation, shareholders provide the manager with weak incentives to exert effort.
In this context, individual leniency raises the costs of inducing collusion; but
also makes it more likely the payment of informational rents and the request
of inefficient effort levels when it is desired to induce competition. Therefore,
while individual leniency contributes to deterrence, it also tempts competition-
prone shareholders to induce collusion rather than competition. Regardless of
the market conduct, productive efficiency is not achieved.
Similar to Aubert (2009), I also get into the firm’s ‘black-box’ to analyze
how the antitrust policy distorts the decision problem of those who decide on
the behavior of the firm. However, the mechanism in this paper is different to
that in Aubert. While Aubert focuses the analysis on how the antitrust policy
10
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can distort the agency problem of a principal and its subordinate, I focus the
analysis on how the antitrust policy can distort firms’ interest in productive
efficiency with respect to that in concealment.
A key element in my framework is the possibility of destroying evidence of
collusion. Aubert et al. (2006) suggest that firms keep evidence of the cartel
if they fear that rivals will apply for leniency. Jellal & Souam (2004) point to
firms’ interest in keeping evidence taking into consideration that concealment is
costly and negatively related to the inspector’s performance. The higher the cost
of effort devoted to concealment or the lower the inspector’s effort devoted to
discovering evidence, the more the evidence that firms prefer to keep. Following
Jellal et al. (2004), I consider costly concealment as the driving force behind
the keeping of evidence of the cartel. However, I assume that concealment
can create productive inefficiencies by making use of effort previously devoted
to production. This trade-off explains why firms keep cartel evidence in the
absence of leniency programs or under-performance of the inspectors.
Other key element in my framework is the endogeneity of the probability of
detection. Jellal et al. (2004) consider the probability of detection endogenous
to the firms’ and the inspector’s efforts devoted to hide and discover collusion,
respectively. Harrington (2004 and 2005) considers the probability of detec-
tion endogenous to current and previous periods’ prices, since he assumes that
anomalous price movement make customers and the AA suspicious that a car-
tel is operating. Harrington & Chen (2005) extends these works to leniency
programs. Similar to the probability of detection, the probability of paying
penalties is endogenous to the cartel firms’ perception regarding the severity of
the antitrust policy, Harrington & Chang (2009), and on the AA’s resources
devoted to prosecute and convict discovered cartels, Harrington (2011).
This paper is in line with those that consider the probability of detection
(penalty) endogeneous to the firm’s, not the AA’s, behavior. The novelty of
my work lies in the productive inefficiencies associated to concealment and,
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ultimately, to the antitrust policy. The reason is that allocating effort to con-
cealment implies effort to be devoted away from productive activities, being
effort devoted to concealment increasing in the severity of the antitrust policy.
This paper is also related to the literature on the impact of leniency pro-
grams in antitrust enforcement. Two main results stand out in this literature.
First, high amnesties, and particularly total amnesty, improve deterrence by
making self-reporting attractive and, therefore, inducing cartel members to de-
fect and report, Motta & Polo (2003), Aubert et al. (2006), Chen & Rey (2007),
Harrington (2008), among others. Second, low and intermediate amnesties may
have a perverse effect on deterrence: when self-reporting becomes attractive,
the threat of self-reporting to punish an agent that did not behave as agreed
upon by the cartel may also become credible, and can be used by smart wrong-
doers to enforce cartels that would not be sustainable in the absence of this
threat, Spagnolo (2000), Buccirossi & Spagnolo (2001 and 2006). Regarding
leniency, my paper has a very specific objective: whether a generally accepted
leniency program distorts cartel firms’ effort allocation, and if so, what implica-
tion does it have on firms’ productive efficiency. To the best of my knowledge,
this question has not been explored in the literature before.4
Finally, this paper also addresses the issue of antitrust policies with perverse
effects, i.e., antitrust policies that contribute to cartel sustainability rather than
to deterrence. Spagnolo (2000) and Buccirossi & Spagnolo (2001 and 2006) em-
phasis the perverse effect of leniency programs in deterrence. Harrington (2004,
2005) shows how a fine increase can (negatively) affect profits from deviation
more than the net value of future profits from collusion, facilitating collusion
(i.e., relaxing the incentive compatibility constraint of the cartel). Similarly, I
show perverse effects from an antitrust policy that distorts profits from deviation
more than those from collusion, facilitating collusion.
4For a generally accepted leniency program I consider a program that offers amnesty to
the first informant firm for its full collaboration in the detection of the cartel.
12
ESSAYS ON CARTEL BEHAVIOR AND DETERRENCE POLICY
2.3 The Model
Consider an economy with a continuum of industries. In each industry, there
are two firms producing perfect substitutes and there is an inelastic demand
for two units with reservation price v. I assume v ∼ U [v, v]. Firms maximize
profits over an infinite time horizon with constant discount parameter δ. To this
end, they compete or collude on prices.
To produce, firms have a fixed marginal cost β, which can be privately
reduced for the current period through effort devoted to productive efficiency
ai ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. Then, the firm’s marginal cost is ci = β − ai.
The market demand goes to the lowest priced firm or, in case of a price
tie, to the firm with the lowest production cost. Under a price tie and equal
production costs, firms equally split demand.
Collusion requires communication, which constitutes hard evidence for car-
tel detection. Evidence lasts for one period and can be discovered by the AA
during an inspection. However, firms can privately destroy some of evidence
through costly effort and, consequently, reduce the likelihood of finding evi-
dence in an inspection.
To model this, I set the probability of finding cartel evidence in an in-
spection to firm i: e−zi , i = 0, 1, where zi ≥ 0 is firm i’s effort devoted to
concealment. The higher is this effort, the lower is the probability of finding
cartel evidence in an inspection to a firm.
Effort is costly. I set the firm’s effort disutility function as (ai+zi)
2
2 . This
specification for the disutility of effort follows Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991) and
is common in multitask analyses. It is consistent with the view that efforts are
technological substitutes and that disutility depends on total effort (not on the
firm’s effort allocation).5
5For the effort allocation to be also relevant, one can introduce a weighting parameter
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To fight cartels, the AA has two instruments, fines and inspections. Both
instruments are specific to firms, which implies: (i) in a single period, the AA
can inspect either firm i, or firm j, or both firms, and (ii) under detection, each
firm pays a fine F .
I assume that the probability of an inspection to a firm, denoted by ρ ∈
[0, 1], is exogenously given. Hence, the cartel probability of detection is:
h (z1, z2 | ρ) = ρ
(
e−z1 + e−z2
)− ρ2e−z1e−z2
There is cartel detection if the AA finds evidence after inspecting one, or both,
of the firms.
Note that each firm’s effort devoted to concealment creates a positive ex-
ternality to rivals by reducing the cartel probability of detection. The lower is
zi, the higher is the externality that firm i perceives from and additional unit
of zj (
∂2h
∂zi∂zj
< 0).
The timing of the game is as follows. At stage 0, firms choose whether to
collude or compete. If one firm chooses to compete, competition takes place
and the game ends. If, instead, there is an agreement on collusion, at stage
1, firms decide whether to follow the collusive agreement or to deviate. Under
deviation, the deviant either slightly reduces its price, or increases its effort
devoted to productive efficiency, or both. In this way, it gets all demand.
At stage 2, effort, production and price decisions are executed and the
rival’s price is observed. Also, inspections take place. At stage 3, firms get
their payoffs from sales. Under cartel detection, firms pay a fine F and the
game starts again from stage 0. If the cartel is not detected, but one firm has
deviated, a punishment phase takes place. Finally, if none of the firms have
deviated and the cartel is not detected, the game repeats itself from stage 1.
In this setup, firms make simultaneous pricing and effort decisions in every
µ ∈ <+0 such that (ai+µzi)
2
2
. The assumption of µ = 1 affects the degree of substitution
between efforts, but in no case restricts the results of the paper.
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Figure 2.1: Time-structure of the model
period t. With an infinite horizon, firm i, i = 1, 2, chooses prices pit ∈ [0, v]
and efforts ai, z1 ∈ [0, 1] (effort zi is relevant only under deviation), in every t,
t = 1, 2, ...,∞.
Under collusion, price choices at date t depend on the history of previous
sales, so that pit depends on Hit = ( qi1 ; qi2 ; . . . ; qi,t−1 ), i = 1, 2. The
rational behind this rule goes as follows: under collusion firms charge the same
price and split the demand in halves, qi = 1, i = 1, 2; thus, for a firm, no sales
implies that the rival deviated (in price, in effort or in both). Therefore, the
collusive strategy for firm i is to initially price at the collusive price pc in period
1 and to continue pricing according to:
pit = p
c if : qτi = 1 ∀τ ∈ {1, ....., t− 1} , j = {1, 2}
as long no firm has deviated from this path. If a firm has deviated, there is a
reversion to the single-period Nash equilibrium strategy of pricing, since Nash
reversion can assure zero profits for the deviant.
In the one-shot game, firms choose price and effort devoted to productive
efficiency to maximize current profits:
Πi = [pi − (β − ai)] qi − a
2
i
2
Proposition 1 There exists a one-shot game Nash equilibrium in which one
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firm obtains zero profits.
In the one-shot game there is a pure strategy equilibrium in weakly domi-
nated strategies that yields zero profits for both firms. Also, there are undomi-
nated mixed-strategy equilibria that yield zero profits for one firm and positive
profits for the other. Since at the static Nash equilibrium there is at least one
firm that obtains zero profits, Nash reversion in which the deviant obtains zero
profits constitutes an optimal penal code.
2.4 Collusion without Effort on Concealment
Without effort on concealment, the probability of finding cartel evidence in
an inspection to a firm is 1. Therefore, the cartel probability of detection is
exogenously determined as a function of ρ: hB = 2ρ− ρ2.
The firm’s problem is to chose price and effort to maximize:
Πi = [pi − (β − ai)] qi − a
2
i
2
− Fρ (2− ρ)
The first term is the firm’s payoff from production and the second and third
ones its costs associated to effort and to detection, respectively.
Solving for effort: ai = qi, i = 1, 2.
Regarding price, under collusion firms charge the same price and split the
demand in halves: pi = p
c and qci = 1, i = 1, 2. Thus, in each period, firms
make one unit of effort (aci = 1) and obtain profits:
Πci = p
c − β + 1
2
− Fρ (2− ρ)
If a firm decides to deviate, it either slightly reduces its price, or increases
its effort devoted to productive efficiency (to reduce marginal costs), or both.
In this way, it gets all demand. A price reduction does not have side effects on
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firm’s efficiency, however the increase of effort on productive efficiency does it.
Thus, to maximize profits, a deviant always reduce its price slightly and chooses
the effort level ad that maximizes the current value of profits from deviation.
Assuming firm i deviates:6
adi = arg max
{
2 [ pc − (β − ai) ]− a
2
i
2
− Fρ (2− ρ)
}
= 2
Under deviation, the firm behaves as an efficient monopolist: it devotes two
units of effort to produce the two units of the good that the market demands.
Profits from deviation are:
Πdi = 2 (p
c − β) + 2− Fρ (2− ρ)
in the current period, and zero thereafter.
2.4.1 Cartel’s Sustainability
Collusion is sustainable as long as firms have no incentives to deviate, i.e., when
the current gains from deviation (G) are no greater than the present value of
net future profits from collusion.
(ICC) G = Πd −Πc ≤ δ
1− δ Π
c (2.1)
In this model:
pc − β + 3
2
≤ δ
1− δ
[
pc − β + 1
2
− Fρ (2− ρ)
]
For δ > 12 , a price increase relaxes ICC, which implies that firms always
charge the reservation price under collusion, pc = v. Prices lower than v, make
collusion harder to sustain, and prices higher than v would imply no sales. So,
collusion is sustainable if and only if it is sustainable at price v. Along the paper
I assume δ > 12 .
7
6Since the optimal penal code yields zero profits for the deviant forever after deviation,
the current value of total profits from deviation equates current profits from deviation: pidi +
δ 0 + δ2 0 + δ3 0 + . . . = pidi .
7Otherwise, collusion is not profitable. δ > 1
2
is the standard level of patient assumed in
models of collusion.
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Solving for v in ICC:
v ≥ v1 = β +
3
2 − 2δ + δρ (2− ρ)F
(2δ − 1)
Proposition 2 (Without effort on concealment) There exists v1 ∈ [v, v] such
that collusion is sustainable in all industries with high enough reservation price,
v ≥ v1. v1 is increasing in F and ρ.
From the AA’s point of view, v1 states the effectiveness of the antitrust pol-
icy to deter cartels: an increase in fine and/or in the likelihood of an inspection
raises the threshold parameter v1, making collusion harder to sustain.
2.5 Collusion with Effort on Concealment
Allowing for effort on concealment, the firm’s problem is to choose price and
effort levels that maximize:
Πi = [pi − (β − ai)] qi − (ai + zi)
2
2
− F ρ [(e−zi + e−zj)− ρe−zi−zj ]
Solving for efforts, the interior solution is:
ai + zi = qi (2.2)
qi = Fρe
−zi (1− ρe−zj) (2.3)
Equations (2.2) and (2.3) characterize firm’s optimal behavior under both
collusion and deviation. Equation (2.2) states that, for the same level of produc-
tion, an increase in effort devoted to productive efficiency must be compensated
with an equal reduction in effort devoted to concealment. Equation (2.3) states
that zi’s marginal benefits to i’s profits (LHS) must equate its marginal costs
(RHS).
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Rewriting (2.3):
Ri(zj) = − ln
[
qi
Fρ (1− ρe−zj )
]
(2.4)
Equation (2.4) is an effort reaction curve. It represents each firm’s effort
devoted to concealment in terms of the rival’s effort devoted to concealment.8
Particularly, the higher is the rival’s effort devoted to concealment, the higher is
the own effort devoted to this activity too. To see this, assume that j increases its
effort on concealment. Immediately, the cartel probability of detection decreases
distorting i’s equilibrium condition: now, i’s marginal utility from effort devoted
to concealment is lower than its marginal cost. To restore equilibrium, i increases
its effort devoted to concealment, too.9
Regarding antitrust parameters, Ri(zj) is upward sloping in F and in ρ: the
more severe is the antitrust policy, the more incentivized is the firm to conceal
evidence, and thus the higher is the firm’s effort devoted to this activity. Re-
garding firm’s market share, Ri(zj) is downward sloping in qi: the higher is the
level of production, the lower is the firms’s willingness to devote effort to con-
cealment, as higher market shares makes concealment relatively less important
with respect to productive efficiency.
Under collusion, firms charge the same price and split demand in halves.
Setting qci = 1 in equations (2.2) and (2.4), reaction curves R1(z2) and R2(z1)
have a unique intersection point, that is on 45◦ line. Therefore, there exists a
8Using equation (2.2), one can rewrite equation (2.4) in terms of efforts devoted to pro-
ductive efficiency.
9Analytically, for the same level of production (dqi = 0), an increase in zj (dzj > 0)
implies:
dqi = −Fρe−zi
[(
1− ρe−zj ) dzi + ρ d (e−zj )] = 0
where d
(
e−zj
)
< 0. Solving for dzi:
dzi = −
ρ d
(
e−zj
)
1− ρe−zj > 0
19
Mar´ıa C. Avramovich
unique interior solution:
zci = 1− aci = − ln
[
F −√F 2 − 4F
2Fρ
]
(2.5)
To assure a solution in the set of rational numbers, I assume F > F = 4.
This assumption is purely numerical and does not restrict the results of the
paper.
Lemma 1 Under collusion, aci + z
c
i = 1, and there exist F0 and F1, where
F0 < F1, such that: for F < F0, all effort is allocated to productive efficiency
(aci = 1), and for F > F1, all effort is allocated to concealment (z
c
i = 1). For
F ∈ (F0, F1), effort is allocated partially to each activity as determined by (2.5),
thus aci , z
c
i ∈ (0, 1).
For F < F0, productive efficiency is the relatively more important activ-
ity, thus firms allocate all effort to it. However, as fines go up, the relative
importance of concealment increases, such that for F ∈ (F0, F1) firms find it
profitable to allocate effort among both productive efficiency and concealment:
the higher the fine and/or the probability of inspection, the more biased the
firms’ effort allocation towards concealment. Finally, for F > F1, concealment
is the relatively more important activity, and thus firms allocate all effort to it.
The critical fine value F0 is downward sloping in ρ: the higher is this
probability, the higher is the relative importance of concealment with respect to
productive efficiency, and therefore the lower is the critical fine value at which
firms find it profitable to devote effort to concealment.10
If firm i decides to deviate, it slightly reduces its price to get all demand
(qi = 2), and redetermines effort allocation considering that its rival follows the
10Actually, both of the critical fine values, F0 and F1, are downward sloping in ρ:
F0 =

1
ρ(1−ρ) if ρ ≤ 12
4 if ρ > 1
2
F1 =
1
ρe−1 (1− ρe−1)
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collusive agreement (qj = 0).
11 Setting qi = 2 in equations (2.2) and (2.4),
Lemma 2 follows immediately:
Lemma 2 (Assume firm i deviates) Under deviation adi + z
d
i = 2, and there
exist F d0 and F
d
1 , where F0 < F
d
0 < F1 < F
d
1 , such that: for F < F
d
0 , firm
i allocates all effort to productive efficiency (adi = 2), and for F > F
d
1 , to
concealment (zdi = 2). For F ∈
(
F d0 , F
d
1
)
, it allocates effort partially to each
activity as determined by Ri(z
c
j | qi = 2), thus adi , zdi ∈ (0, 2).
Critical fine values F d0 and F
d
1 are downward sloping in ρ.
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From Lemmas 1 and 2 we observe that firms allocate effort similarly under
collusion and deviation: for low values of the fine, all effort is allocated to
productive efficiency; but, as fines go up effort is reallocated from productive
efficiency to concealment.
However, the critical fine value at which the firm finds it profitable to
devote effort to concealment is higher under deviation, F0 < F
d
0 . The reason is
that under deviation, more units of the good are produced. Therefore, for F ∈(
F0, F
d
0
)
while the firm that follows the collusive agreement finds it profitable
to devote effort to concealment, the firm that deviates does not. Similarly,
for F ∈ (F1, F d1 ), the firm that follows the collusive agreement devotes all
the effort to concealment, whereas the deviating firm does not. In this case,
further reductions in the cartel probability of detection depend exclusively on
the deviant. (Figure 2.2).
Two final comments are in order. First, for Fˆ = 2e−1ρ(1−e−1ρ) ∈
(
F1, F
d
1
)
,
efforts devoted to concealment under collusion and deviation are equal, zdi =
11As discussed in the benchmark case, firm i can deviate with a slight reduction in its price,
an increase in its effort on productive efficiency, or both. In this way, it gets all demand.
However, while a price reduction does not alter i’s productive efficiency, an increase of effort
on productive efficiency does it. Thus, to maximize profits from deviation, the firm always
reduces its price. Whether it also increases its effort devoted to productive efficiency depends
on the antitrust parameters ρ and F (Lemma 2).
12 F d0 =
4
ρ(2−ρ) and F
d
1 =
4
ρe−2(2−ρe−2) .
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Figure 2.2: Firm’s effort allocation under collusion (ac, zc) and under deviation
(ad, zd) in terms of F , for ρ < 1/2. Effort devoted to productive efficiency in dashed
lines and effort devoted to concealment in solid lines.
zcj = 1. Hence, the corresponding probabilities of cartel detection are equal as
well, hd = hc. For F < Fˆ , there is more effort devoted to concealment under
collusion, and for F < Fˆ , under deviation. Thus:
Corollary 1 There exists Fˆ ∈ (F1, F d1 ) such that: zdi > zcj if and only if F > Fˆ .
Hence, for F > Fˆ , the cartel probability of detection following a deviation is
lower as compared to when no deviation has taken place. Otherwise, the opposite
holds.
The second comment refers to firm’s productive efficiency under collusion
and under deviation. Firm’s relative productive efficiency following a deviation
is higher as compared to when no deviation has taken place. To see this, define
the ratio of effort devoted to productive efficiency over effort devoted to con-
cealment: rc =
aci
zci
, under collusion, and rd =
adi
zdi
, under deviation. These ratios
lie in <+0 and are decreasing and convex in F . Then, the higher the fine, the
more biased the firm’s effort allocation towards concealment. But, they are not
equal: rd ≥ rc, as under deviation more units of the good are produced and,
thus, each unit of effort devoted to productive efficiency is more valued then
that under collusion. Thus, the deviant’s relative productive efficiency is higher
than (or equal to) that of the firm that follows the collusive agreement. (Figure
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rc
rdr = a/z
F0
Figure 2.3: Firm’s ratio of effort devoted to productive efficiency over effort devoted to
concealment, in terms of F . rc and rd denote the ratio under collusion and deviation,
respectively.
2.3)
2.5.1 Cartel’s Sustainability
Effort on concealment does not affect the previous result that states that col-
lusion is sustainable if and only if it is sustainable at the reservation price,
pc = v.13 However, it affects the result that an increase in F or ρ always
improves deterrence. To see this, recall ICC:
G ≤ δ
1− δΠ
c
For the benchmark case (without effort on concealment), an increase in F or ρ
reduces firm’s profits through higher expected detection costs. This profit loss is
independent of whether the firm colludes or deviates, as the cartel probability of
detection is exogenous to the firm’s effort allocation. Therefore, whereas a more
severe antitrust policy reduces the RHS of ICC, it does not affect the LHS. As a
direct consequence, the more severe the antitrust policy, the fewer the number
of cartels.
13Since the collusive price does not depend on firms’ effort allocation, whether firms devote
effort on concealment (and how much effort they devote to it) does not distort the previous
result that a price increase relaxes ICC.
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Allowing for effort on concealment, an increase in F or ρ affects firm’s profits
in two ways: directly through higher expected detection costs, and indirectly
through a distortion in the effort allocation. The magnitude of these two effects
depends on whether the firm colludes or deviates (Lemmas 1 and 2). Thus,
in this context, both the profits from collusion and the gains from deviation
depend on F and ρ. Whether a more severe antitrust policy improves deterrence
depends on how it distorts the gains from deviation (in sign and magnitude) in
comparison to how it distorts the expected profits from collusion.
In what follows, I analyze in detail the endogenous nature of the gains
from deviation with respect to fines. On the basis of this analysis, the global
implications of a fine increase on deterrence follow immediately.
Endogenous gains from deviation: assume firm i deviates. A fine
increase distorts i’s gains from deviation as follows:
∂G
∂F
=
(
hc − hd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct Effect
+
(
2
∂adi
∂F
− F ∂h
d
∂F
)
−
(
∂acj
∂F
− F ∂h
c
∂F
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Effect
(2.6)
Equivalently:
∂G
∂F
=
(
hc − hd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct Effect
+ F
∂zcj
∂F
(
∂hc
∂zcj
− ∂h
d
∂zcj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Effect
(2.7)
The direct effect measures the effect of a fine increase on G from different
probabilities of cartel detection under collusion and deviation. For F < F0,
this effect is zero: when fines are low, all effort is devoted to productive effi-
ciency under both collusion and deviation; thus hc = hd = hB = 2ρ − ρ2. For
F ∈
(
F0, Fˆ
)
, this effect is negative because there is more effort devoted to con-
cealment under collusion and, consequently, the cartel probability of detection
is lower then, hc < hd. However this argument is reversed for F > Fˆ , and the
direct effect is positive, hc > hd.
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The indirect effect measures the effect of a fine increase on G from different
reallocations of effort under collusion and under deviation. This is clearly stated
in (2.6): following a fine increase, firms may find it convenient to reallocate effort
from productive efficiency to concealment; this effort reallocation depends on
whether the firm colludes or deviates (Lemmas 1 and 2).
Taking into account forthcoming discussions in this paper, I find it more
appropriate to analyze the indirect effect as stated in equation (2.7). The key el-
ement behind this formulation is that each firm determines its own, but not the
rival’s, effort allocation. This implies that, following a fine increase, each firm
reallocates effort from productive efficiency to concealment so as to equate the
(own) profit losses from a lower productive efficiency to the (own) profit gains
from a lower probability of detection, given a rival that follows the collusive
agreement. This effort reallocation has zero algebraical counterpart in profits
(thus does not appear in (2.7) ). Yet, firms’ profits alter as the rival’s reallo-
cation of effort creates externalities. This is what (2.7) demonstrates.14 Note
that under both collusion and deviation, the ‘rival firm’ follows the collusive
agreement, thus the indirect effect highly depends on
∂zcj
∂F .
For F < F0, the firm that follows the collusive agreement finds fines too low
to worry about. Thus, the indirect effect is zero. For F > F1 the indirect effect
is zero too, but for a different reason: for F > F1, fines are so high that the firm
14Technically, since: (i) ∂ai
∂F
= − ∂zi
∂F
, and (ii) ∂h
∂F
= ∂h
∂zi
∂zi
∂F
+ ∂h
∂zj
∂zj
∂F
, the indirect effect
associated to deviation in (2.6) is:
2
∂adi
∂F
− F ∂h
d
∂F
= −∂z
d
i
∂F
(
2 + F
∂hd
∂zdi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
−F ∂h
d
∂zcj
∂zcj
∂F
= −F ∂h
d
∂zcj
∂zcj
∂F
In the RHS, the first term is zero, as in brackets there is the equilibrium condition (2.3). The
second term is the change in profits that the deviant obtains from a change in the rival’s effort
allocation.
One can obtain the indirect effect associated to collusion analogously. In this way, the
indirect effect can be written as:
F
∂zcj
∂F
(
∂hc
∂zcj
− ∂h
d
∂zcj
)
which is what equation (2.7) states.
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has already allocated all its effort to concealment. What if F ∈ (F0, F1)? For
intermediate fine values, a fine increase induces the firm to reallocate effort from
productive efficiency to concealment,
∂zcj
∂F > 0. As a whole, the indirect effect is
negative, as ∂h∂zi is downward sloping in the total effort devoted to concealment,
which is higher under collusion
(
∂hd
∂zdi
> ∂h
c
∂zci
)
,
Lemma 3 With effort on concealment:
(i) for F < F0, the gains from deviation are independent of F , and are equal
to those for the benchmark case, and
(ii) for F > F0, the gains from deviation are U-shaped in F , with a minimum
at Fˆ .
One final comment related to the negative slope of G with respect to F :
for F ∈ (F0, F d0 ), a fine increase induces both firms to reallocate effort under
collusion, whereas under deviation only one firm is induced (the one that follows
the collusive agreement). Therefore, the negative effect of a fine increase on
profits is less mitigated under deviation. In other words, a fine increase reduces
more profits from deviation. This effect gets stronger as ρ increases, i.e., the
higher the ρ, the higher the expected detection costs perceived by the deviant.
Corollary 2 For F ∈ (F0, F d0 ), the higher the ρ, the higher the reduction in G
that follows from a fine increase.
Solving for v in ICC, and given Lemma 3 and Corollary 2:
Proposition 3 (With effort on concealment) There exist v2 ∈ [v, v], ρˆ ∈ [0, 1]
and F˜ ∈
(
F0, Fˆ
)
, such that collusion is sustainable in all industries with v > v2,
and:
(i) for ρ < ρˆ, v2 is upward sloping in F , thus a fine increase improves deter-
rence.
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G
G
0 F0 F^F1 F Fd1Fd0
Figure 2.4: With effort on concealment, for F > F0, the gains from deviation are
U-shaped in F , with a minimum at Fˆ .
(ii) for ρ > ρˆ, v2 inherits the U-shaped form of G with respect to F : for
F /∈
(
F0, F˜
)
, v2 is upward sloping in F , and a fine increase improves
deterrence. Otherwise, v2 is downward sloping in F , and a fine increase
facilitates collusion.
Briefly, points (i) and (ii) in Proposition 3 summarize the following: for F <
F0, a fine increase reduces the present value of net future profits from collusion,
leaving the gains from deviation unaffected. Therefore, a fine increase improves
deterrence unambiguously. For F ∈
(
F0, Fˆ
)
, a fine increase reduces the present
value of net future profits from collusion and the gains from deviation. For ρ > ρˆ
the reduction in the gains from deviation is high, and in particular, higher than
observed for the present value of net future profits from collusion. Thus, a fine
increase facilitates collusion. The opposite holds for ρ < ρˆ, where the reduction
in the gains from deviation is little relatively to that in the present value of
net future profits from collusion. Thus, a fine increase improves deterrence.
Finally, for F > Fˆ , a fine increase reduces the present value of net future profits
from collusion and increases the gains from deviation. Both effects improve
deterrence.
Let me stress the perverse effects that Proposition 3 states for intermediate
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v
v1
v2 (ρ < ρ)^
0 F0 F
v2 (ρ > ρ)^
F˜ F1
Figure 2.5: With effort on concealment, collusion is sustainable in all industries with
v > v2.
values of the fine: when the probability of inspection is high (ρ > ρˆ), the
threshold price v2 inherits the U-shaped form of G with respect to F . In this
case, the deviant is severely affected by a fine increase; so severely that collusion
is facilitated.
Finally, it is important to mention that the threshold price v2 lies below
that for the benchmark case, v2 ≤ v1. By a revealed preference argument, if it
were not the case, firms would not have chosen to devote effort to concealment
in the first place.
Corollary 3 For F = F0, v2 = v1, and for F > F0, v2 < v1.
2.6 Social Welfare
In this economy demand is perfectly inelastic, thus welfare depends exclusively
on whether production is efficient. In other words, collusion creates an efficiency
loss if and only if the good is inefficiently produced as compared to when com-
petition takes place. Under competition only one firm serves demand, devoting
as much effort to productive efficiency as output produced (the rival does not
produce, neither devotes effort to production). Thus, production is efficient if
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production is efficiently allocated among firms (i.e., if only one firm serves de-
mand)15 and if each firm is technologically efficient (i.e., if each firm devotes
to productive efficiency as much effort as output privately produced). Under
collusion, the former condition never holds, as both firms produce. Whether
the latter holds depends on the antitrust policy: when fines are low, firms are
technologically efficient, but as fines go up, their productive efficiency goes down.
In this setup, a fine increase can have two welfare effects. On the one side,
it can increase welfare through fewer cartels. But, on the other side, it can
reduce welfare through more inefficient surviving ones.
Let W ∗ and W c denote the social welfare in an industry under competition
and under collusion, respectively. Industries are uniformly distributed in [v , v],
thus total welfare in this economy is:
W =
∫ v2
v
W ∗
v
(v − v) dv +
∫ v
v2
W c
v
(v − v) dv
Within industries, social welfare is the sum of the consumer surplus (CS)
and the producer surplus (Π = Π1 + Π2). Under collusion: W
c = Πc + R, as
the consumer surplus is equal to the expected revenues from fines (CSc = R).
Under competition: W ∗ = CS∗, as firms’ profits are zero.16 Therefore:
W =
∫ v2
v
CS∗
v
(v − v) dv +
∫ v
v2
(Πc +R)
v
(v − v) dv
15Considering total profits, the net contribution of total effort devoted to productive effi-
ciency is higher when only one firm serves demand. To see this, assume F < F0. For low values
of the fine, total effort devoted to productive efficiency is 2 under both competition and collu-
sion, and there is no effort on concealment under collusion. However, while under competition
only one firm serves demand, under collusion demand is split in halves. In this context, under
competition, the contribution of effort to social welfare is 4 (ai = qi = 2 and aj = qj = 0,
i 6= j ⇒ aiqi + ajqj = 2× 2 = 4). Under collusion, instead, the contribution of effort to social
welfare is 2 (aci = q
c
i = 1, i = 1, 2 ⇒ 2(aci qci ) = 2). Regarding effort costs, under competition
these are 2
(
a2i
2
+
a2j
2
= 4
2
+ 0
2
= 2
)
, and under collusion 1
(
2
(aci )
2
2
= 2× 1
2
= 1
)
. Conse-
quently, the net contribution of total effort devoted to productive efficiency under competition
(2 = 4− 2) is higher than that under deviation (1 = 2− 1).
For higher levels of the fine, there is less effort devoted to productive efficiency under
collusion, and, thus, the inefficiencies associated to production under collusion are higher.
16In the analysis, I consider competitive profits from the one-shot Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies, which yields zero profits to each firm. Considering the equilibria in mixed-strategies
would imply positive profits for one firm and, thus, industry profits higher than zero. For social
welfare purposes, the distribution of profits between firms in an industry is irrelevant. For
details on the one-shot Nash equilibria, please see the Appendix.
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Taking partial derivative of W with respect to F :17
∂W
∂F
=
1
(v − v)
[
( CS∗ (v2)−Πc (v2)−R ) ∂v2
∂F
− 2 (v − v2) ∂z
c
i
∂F
]
(2.8)
Inside the brackets, the first term denotes the welfare gains/losses from a
change in the number of competitive industries. The sign of this term depends
on whether the fine increase improves deterrence or not (i.e., ∂v2∂F > 0). Indeed,
the term CS∗ (v2)−Πc (v2)−R is strictly positive, reflecting the inefficiencies
on production from an inefficient allocation of production under collusion (i.e.,
inefficiencies from two firms producing, instead of one). Thus, if there are fewer
cartels after a fine increase, there is a welfare gain. If, instead, there are more
cartels after a fine increase, there is a welfare loss.
The second term in brackets
(
2 (v − v2) ∂z
c
i
∂F
)
, represents the welfare losses
from less efficient cartels. Since higher fines can induce firms to reallocate effort
from productive efficiency to concealment, this term is non-negative.
Note that for F /∈ (F0, F1), the second term is zero, as a fine increase does
not distort the effort allocation under collusion (Lemma 1). Thus, a fine increase
improves total welfare if and only if it improves deterrence (i.e., iff the first term
in (2.8) is positive). This result is standard in models of collusion. However,
for F ∈ (F0, F1), the second term is negative, as higher fines induce colluding
firms to increase effort on concealment (Lemma 1). In this case, the final effect
of a fine increase on total welfare depends on the antitrust parameters F and ρ.
This result is a novelty in models of collusion.
Using our previous results described in Proposition 3 in equation (2.8),
Proposition 4 follows immediately:
Proposition 4 There exists ρˇ ∈ [0, ρˆ], such that
(i) for ρ < ρˇ, W is upward sloping in F , thus a fine increase improves total
17When taking the derivative, keep in mind that
∂(Πc+R)
∂F
= −2 ∂z
c
i
∂F
, and ∂CS
∗
∂F
= 0.
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welfare.
(ii) for ρ > ρˇ, W inherits the U-shaped form of v2 with respect to F : for
F /∈ (F0, F1), W is upward sloping in F , and a fine increase improves
total welfare. Otherwise, W is downward sloping in F , and a fine increase
reduces total welfare.
Proposition 4 reinforces the perverse effects of intermediate fine levels: when
fines are not high enough, a fine increase may be eventually detrimental for
social welfare despite its effectiveness in deterring cartels. The latter is the case
in which the welfare gains from fewer cartels are not high enough to compensate
society for the welfare losses associated to more inefficient surviving cartels. This
result strongly favors setting very large fines such that no cartel survives.
Note that this result is in line with standard literature on collusion, which
favors the use of very high fines to achieve deterrence: high fines achieve de-
terrence at a lower cost than many inspections. However, this paper suggests
something else: fines and inspections are not exchangeable instruments anymore.
Indeed, increasing one of these instruments may have negative consequences on
the other instrument’s impact on deterrence, firm’s productive efficiency and,
ultimately, social welfare. Thus, the general recommendation is that the an-
titrust policy should be carefully designed, pushing crime detection too much
with a single instrument may be detrimental for deterrence and social welfare.
2.7 Leniency Programs
Consider a leniency program that offers a fine amnesty to the first cartel firm to
come forward with hard evidence of the cartel. Denoting the amnesty parameter
by θ ∈ [0, 1], the fine amnesty is (1− θ)F .
Leniency applications are public, i.e., leniency reports are observed by ri-
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vals. This implies that the cartel breaks after a leniency application, and that,
therefore, there are no leniency applications under collusion. Indeed, a leniency
application is a betrayal to the collusive agreement, and the knowledge of a
rival’s leniency application leads to cartel breakdown, regardless of whether the
application finally ends in a sentence for collusion.
Thus, leniency applications only take place under deviation. For a deviant,
the introduction of a leniency program implies two strategies to choose from:
(a) deviation with report, and (b) deviation without report.
Without effort on concealment (benchmark case), this decision is simple:
a deviant applies for leniency if and only if the fine payed after reporting is
lower than the expected fine to be paid without it. In other words, there is a
leniency application if and only if the amnesty parameter θ is lower than the
cartel probability of detection: θ < θˆB = ρ (2− ρ).
With effort on concealment, a deviant that applies for leniency has no in-
centives to devote effort on concealment, as it will pay θF regardless of its effort
allocation. Thus, assuming firm i deviates, alternative (a) implies maximum
productive efficiency and deviation with report, which yields profits:18
Πli = 2 (v − β) + 2− θF
And alternative (b) implies an effort allocation as stated in Lemma 2 with-
out reporting. In this case, profits from deviation are:
Πdi = 2 (v − β) + 2 adi − 2− Fhd
18Applying for leniency, the problem of a deviant is:
max
ali
: Πi = 2 [v − (β − ai)]−
a2i
2
− θF
where ∂Πi
∂ai
= ai − 2. Thus:
(
ali, z
l
i
)
= (2, 0), and Πli = 2 (v − β) + 2− θF .
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There is a leniency application if Πli > Π
d
i . Equivalently:
19
θ < θˆ = hd +
2
(
2− adi
)
F
∈
[
0 , θˆB
]
Intuitively, if the deviant devotes effort to concealment, it is because such an
effort allocation allows it to achieve the highest expected profits. Hence, to
induce the deviant to collect cartel evidence and apply for leniency, the AA
should offer a fine amnesty that more than compensates the firm’s profit losses
associated to a different effort allocation.
Proposition 5 summarizes:
Proposition 5 There exist θˆB , θˆ ∈ (0, 1), where θˆ < θˆB, such that a leniency
program improves deterrence if and only if it sets an amnesty parameter:
(i) Without effort on concealment: θ < θˆB.
(ii) With effort on concealment: θ < θˆ.
Two comments to conclude. First, deterrence is maximized at θ = 0, re-
gardless of whether we allow for effort on concealment. Thus, the analysis
strongly favors full amnesties. Second, with effort on concealment, a successful
leniency program implies a welfare gain beyond deterrence, as reporting implies
full productive efficiency for the firm that deviates. This ‘efficiency’ gain from
leniency programs is a novelty in models of leniency in games of collusion.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper I develop a model in which cartel firms devote effort to productive
efficiency and to concealment: the former reduces marginal costs from produc-
tion and the latter reduces the probability of detection. Effort is costly and
19With a little bit of algebra, one can easily prove that θˆ is downward sloping in F and
θˆ ∈ ( ρ (e−2 + e−1 − ρe−3) , ρ (2− ρ) ).
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limited, thus firms have to decide on how to allocate it among productive effi-
ciency and concealment.
When fines are low, productive efficiency is relatively more important than
concealment, thus firms allocate all effort to productive efficiency. But, as fines
go up (or if inspections become more likely), the relative importance of conceal-
ment goes up, and firms find it profitable to reallocate effort from productive
efficiency to concealment. In this context, a fine increase can have two opposite
effects on welfare, while it can improve welfare through fewer cartels, it can also
reduce it through more inefficient surviving ones.
Two results stand out. First, firm’s possibility to reduce the likelihood of
cartel detection makes collusion sustainable in industries where it wouldn’t be
otherwise. This result is intuitive: concealment is costly, implying that if firms
devote effort to it, it must be because it facilitates collusion.
The second result states perverse effects from the antitrust policy: a fine
increase can reduce social welfare, by inducing surviving cartels to be highly
inefficient, or by facilitating collusion, or both. For the second effect, the trigger
element is that the effort allocation under deviation is biased towards productive
efficiency as compared to that under collusion (as in the former case there are
produced more units of the good). For low/intermediate fine values, this implies
that the cartel probability of detection is higher under deviation. In this context,
a fine increase may relatively affect the deviant so negatively that eventually it
induces cartel sustainability rather than deviation.
On the basis of these results, the analysis favors setting very high fines such
that no cartel survives. However, in practice this is not always credible or possi-
ble to implement. In this context, the main message from the paper is that the
antitrust policy has to be carefully designed, such that combining both instru-
ments, fines and inspections, conveniently: since deterrence is non-monotonic
in the level of any of these instruments individually considered, pushing crime
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detection too much with a single instrument can lead to undesirable outcomes.
This result leads to a number of interesting observations, some of which
may be lines for future work. For instance, what if fines are endogenous to
some measure of the crime damage (e.g., to the price mark-up achieved under
collusion)? This new element in the model may lead to imperfect collusion,
which would distort the relative importance of productive efficiency with re-
spect to concealment. In this context, it becomes crucial the analysis of the
implications of endogenous fines on the non-monotonicity observed between de-
terrence and fines, firms’ productive efficiency, and welfare. Other interesting
line for future work is related to the modeling assumption on inspections. In
this model, inspections are firm specific, but what if inspections are industry-
specific? Industry-specific inspections implies that each firm can not reduce
the probability of detection by itself. In this context, how does the critical
fine value at which firms find it convenient to substitute effort from production
to concealment change? We should expect this critical value to be greater, as
neither firm will devote effort to concealment without being sure that its rival
has strong incentives to do so as well. These types of questions lead one to
think about the importance of establishing the optimal detection policy under
different frameworks; a clear challenge for future work on the subject.
Finally, in Section 7 I show that leniency programs can improve welfare
beyond a deterrence improvement. Since leniency programs demand full collab-
oration from the reporting firm, a leniency application implies no effort on con-
cealment. Thus, by inducing reporting, leniency programs improve deterrence
and assure full productive efficiency from the deviant. This result is restricted to
the case where deviation takes place, but, nevertheless, is novel in the literature.
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Appendix
 Proposition 1: Equilibrium in pure strategies
Let’s first prove that there is no NE with ai = aj .
Assume pi < pj . Since i has the lowest price, it serves all demand. But,
this implies that one of the firms is not optimizing. Indeed, firm i serving
demand and both firms optimizing implies: ai = qi = 2 and aj = qj = 0, which
contradicts the initial statement.
Assume pi = pj = p, then firms split demand in halves, qi = qj = 1.
Optimization implies ai = aj = 1, and profits Πi = p − (β − 1) − 12 , i = 1, 2.
Assume firm i slightly reduces its price: it gets all demand, qi = 2, and makes
effort ai = 2. In this context, i’s profits are Πi = [pi − − (β − 2)] 2− 2,  > 0,
greater than before for low . As there is a profitable deviation to the candidate
outcome, this can not be a NE.
Hence, if there exists an equilibrium, it must be at ai 6= aj .
Let’s prove that there is no NE with ai 6= aj and pi 6= pj .
Assume pi < pj , then firm i serves all demand, qi = 2 and qj = 0. The
optimality condition implies ai = 2 and aj = 0. Notice that firm i can increase
profits with a slight increase in its price. In fact, i’s most profitable deviation is
to charge pi = pj . But, then, firm j would find it profitable to reduce its price
below pi. This process repeats itself anytime pi 6= pj . The outcome pi 6= pj
with ai 6= aj is not stable and, therefore, can not be a NE.
Let’s prove that there is no NE with ai 6= aj and pi = pj 6= p∗ = β − 1.
Assume pi = pj > p
∗ = β − 1 and ai < aj , then firm i serves all demand,
qi = 2 and qj = 0. The optimality condition implies ai = 2 and aj = 0. Since
i’s profits are positive for pi > p
∗ = β−1, nothing prevents j to reduce its price
and get all demand. But this is a contradiction with the initial statement of
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equal prices.
Assume pi = pj < p
∗ = β − 1 and ai > aj . Firm i obtains negative profits
for p < p∗ = β − 1, so it won’t charge a price below p∗. But, this contradicts
the initial statement.
Finally, let’s prove that ai 6= aj with pi = pj = p∗ = β − 1 is a NE.
Assume ai > aj , then firm i serves all demand and obtains profits Πi =
(p∗ − β + 2) 2 −2 = 0. Since j does not produce, neither makes effort, it obtains
zero profits too. As both firms are maximizing profits: ai = qi = 2 and aj =
qj = 0. If i reduces its price, it obtains negative profits. If, instead, i increases
its price, j charges p∗ and serves all demand. In this case, we are back to the
initial statement with one firm serving demand and both firms making zero
profits. As there is no profitable deviation from the candidate outcome, this is
a NE.
Mixed-strategy Equilibria
Each firm’s payoff is given by:
Πi = (pi − ci) qi − a
2
i
2
Let p
i
and pi denote the infimum and supremum, respectively, of the sup-
port of firm i’s strategy.
Assume ai > aj , then ci < cj = c.
First, note that p
i
= p
j
≥ c. This follows from the facts that pi ≥ ci, and
that profits are strictly increasing in the firm’s price whenever it is the lowest.
Then observe that firm i obtains zero profits if pi > pj . The same is true
if p
i
= p
j
< pi = pj = p and either no one plays p with positive probability
or if some firm does (there is at most one), it is firm j. It follows that at least
one firm earns zero profits in any mixed-strategy equilibrium. As ci < c, this
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is not firm i, which can always guarantee positive profits by pricing below c;
so pi ≤ pj . Further more, pi = c, since otherwise firm j could obtain positive
profits by undercutting.
Consequently, if ai > aj , such that ci < cj = c, there exist mixed-strategy
equilibria in which firm i charges pi = c with probability 1 and firm j mixes
price over the range [c, p′) for any p′ ∈ (c, v], according to some strategy Fj(p) =
Pr (pj ≤ p) that satisfies Fj(p) ≥ p−cp−β+ai , so as to deter firm i from raising its
price. Given firm j’s strategy, firm i’s profits from deviating and charging a
price p > c = β is [1− Fj(p)] (p− β + ai) 2− a
2
i
2 ≤ (c− β + ai) 2− a
2
i
2 .
Given above strategies, firms’ optimal effort levels are ai = 2 and aj = 0,
being profits Πi = 2 and Πj = 0.
Note that while outputs and costs of the set of mixed-strategy equilibria
are identical to those of the pure-strategy equilibrium, profits are not. Note fur-
ther that while the pure-strategy equilibrium involves firm j playing a weakly-
dominated strategy, in any mixed-strategy equilibrium firm j plays an undomi-
nated strategy almost surely.
Now, assume ai = aj = a, then ci = cj = β − a, and min {pi, pj} = β − a,
since otherwise either firm could obtain positive profits by undercutting. It
follows that there does not exist a mixed-strategy equilibrium in this case.
 Proposition 2: In main text.
 Lemma 1: Recalling equations (2.2) and (2.3), firm i’s optimal behavior,
i = 1, 2 is given by:
ai + zi = qi
qi = Fρe
−zi (1− ρe−zj)
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Under collusion, firms split the market in halves, qci = q
c
j = 1. Thus the
former equation is: aci + z
c
i = 1. This is the first statement in Lemma 1.
For the second statement in Lemma 1 note that the latter equation can be
reduced to:
Fρe−z
c
i = 1 + Fρ2e−z
c
i e−z
c
j (2.9)
for firm i, and:
Fρe−z
c
j = 1 + Fρ2e−z
c
i e−z
c
j (2.10)
for firm j.
The RHSs of equations (2.9) and (2.10) are equal, so that the LHSs are
equal too, which implies: zci = z
c
j . Particularly:
zci = z
c
j = − ln
[
F −√F 2 − 4F
2Fρ
]
With a little bit of algebra, the reader can proof that zci ∈ (0, 1) for F ∈
(F0, F1), where:
F0 =

1
ρ(1−ρ) if ρ ≤ 12
4 if ρ > 12
F1 =
1
ρe−1 (1− ρe−1)
 Lemma 2: Assume i deviates: i has two units of effort to allocate among
production and concealment (condition 2.2).
Setting qdi = 2 and zj = z
c
j in equation (2.3): Fρe
−zi = 2 + Fρ2e−zie−z
c
j .
Solving for zi, there is a unique solution at:
zdi = − ln
(
2
Fρ
(
1− ρ2e−zcj )
)
With a little bit of algebra, the reader can proof that zdi ∈ (0, 2) for F ∈(
F d0 , F
d
1
)
, where: F d0 =
4
ρ(2−ρ) and F
d
1 =
4
ρe−2(2−ρe−2) .
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 Lemma 3: Holds from considering Lemmas 1 and 2 and Corollary 1 in
equation (2.7). See main text.
 Proposition 3: By definition, v2 follows from setting pc = v in ICC
and solving for v.
v > v2 =

β +
δFρ(2−ρ)+ 12 (3−4δ)
2δ−1 if : F < F0
β +
5−4δ+δ(F−
√
F 2−4F)−2 ln(Ac)−ρ(1−δ)(F+
√
F 2−4F)
2(2δ−1) if : F0 < F < F
d
0
β +
1+δ(F−
√
F 2−4F)−2 ln(Ac)+4 ln(Ad)(1−δ)
2(2δ−1) if : F
d
0 < F < F1
β +
1
2+Fρe
−1(1+δ−ρe−1)+2(1−δ) ln(Aˆd)
2δ−1 if : F1 < F < F
d
1
β +
(− 32 )+Fρe−1(1−e−1)(1+δ)−Fρ2e−2(1+e−1δ)
2δ−1 if : F > F
d
1
where Ad = 4
ρ(F+
√
F 2−4F) and Aˆ
d = 2Fρ(1−ρe−1) .
The partial derivative of v2 with respect to F is negative; except when
F ∈
(
F0, F˜
)
, F˜ < Fˆ , and ρ > ρˆ, case in which v2 inherits the U-shaped form
of G with respect to F (See Lemma 3).
 Proposition 4: Holds from considering the results described in Lemma
1 and Proposition 3 in equation (2.8). See main text.
 Proposition 5: In main text.
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Chapter 3
An inspector calls: On the
optimality of
not-by-surprise inspections
3.1 Introduction
Cartel firms’ willingness to undertake illegal activities depends on the profit
gains from crime and the associated detection costs. Regarding the latter, any
information on the likelihood of inspection is crucial to firms. In this paper, I
show that the Antitrust Authority (AA) can make use of firms’ interest on the
likelihood of inspections to improve deterrence: by disclosing information on
the likelihood of a current inspection, the AA can distort cartel firms’ behavior
over time, which can destabilize the current collusive agreement. I address two
questions in this paper: how does the disclosure of accurate information on the
likelihood of a current inspection distort cartel firms’ strategic decisions? Can
this policy induce an improvement in deterrence?
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I develop a model in which cartel firms devote effort to productive activities
and to concealment: effort devoted to production reduces marginal costs and ef-
fort devoted to concealment reduces the probability of detection. Effort is costly
and limited, thus firms have to decide on how to allocate it among productive
efficiency and concealment. The intuition goes as follows: cartel survival de-
pends on the success of each of its member firms, not only as firms that collude
in a cartelized market, but also as firms that individually operate in complex
markets. Thus, in a cartel, senior executives have to be cautious on how to al-
locate their time, effort and attention among the own productive efficiency and
the cartel organization, in order to guarantee a balanced success on both.1 For
simplicity purposes, among the activities related to the cartel organization, I fo-
cus on concealment activities. These include the attendance to secret meetings
all over the world and the conduct of a joint sales agency, among other activ-
ities.2 For further simplification, I reduce the three dimensions of care (effort,
time and attention) to one: effort.
Regarding the antitrust policy, the AA can credibly disclose information
on the likelihood of current inspection before firms decide on how to allocate
effort. The AA performs this policy by sending warnings to firms with a high
probability of current inspection. The possibility to take decisions on the basis
of a more accurate probability of inspection raises cartels’ profitability: firms
can minimize profit losses from devoting costly effort to concealment each time
that they do not receive a warning, and from not doing so each time they receive
a warning. However, since deviants also benefit from this, incentives to deviate
1Taking into consideration how time and effort-consuming are cartel activities (not only
concealment), cartel members create complex hierarchical structures that set the role of each
member in the cartel, as well as the rules to follow in case of eventual problems. In this way,
the cartel is intended to be conducted as efficiently as a legal organization. For evidence on the
hierarchical operativeness of cartels, see Baker & Faulkner (1993), Griffin (2000), Levenstein
& Suslow (2006) and Harrington (2006).
2Using data from 19 discovered cartels, Levenstein & Suslow (2006) show that cartels
that used joint sales agencies were among the more successful cartels in terms of their long-
lastingness and fewer coordination problems. They find evidence on the use of a joint sales
agency to conceal cartel practices in the following cartels: bromine (1885-1895), cement (1922-
1962), diamonds (1870s-1970s), ocean shipping (1870-1924), oil (1871-1874), potash (1877-
1897), and European steel (1926-1939).
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are also enhanced, making collusion harder to sustain.
In this context, I show that a warning program of this type improves de-
terrence when both the fine and the probability of inspection are high. The key
issue behind this result is that for such parameter values the program does not
distort much the behavior of a firm that follows the collusive agreement, but
it does so for a deviant. Indeed, faced with high expected costs, the program
does not imply much for the former: this allocates all its effort to concealment
(a) always, if there is not a warning program, and (b) almost always, if there
is. However, for a deviant the program implies a lot. Since periods of no in-
spection are few, accurate information about when one is in one of these is of
huge relevance: in these periods deviation not only implies the standard higher
gains from sales, but also minimum (no) detection costs.3 Hence, in this con-
text, whereas firm’s benefits derived from the program are little under collusion,
there are huge under deviation; and so the program implies an improvement in
deterrence.
The driving force behind this result is that warnings create fluctuations in
the probability of inspection. These fluctuations distort cartel firms’ incentives
to deviate over time, destabilizing the collusive agreement. In this sense, this
paper is related to Harrington (2008), which considers i.i.d probability of cartel
condemnation once an investigation is launched. Allowing for leniency applica-
tions, this framework explains why at some initial point in time it is sustainable
for firms to collude and not apply for leniency, but at some later time it be-
comes optimal to apply.4 Harrington (2011) extends the analysis by considering
i.i.d. signals on this probability that are private to firms (signals that can be
sent by the AA). These signals magnify firms’ concerns about a leniency ap-
3A key assumption in this result is that evidence from collusion lasts for one period, such
that a deviant can not be punished from colluding in past periods. This is a usual assumption
in models of collusion.
4Leniency programs reduce sanctions against the first cartel firm that reports information
of the cartel to the Antitrust Authority and cooperates with it along the prosecution phase.
The effectiveness of these programs to improve deterrence lies in their capability to increase
the temptation to deviate. Spagnolo (2008) provides an extensive review of literature on
leniency in collusion.
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plication even when the likelihood of condemnation is low. Even though both
papers consider fluctuations in an antitrust parameter, my setup is closer to the
latter, in the sense that the fluctuations can derive from the execution of an
antitrust policy. However, the driving force for deterrence is different: in Har-
rington (2011), the driving force for deterrence is firms’ rivalry in obtaining the
amnesty in a post-cartel environment, which is magnified with private informa-
tion on the likelihood of condemnation. In my paper, instead, the driving force
for deterrence is the distortion that i.i.d. signals on the likelihood of inspection
create on firms’ incentives to deviate in a pre-cartel environment.
This paper is also related to papers on collusion with demand fluctuations
over time. Rotemberg & Saloner (1986) analyze optimal collusive pricing under
observable demand shocks which are i.i.d. over time. They find that collusion
is more difficult to sustain when demand is high, as the gains from deviation
are increasing in the size of the market to be served by the deviant. In this
context, pricing countercyclically realigns incentives to collude over time, facili-
tating collusion. Haltiwanger & Harrington (1991) extend Rotemberg & Saloner
(1986) to a business cycle analysis, where the demand is subject to (determin-
istic) cyclical fluctuations.5 In this setup, it is no longer clear whether booms
(i.e., when demand is raising) are the toughest time for firms to collude: during
boom, the temptation to deviate is high, however immediate future profits from
collusion (which are heavily weighted) also are. On the contrary, Haltiwanger
et al. (1991) show that recessions are the toughest time for firms to collude.
Considering two points on the cycle with equal demand, such that demand is
increasing in one of them and decreasing in the other, losses from cheating are
greater at the point at which demand is raising, as immediate profits from col-
lusion are expected to be higher. During booms, the expectation of immediate
higher future gains from collusion acts as a deterrent to cheat, and turns reces-
sions into the toughest time for firms to collude. Numerical simulations suggest
5Although in Haltiwanger et al. (1991) demand movements are specified to be determin-
istic, their results are robust to allowing for (nonobservable) i.i.d. demand shocks. In that
case, there are firms’ expectations on future demand that move cyclically.
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a tendency for firms to price countercyclically during recessions.
This paper differs from the previous ones in that I consider parameter
fluctuations derived from an antitrust policy. The decision on whether to disclose
information on the likelihood of inspection, as well as on how much information
to disclose and how to do it (e.g., the timing to follow in the disclosure, whether
the disclosure is public or private, etc) is an attribute of the AA. Another
difference is that, in my paper, firms do not find it optimal to price differently
over time to reduce the impact of parameter fluctuations. Instead, they find
it optimal to reallocate effort from production to concealment. This realigns
incentives to deviate over time better than price movements.
The paper continues as follows. In Section 2, I set up the model. In Section
3, I solve it for the case in which the AA does not disclose information on
inspections (benchmark case), and, in Section 4, I solve it for the case in which
it does. Particularly, I consider that in each period the AA warns firms in
industries with a high probability of current inspection before they take decisions
on price and effort. In Section 5, I perform a welfare analysis considering the
effects of this policy on deterrence and on the productive efficiency of surviving
cartels. In Section 6, I introduce some variations to the basic framework. I
conclude in Section 7.
3.2 The Model
Consider an economy with a continuum of industries. In each industry, there is
an inelastic demand for two units with reservation price v, and two firms pro-
ducing perfect substitutes. Firms maximize profits over an infinite time horizon
with time-invariant discount parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] and, to this end, they compete
or collude on prices. Within industries, firms have the same δ. However, across
industries the discount factor might differ. In particular, I assume that the
45
Mar´ıa C. Avramovich
discount factor across industries follows a uniform distribution function U [0, 1].
Thus, industries are identified through the degree of patience of their firms.6
To produce, firms have a fixed marginal cost β, which can be privately
reduced for the current period through effort devoted to productive efficiency
ai ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. Then, the firm’s marginal cost is ci = β − ai.
The market demand goes to the lowest priced firm or, in case of a price
tie, to the firm with the lowest production cost. Under a price tie and equal
production costs, firms equally split demand.
Collusion requires communication, which constitutes hard evidence for car-
tel detection. Evidence lasts for one period and can be discovered by the AA
during an inspection. However, firms can privately destroy some of evidence
through costly effort and, consequently, reduce the likelihood of finding evi-
dence in an inspection.
To model this, I assume zi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, such that the probability of
finding cartel evidence in an inspection to firm i, denoted ϕi, takes two values:
if firm i does not devote effort to concealment (zi = 0), this probability is 1;
otherwise, if zi = 1, this probability is reduced to ϕi < 1.
7
Effort is costly. I set the firm’s effort disutility function as (ai+zi)
2
2 . This
specification for the disutility of effort follows Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991) and
is common in multitask analyses. It is consistent with the view that efforts are
technological substitutes and that disutility depends on total effort (not on the
firm’s effort allocation).8
6Different industries is not an essential component of the model; however it facilitates the
interpretation of the welfare analysis in Section 5. Also, industries can differ in any parameter
of the model; w.l.o.g. I chose δ.
7A general version of this model can be found at Avramovich (chapter 1 in thesis disser-
tation, 2012), where zi ≥ 0 and the probability of finding cartel evidence in an inspection to
firm i is ϕi = e
−zi , i = 1, 2. The restriction on zi to be zero or one responds to the interest
of simplification and in no case restricts the results of this work.
8For the effort allocation to be also relevant, one can introduce a weighting parameter
µ ∈ <+0 such that (ai+µzi)
2
2
. The assumption of µ = 1 affects the degree of substitution
between efforts, but in no case restricts the results of the paper.
46
ESSAYS ON CARTEL BEHAVIOR AND DETERRENCE POLICY
To fight cartels, the AA has three instruments: fines, inspections and warn-
ings. Both warnings and inspections, are industry-specific policies: either both
firms in the industry are inspected (warned), or none.9
Warnings are signals on the likelihood of current inspection sent to firms
prior to inspections. Particularly, these inform each firm on whether its prob-
ability of current inspection is high or low. These signals are i.i.d. across time
and are sent once and at the same time for all firms. Throughout the paper I
refer to firms that receive a signal on a high probability of current inspection as
warned firms. Similarly, I refer to firms that receive a signal on a low probability
of current inspection as not-warned firms.10
To model this, I define the events W = warning and I = inspection, W, I ∈
{0, 1}. W = 1 states that the firm is warned, and W = 0 states that the firm is
not warned. With the same logic, I = 1 states that the firm is inspected, and
I = 0 states no inspection.
The probabilities associated to these events are: Pr(W = 1) = η , the
probability of being warned, and Pr( I | W = 1) = ρ and Pr( I | W =
0) = ρ < ρ , the probabilities of inspection given a warning and no-warning,
respectively. η, ρ, ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, the expected probability of inspection to a firm is:
ρ = η ρ + (1− η) ρ (3.1)
and the associated cartel probability of detection is:
h (zi, zj | ρ) = ρ ( ϕi + ϕj − ϕiϕj ) (3.2)
There is cartel detection if there is an inspection and the inspector finds cartel
9I relax this assumption in Section 6, where both warnings and inspections, are firm-specific
policies.
10One can think on warned firms as firms that receive a letter from the AA informing of a
high probability of current inspection for them, and on not-warned firms as firms that do not
receive this letter. Hence, after the signaling time, firms that receive the letter (warned firms)
know that their probability of current inspection is high. Similarly, firms that do not receive
the letter (not-warned firms) know that their probability of current inspection is low.
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Figure 3.1: Time-structure of the model
evidence after inspecting any of the firms. Note that none of the firms can
reduce the probability of cartel detection by itself. Indeed, assume there is an
inspection and zi = 1, but zj = 0, then: h (1, 0 | ρ) = ρ
(
ϕ
i
+ 1− ϕ
i
)
= ρ.
Firm i’s effort devoted to concealment is useless to reduce the probability of
detection if firm j does not devote effort to concealment too.
The timing of the game is as follows. At stage 0, firms choose whether to
collude or compete. If one firm chooses to compete, competition takes place and
the game ends. At stage 1, the AA makes warnings.
If there was an agreement on collusion, at stage 2 firms decide whether to
follow the collusive agreement or to deviate. Under deviation, the deviant either
slightly reduces its price, or increases its effort devoted to productive efficiency,
or both. In this way, it gets all demand.
At stage 3, effort production and price decisions are executed and the rival’s
price is observed. Also, inspections take place. At stage 4, firms obtain their
payoffs from sales. Under cartel detection, firms pay a fine F and the game starts
again from stage 0. If the cartel is not detected, but one firm has deviated, a
punishment phase takes place. Finally, if none of the firms have deviated and
the cartel is not detected, the game repeats itself from stage 1.
48
ESSAYS ON CARTEL BEHAVIOR AND DETERRENCE POLICY
In this setup, firms make simultaneous pricing and effort decisions in every
period t. With an infinite horizon, firm i, i = 1, 2, chooses prices pit ∈ [0, v] and
efforts ai, zi (effort zi is relevant only under deviation), in every t, t = 1, 2, ...,∞.
Under collusion, price choices at date t depend on the current warning
(Wt) and on the history of previous sales; so that pit, depends on Hit =
( qi1(W1) ; qi2(W2) ; . . . ; qi,t−1(Wt−1) ; Wt ). The rational behind this rule
goes as follows: under collusion firms charge the same price and split the de-
mand in halves, qi = 1, i = 1, 2; thus, for a firm, no sales implies that the rival
deviated (in price, in effort or in both). Therefore, the collusive strategy for
firm i is to initially price at the collusive price pcW1 in period 1 and to continue
pricing according to:
pit = p
c
Wt if : q
τ
i = 1 ∀τ ∈ {1, ....., t− 1} , Wt ∈ {0, 1} , j = 1, 2
as long no firm has deviated from this path. If a firm has deviated, there is a
reversion to the single-period Nash equilibrium strategy of pricing, since Nash
reversion can assure zero profits for the deviant.
In the one-shot game firms choose price and effort to maximize current
profits:
Πi = [pi − (β − ai)] qi − a
2
i
2
Proposition 6 There exists a one-shot game Nash equilibrium in which one
firm obtains zero profits.
In the one-shot game there is a pure strategy equilibrium in weakly domi-
nated strategies that yields zero profits for both firms. Also, there are undomi-
nated mixed-strategy equilibria that yield zero profits for one firm and positive
profits for the other. Since at the static Nash equilibrium there is at least one
firm that obtains zero profits, Nash reversion in which the deviant obtains zero
profits constitutes an optimal penal code.
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3.3 Collusion without Warnings
As a benchmark case assume there is not a warning program. Consequently,
no information on inspections is disclosed to firms.11 Throughout the paper, I
frequently reference this case with the shortcut ‘without warnings’, and the case
in which there is a warning program with the shortcut ‘with warnings’.
The firm’s problem is to choose price and effort levels that maximize:
Πi = [pi − (β − ai)] qi − (ai + zi)
2
2
− F ρ (ϕi + ϕj − ϕiϕj)
The first term is the firm’s payoff from production and the second and third
ones its costs associated to effort and to detection, respectively.
Solving for effort ai:
ai + zi = qi (3.3)
This equation characterizes firms’ optimal behavior under both collusion
and deviation. For the same level of production, an increase in effort devoted
to productive efficiency must be compensated with an equal reduction in effort
devoted to concealment.
Regarding price, under collusion firms charge the same price and split the
demand in halves: pi = p
c and qci = 1, i = 1, 2. Setting q
c = 1 into equation (3.3)
and recalling that zi ∈ {0, 1}, two effort allocations satisfy this condition: one
that maximizes productive efficiency, and other that maximizes concealment.
Firm’s optimal behavior is given by the one that maximizes profits:
Lemma 4 Under collusion aci + z
c
i = 1, and there exists FE such that: for
F < FE, all effort is allocated to productive efficiency (a
c
i = 1), and for F > FE,
all effort is allocated to concealment (zci = 1).
11In this setup, the event W is not defined, so neither are the probabilities associated to it,
η, ρ and ρ.
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For F < FE ,
12 the marginal contribution of an additional unit of effort
devoted to productive efficiency is higher than the marginal contribution of an
additional unit of effort devoted to concealment. Hence, firms find it optimal to
allocate all effort to productive efficiency. Beyond FE this condition is reversed
and, to restore the equilibrium, firms substitute effort from productive efficiency
to concealment.13
The critical fine value FE is negatively related to the probability of inspec-
tion ρ: the higher is this probability, the more important is concealment with
respect to productive efficiency, and therefore the lower is the critical fine value
at which firms find it profitable to devote effort to concealment.
If a firm decides to deviate, it either slightly reduces its price, or increases
its effort on productive efficiency (to reduce marginal costs), or both. In this
way, it gets all demand. A price reduction does not have side effects on firm’s
efficiency, however the increase of effort on productive efficiency does it. Thus,
to maximize profits, a deviant always reduce its price slightly and redetermines
effort allocation considering that its rival follows the collusive agreement.
Lemma 5 (Assume firm i deviates) Under deviation adi+z
d
i = 2. For F < 2FE,
firm i allocates all effort to productive efficiency (adi = 2), and for F > 2FE, it
allocates one unit of effort to each activity (adi = z
d
i = 1).
From Lemmas 1 and 2 we observe that firms allocate effort similarly under
collusion and deviation: for low values of the fine, all effort is allocated to pro-
ductive efficiency; but, as the fine goes up effort is reallocated from productive
efficiency to concealment.
However, the critical fine value at which the firm finds it profitable to devote
12 FE =
1
ρ[1−ϕ(2−ϕ)] .
13For F > FE there are two equilibria, one in which firms maximize productive efficiency,
and other in which they maximize concealment. Since the latter yields higher profits, it is
the one that takes place, and therefore the one considered throughout the paper. See the
Appendix for details.
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effort to concealment is higher under deviation. This is so since the deviant
produces more units of the good and, therefore, finds it productive efficiency
relatively more important than the firm that follows the collusive agreement.
Also note that for high fine values the deviant devotes one unit of effort to each
activity, concealment and productive efficiency; instead, the firm that follows
the collusive agreement allocates its single unit of effort to concealment. Hence,
the former is always relatively more efficient than the latter.14
Finally, but not less important, I want to stress that for F ∈ (FE , 2FE) there
is effort devoted to concealment under competition but not under deviation.
This implies: (i) by deviating, a firm obtains high sale revenues due to more
goods sold and a higher productive efficiency, and (ii) the cartel probability of
detection under collusion is lower than that under deviation, which yields gains
from deviation downward sloping in F . Both results are a novelty in models of
collusion.
To understand why the gains from deviation can be downward sloping in
F , consider a fine increase. If the firms want to reduce the negative impact of
this policy in profits, they have to devote effort to concealment – both of them
–, such that reducing the cartel probability of detection. However, for F ∈
(FE , 2FE) only the firm that follows the collusive agreement finds it profitable
to do it, thus the cartel probability of detection is reduced only under collusion.
Therefore, a fine increase affects more profits from deviation than from collusion
and, consequently, the gains from deviation go down. (Figure 3.2)
3.3.1 Cartel’s Sustainability
Collusion is sustainable as long as firms have no incentives to deviate, i.e., when
the gains from deviation are no greater than the current value of net future
14Considering the ratios rd = ad/zd and rc = ac/zc, it holds that rd ≥ rc for all values of
F and ρ.
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Figure 3.2: Gains from deviation for the benchmark case GB in terms of F . For
F < FE and F > 2FE , GB is not related to F , as the cartel’s probabilities of detection
under collusion and deviation are equal. For F ∈ (FE , 2FE), GB is downward sloping
in F , as the cartel probability of detection is higher under deviation and, therefore, a
fine increase damages more profits from deviation.
profits from collusion:
(ICC) G = Πd −Πc ≤ δ
1− δ Π
c (3.4)
In this model, for F < FE , (a
c
i , z
c
i ) = (1, 0) and
(
adi , z
d
i
)
= (2, 0). Thus,
ICC is:
pc − β + 3
2
≤ δ
1− δ
[
pc − β + 1
2
− Fρ
]
For F ∈ (FE , 2FE), (aci , zci ) = (0, 1) and
(
adi , z
d
i
)
= (2, 0). Thus, ICC is:
pc − β + 5
2
− Fρ [1− ϕ (2− ϕ)] ≤ δ
1− δ
[
pc − β − 1
2
− Fρϕ (2− ϕ) ]
Finally, for F > 2FE , (a
c
i , z
c
i ) = (0, 1) and
(
adi , z
d
i
)
= (1, 1). Thus, ICC is:
pc − β + 1
2
≤ δ
1− δ
[
pc − β − 1
2
− Fρϕ (2− ϕ) ]
For δ > 1/2, a price increase relaxes ICC condition, which implies that
firms always charge the reservation price under collusion, pc = v. Prices lower
than v, make collusion more difficult, and prices higher than v would imply no
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Figure 3.3: Critical probability value ρE for F and F ′, F < F ′. Perfect collusion is
sustainable if and only if ρ < ρE . Otherwise, competition takes place.
sales. So, collusion is sustainable if and only if perfect collusion is sustainable.
Along the paper I assume δ > 1/2, as otherwise collusion is not profitable.15
Proposition 7 Without warnings, there exists ρE such that perfect collusion is
sustainable if and only if ρ ≤ ρE. Otherwise, competition takes place.
Figure 3.3 illustrates Lemma 3 in terms of ρ and δ: the higher is the
probability of inspection ρ, the greater is the patience required to collude. The
critical probability value ρE is negatively related to F : the higher is the fine, the
lesser is the amount of industries that find collusion sustainable for each value
of ρ (ρE moves to the right). On the contrary, ρE is positively related to v: the
higher is the reservation price, the higher is the amount of industries that find
collusion sustainable for each value of ρ (ρE moves to the left).
3.4 Warnings
Now, assume that there is a warning program. Through warnings, the AA
discloses valuable information for firms: at some initial point in time firms decide
15Profitability is a necessary condition for collusion. In this model, profitability implies
δ > 1/2, which is a standard level of patient in models of collusion.
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whether to form a cartel on the basis of an expected probability of inspection
ρ = η ρ + (1− η) ρ, but knowing that in each later period they will take
price and effort decisions on the basis of a more accurate probability ρ or ρ.
In the interest of simplicity, and w.l.o.g., I assume ρ = 0 and ρ = 1. This
assumption implies certainty about the occurrence of a current inspection, rather
than a more accurate prediction of its likelihood of occurrence.
The firm’s problem is to choose price and effort levels that maximize:
Πi = [ pi − (β − ai) ] qi − (ai + zi)
2
2
− W F (ϕi + ϕj − ϕiϕj)
The first term is the firm’s payoff from production and the second and third ones
are firm’s costs associated to effort and to detection, respectively. The latter is
relevant only if the firm is warned of current inspection, i.e., when W = 1.
Solving for ai: ai + zi = qi, i = 1, 2. Under collusion this is a
c
i + z
c
i = 1,
i = 1, 2, as firms split demand in halves.
Straightforward, for W = 0 a firm devotes all effort to productive efficiency,
as it is not going to be inspected. For W = 1, instead, a firm allocates either
all effort to productive efficiency or to concealment depending on the value of
the fine.
Lemma 6 Under collusion aci + z
c
i = 1, and
(i) for W = 0, all effort is allocated to productive efficiency,
(ii) for W = 1, there exists FN = FE(ρ = 1) such that: for F < FN , all effort
is allocated to productive efficiency (aci = 1), and for F > FN , all effort is
allocated to concealment (zci = 1).
Note that when fines are low, firms allocate all their effort to productive effi-
ciency, regardless of warnings. This is so since for low fine values firms’ profit
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losses associated to detection costs are little as compared to those associated to
low sale revenues from an effort allocation away from productive efficiency.
If firm i decides to deviate, it slightly reduces its price to get all demand
(qi = 2), and redetermines effort allocation considering that its rival follows the
collusive agreement.16
Lemma 7 (Assume firm i deviates) Under deviation adi + z
d
i = 2, and
(i) for W = 0, the firm allocates all effort to productive efficiency,
(ii) for W = 1: for F < 2FN , the firm allocates all effort to productive effi-
ciency (adi = 2), and for F > 2FN , the firm allocates one unit of effort to
each activity (adi = z
d
i = 1).
3.4.1 Cartel’s Sustainability
As firms behave differently with respect to whether they are warned of an on-
going inspection or not, ICC differs on whether the current W is 0 (ICC0) or
1 (ICC1):
(ICCW ) GW ≤ δ
1− δ [ (1− ρ) Π
c( pc0 | W = 0) + ρ Πc( pc1 | W = 1) ]
where: GW = Π
d
(
pdW | W
)−Πc ( pcW | W ) , for W ∈ {0, 1}
The RHS of ICCW is independent of the current value of W , as it states
information regarding future periods: in future periods, with probability ρ firms
are warned and charge pc1, and with probability 1− ρ they are not warned and
charge pc0.
17
16As discussed for the benchmark case, firm i can deviate with a slight reduction in its
price, an increase in its effort on productive efficiency, or both. In this way, it gets all demand.
However, whereas a price reduction does not alter i’s productive efficiency, an increase of effort
on productive efficiency does it. Thus, to maximize profits from deviation, the firm always
reduces its price. Whether it also increases its effort devoted to productive efficiency depends
on the antitrust parameters ρ and F (Lemma 4).
17The key assumption behind this issue is that W is i.i.d. across time.
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The LHS of ICCW , instead, depends on the current value of W . If in the
current period W = 0, firms allocate all effort to productive efficiency under
both collusion and deviation. This implies equal probabilities of detection and,
therefore, G0 independent of F .
Instead, if in the current period W = 1, firms allocate effort depending on
the fine value. For F < FN and F > 2FN , they allocate effort to concealment
equally, under both collusion and deviation. This implies equal probabilities of
detection and, therefore, G1 independent of F . However, for F ∈ (FN , 2FN ), all
effort is allocated to concealment under collusion and to productive efficiency
under deviation. In this case, the probability of detection is higher under de-
viation and, therefore, a fine increase reduces profits from deviation more than
those from collusion. Consequently, G1 is downward sloping in F .
Figure 3.4 shows G0 and G1 in terms of F when firms charge the same price
in all periods (pc0 = p
c
1 = p
c). Note that for equal prices G1 ≤ G0.18 In this
context, ICC0 is more restrictive than ICC1. This result is of high relevance
for the rest of the paper.
Lemma 8 If firms charge the same price in all periods, then G1 ≤ G0 and
ICC0 is more restrictive than ICC1.
Optimal Price under Collusion
Under collusion, firms charge the highest possible price compatible with cartel
sustainability. For the benchmark case, this price is v, as a price increase relaxes
ICC. However, with warnings, whether an increase in the current price relaxes
ICCW depends on W and ρ:
Lemma 9 There exist ρ0 and ρ1 such that:
18This is so since the gains from deviation are upward sloping in the current price.
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Figure 3.4: Gains from deviation in terms of F for pc0 = p
c
1 = p
c.
(i) Assume W = 0, then for ρ > ρ0, an increase in p
c
0 restricts ICC0, making
collusion more difficult to sustain. On the contrary, for ρ < ρ0, an increase
in pc0 relaxes ICC0, facilitating collusion.
(ii) Assume W = 1, then for ρ > ρ1, an increase in p
c
1 relaxes ICC1, facilitating
collusion. On the contrary, for ρ < ρ1, an increase in p
c
1 restricts ICC1,
making collusion more difficult to sustain.
For a price reduction, the opposite holds.
Assume W = 0: firms are not warned in the current period and charge
pc0. Furthermore, assume that ρ is high (ρ > ρ0): the probability of receiving
a warning in any future period is high, and so pc1 is the price generally charged
in the future. In this context, an increase in pc0 rises the continuation value of
profits (CVP) little, and in particular less of what it rises G0, making collusion
more difficult to sustain. Analogously, a reduction in pc0 facilitates collusion.
Now, assume that ρ is low (ρ < ρ0): the probability of receiving a warning in
any future period is low, and so pc0 is the price generally charged in the future.
In this context, an increase in pc0 rises CVP greatly, and in particular more of
what it rises G0; therefore, collusion is facilitated. Analogously, a reduction
in pc0 makes collusion more difficult to sustain. The same arguments hold in
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understanding the case W = 1.19
Figure 3.5 shows ρ0 and ρ1 in terms of δ.
20 ρ0 and ρ1 cross each other at
(δ, ρ) =
(
1
2 ,
2
3
)
, setting three areas of interest. Area I, for ρ < ρ0, states pairs
(δ, ρ) for which if perfect collusion is not sustainable, neither is other type of
collusion.21 Area II, for ρ ≥ max {ρ0, ρ1}, states pairs (δ, ρ) for which if perfect
collusion is not sustainable, imperfect collusion at prices (pc0, p
c
1) = (p
′, v) with
p′ < v, may still be sustainable. This comes from the fact that a reduction in
p0 relaxes ICC0, facilitating collusion. Finally, Area III, for ρ ∈ (ρ0, ρ1), states
pairs (δ, ρ) for which if perfect collusion is not sustainable, imperfect collusion
at prices (p′, v) or (p′′, p′′′) such that p′′ < p′ < v and p′′ < p′′′ < v, may still
be sustainable. Imperfect collusion at prices (p′′, p′′′) comes from the fact that
ICCW is relaxed with price reductions.
Note that imperfect collusion is direct consequence of Lemma 5: if firms
always charge the same price, collusion is sustainable if and only if ICC0 holds.
But, by reducing price in those periods in which they are not warned on a current
inspection, the gains from deviation G0 go down, facilitating collusion. However
such a price reduction also reduces CVP, which makes collusion more difficult
to sustain. Lemma 6 states critical values for ρ that assure that this pricing
strategy (e.g., imperfect collusion at prices (p′, v)) truly facilitates collusion.
Lemma 10 With warnings, there exist ρPC ≥ ρIC ≥ ρIC2, such that:
19Assume W = 1: firms are warned in the current period and charge pc1. When ρ > ρ1, the
probability of receiving a warning in any future period is high, and so pc1 is the price generally
charged in the future. Consequently, an increase in pc1 rises CVP greatly, and in particular
more of what it rises G0, facilitating collusion. The opposite holds for a reduction in pc1. On
the contrary, when ρ < ρ1, the probability of receiving a warning in any future period is low,
and so pc0 is the price generally charged in the future. In this context, a reduction in p
c
1 reduces
CVP little, and in particular less of what it reduces G0, facilitating collusion. Analogously,
an increase in pc1 makes collusion more difficult to sustain.
20Critical probability levels ρ0 and ρ1 are: ρ0 =
2δ−1
δ
and ρ1 =
1−δ
δ
.
21Consider ρ ∈ (ρ0, ρ1): a price increase relaxes ICCW . Thus, if perfect collusion is not
sustainable, neither is other type of collusion (under perfect collusion, firms already charge
the highest possible price v). Consider ρ ≤ min {ρ0, ρ1}: a price increase relaxes ICC0,
but restricts ICC1. Assume perfect collusion, then (i)
(
pc0, p
c
1
)
= (v, v), and (ii) ICC0 is
most restrictive than ICC1. If perfect collusion is not sustainable, it is so (particularly)
because ICC0 does not hold. Can one change pc0 to make this condition to hold? No, since
under perfect collusion it is already charged the highest possible price v. Therefore, if perfect
collusion is not sustainable, neither is other type of collusion.
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Figure 3.5: Critical parameter values ρ0 and ρ1 define three critical areas of interest
for collusion. Area I: if perfect collusion is not sustainable, neither is other type of
collusion. Areas II and III: if perfect collusion is not sustainable, imperfect collusion
may still be sustainable.
(i) Perfect collusion is sustainable if and only if ρ ≤ ρPC ,
(ii) Imperfect collusion at prices (p′, v) is sustainable if and only if ρ ≤ ρIC ,
(iii) Imperfect collusion at prices (p′′, p′′′) is sustainable if and only if ρ = ρIC2.
Corollary 4 If imperfect collusion is sustainable, perfect collusion also is.
Lemma 7 states sustainability conditions for perfect and imperfect collusion.
These conditions are not mutually exclusive, i.e., for some parameter values
firms can sustain more than one type of collusion. Among two o more types
of collusion, firms choose the one that maximizes profits: perfect collusion is
preferred to collusion at prices (p′, v), which, in turns, is preferred to collusion
at prices (p′′, p′′′). This is so since firms maximize profits and these are increasing
in price.
Following this profit choice, a direct result from Corollary 1 is that imperfect
collusion never takes place.
Proposition 8 With warnings, firms play perfect collusion if and only if ρ <
ρPC . Otherwise, competition takes place.
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The critical probability value ρPC is upward sloping in δ and v. The more
patient are the firms or the higher is the reservation price v, the higher is the
probability of inspection at which collusion is sustainable. On the contrary, ρPC
is downward sloping in F : the higher is the fine, the lower is the probability of
inspection at which collusion is sustainable.
3.5 Social Welfare
Preceding Sections characterize the sustainability of cartels in terms of a thresh-
old value for the probability of inspection ρ, such that one can argue that (per-
fect) collusion is sustainable if and only if the probability of inspection is lesser
than a certain threshold. However, that threshold differs on whether the AA
makes use of a warning program or not: whereas without the program (bench-
mark case), that threshold is ρE , with the program, it is ρPC . In the light
of these results, does the warning program improve deterrence? And social
welfare? This Section sheds light to these questions.
The use of a warning program has two opposite effects on the sustainability
of cartels. On the one side, the program raises the profitability of collusion:
accurate information on the likelihood of current inspections prevents (i) not-
warned firms from devoting costly effort to concealment, and (ii) warned firms
from an unprofitable effort allocation towards productive efficiency. Thus, the
expected profits from collusion in the presence of the program are higher than
those from the benchmark case.
However, on the other side, the warning program also raises the gains from
deviation, as the firm that deviates is also beneficed from the accurate informa-
tion on inspections. Technically: in the presence of the program, the relevant
gains from deviation are G0, which are equal to those for the benchmark case
(GB) for low fine values, but higher than these for high fine values.
22 Therefore,
22Please, see the Appendix for details.
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there can be also a deterrent effect from warnings.
Figure 3.6 illustrates these two opposite effects, and Proposition 4 states
the condition under which one or the other dominates (i.e., the condition under
which ρE is lesser/greater than ρPC), as well as the welfare implications of both
cases.
G
GW
0 F
GB
2FEFEFN
Eπc
Eπc,W
0 FFEFN
Eπc,B
Figure 3.6: Left: gains from deviation with and without a warning program, GW and
GB respectively. Right: expected profits from collusion with and without a warning
program, Epic,W and Epic,B respectively.
Proposition 9 There exists ρ∗ such that:
(i) For F < FN , a warning program has no effect on deterrence, neither on the
productive efficiency of cartels,
(ii) For F ∈ (FN , FE), a warning program facilitates collusion and creates pro-
ductive inefficiencies on cartels,
(iii) For F > FE, a warning program facilitates collusion for ρ < ρ
∗, and makes
it more difficult otherwise. In no case the program affects the productive
efficiency of cartels.
For F < FN , fines are too little to worry about, and thus firms maximize
productive efficiency regardless of the existence of the warning program. In
this case, ρE = ρPC , the program has no effect on deterrence, neither on the
productive efficiency of cartels.
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For F ∈ (FN , FE), F < FE the gains from deviation with and without the
warning program are equal (Figure 3.6, left), thus there is no deterrence effect
from it. However, there is a cartel’s sustainability effect: in the presence of
the program, firms reduce their expected detection costs by substituting effort
from productive efficiency to concealment whenever they receive a warning on
an inspection. Undoubtedly, the program facilitates collusion. In addition, the
program creates productive inefficiencies, as firms are efficient in its absence,
but only in some periods in its presence.
Finally, for F > FE , the warning program facilitates collusion by preventing
firms from devoting costly effort to concealment each time they do not receive
a warning. However, the program also makes collusion harder to sustain by
increasing the gains from deviation. In this context, when ρ is high (ρ > ρ∗),
the latter effect prevails, as the profit gains derived from the program are little:
when the probability of receiving a warning in any future period is high, firms
behave as in the benchmark case most of the time, and the program’s favorable
effect on the cartel’s sustainability is little as compared to its adverse effect on
it. However, when the probability of receiving a warning in any future period
is low (ρ < ρ∗), firms’ profit gains derived from the program are huge. In this
case, the warning program facilitates collusion.
This analysis suggests that when the fine and the probability of inspection
are high, the AA should make use of a warning program as part of the antitrust
policy. But, how high the probability of inspection should be?, i.e., which is the
critical level of inspection ρ∗? It depends on the firm’s patience coefficient δ:
the higher is the value of δ, the higher is the critical value ρ∗, and hence the
greater must be the probability of inspection in order to recommend the use of
a warning program. Considering δ equal to 0.6 and 0.7, the critical value ρ∗ is
0.33 and 0.57, respectively.
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Figure 3.7: ρE and ρPC in terms of F , for F > 2FE . For ρ < min {ρE , ρPC} firms
collude regardless of the existence of a warning program. For ρ ∈ (ρE , ρPC) firms
collude when there is a warning program and compete otherwise. For ρ ∈ (ρPC , ρE),
firms compete when there is a warning program and collude otherwise. For ρ >
max {ρE , ρPC}, firms compete.
3.6 Extensions and Variations
Preceding Sections analyzed the impact of disclosing information on the like-
lihood of current inspection on cartel’s deterrence and on the productive effi-
ciency of surviving cartels. The analysis assumed industry-specific inspections
and warnings, and a collusive agreement that requires communication in all
periods. This Section relaxes each of these two assumptions in turn.
 Firm-specific inspections and warnings. I first extend the analy-
sis by allowing inspections and warnings to be firm-specific policies instead of
industry-specific policies.
Firm-specific inspections allows for single-firm inspections. In this context,
each cartel firm can reduce the cartel probability of detection by devoting effort
to concealment. Following notation of previous Sections, the cartel probability
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of detection is:23
h (zi, zj | ρ) = ρ ( ϕi + ϕj − ρ ϕi ϕj )
There is cartel detection if there is an inspection in at least one firm and the
inspector finds cartel evidence during it.
In terms of my model, the cartel probability of detection only affects firm’s
marginal benefits from effort devoted to concealment. Thus, different speci-
fications for this probability (one calculated on the basis of industry-specific
inspections and other on the basis of firm-specific inspections) affects the rel-
ative importance of concealment with respect to productive efficiency, but not
firms’ willingness to devote effort to concealment when fines are high:
Lemma 11 When fines are low, firms allocate all effort to productive efficiency;
however when fines go up, they find it profitable to reallocate effort from pro-
ductive efficiency to concealment. This behavior holds under both collusion and
deviation.
From Lemma 8 it follows that Lemmas 1 and 2 are robust to inspections
specific to the firm or industry.24
Firm-specific warnings implies a collusive game in which firms may allocate
effort differently in each period. E.g., assuming that only firm i receives a
warning, firm j does not devote effort to concealment, as it is not inspected;
however firm i may find it profitable to do so, as this can reduce the probability
of detection. Therefore, given a collusive agreement, in each period each firm
takes strategic decisions depending on whether it receives a warning and on an
expected probability of warnings to rivals.25
23Note that under firm-specific inspections, the probability of inspection to a firm is ρ, and
the probability of inspection to both firms in the industry is ρ2. Instead, under industry-
specific inspections, these two probabilities are equal, ρ.
24Technically, whether inspections are firm-specific or industry-specific only matters in iden-
tifying the critical fine level at which firms find it profitable to substitute effort from productive
efficiency to concealment. Please, see the Appendix for a detailed algebraical analysis.
25Note that even though that a posteriori (after warnings) firms’ effort allocations may differ,
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Thus, there is only one single difference between a setup in which warnings
are specific to the industry to other in which they are specific to firms: in the
latter each firm takes decisions knowing that its rival may devote more/less effort
to concealment than itself. This asymmetry distorts the marginal benefit that
each firm obtains from devoting effort to concealment, but not its willingness to
devote effort to concealment when fines are high.
Holding the assumption of fully informative warnings, Lemmas 9 and 10
state firm’s effort allocation under collusion and deviation.
Lemma 12 Under collusion:
(i) For Wi = 0, i = 1, 2: firm i finds it profitable to allocate all effort to
productive efficiency.
(ii) For Wi = 1, i = 1, 2: firm i finds it profitable to allocate all effort to
productive efficiency for low values of the fine, and to substitute effort
from productive efficiency to concealment otherwise
Lemma 13 (Assuming firm i deviates) Under deviation:
(i) For Wi = 0: firm i finds it profitable to allocate all effort to productive
efficiency.
(ii) For Wi = 1: firm i finds it profitable to allocate all effort to productive
efficiency for low values of the fine, and to substitute effort from productive
efficiency to concealment otherwise
From Lemmas 9 and 10 it follows that Lemmas 3 and 4 are robust to
inspections specific to the firm or industry.
a priori, at the time of deciding the cartel formation, firms’ (expected) effort allocations are
equal. Indeed, at stage 0 cartel firms decide whether to form a cartel on the basis of an
expected joint probability of receiving a warning, which is equal to both firms.
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Finally, holding Lemmas 1-4, the discussion in Section 5 regarding the
implications of a warning program on deterrence and on social welfare holds
too.
Proposition 10 Results exposed in Proposition 4 are robust to warnings spe-
cific to the firm or industry.
 Communication conditional on warnings. For the next variation
assume that firms establish a collusive agreement in which communication is
conditional on warnings: firms communicate if and only if they are not warned.
Since communication is crucial in the price-fixing practice, this variation
implies that firms compete each time they receive a warning and collude oth-
erwise. In this way, firms avoid detection costs; however, they sacrifice high
profits in exchange (firms obtain competitive profits each time they are warned,
which are lower than those from collusion).
This variant in the game does not distort firms’ behavior under competition,
neither under collusion in the absence of the warning program. Thus, Lemmas
1 and 2 from the main text still hold. Instead, Lemmas 3 and 4 does not hold
anymore, as in the presence of the warning program firms collude only when
W = 0. Lemmas 10 and 11 substitute Lemmas 3 and 4, respectively:
Lemma 14 Given a collusive agreement with communication conditional on
warnings: for W = 1, firms compete, and for W = 0, firms collude. Under
collusion (aci , z
c
i ) = (1, 0).
Lemma 15 Firm i deviates with an effort allocation
(
adi , z
d
i
)
= (2, 0) when
W = 0.
Corollary 5 In the presence of a warning program, firms are fully efficient on
production.
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In this context, whereas a fine increase restricts ICC in the absence of the
warning program (benchmark case), it does not affect this in its presence (ICCW
does not dependent on F ). Indeed, without the program the cartel probability
of detection is h (zi, zj | ρ) > 0; instead, with the program, this probability is
zero, as collusion takes place only when firms are not inspected. Proposition 6
follows immediately:
Proposition 11 There exists F ∗ such that a warning program improves deter-
rence if and only if F < F ∗. Otherwise, the program facilitates collusion.
For F < F ∗, firms’ profit gains from avoiding detection costs are little and,
in particular, lower than their profit losses from less sales revenues. Thus, the
warning program improves deterrence for low values of the fine. The opposite
holds for F > F ∗, and the program facilitates collusion.
Note that Propositions 4 and 6 state opposite results regarding the de-
terrent effect of the warning program conditional to fines. In the basic model
(with communication in all periods), high fines are a necessary condition for the
program to improve deterrence (Proposition 4). However, with communication
conditional on warnings, low fines are.26 Intuitively, the reason goes as follows:
in the basic model, firms sacrifice high sale revenues in favor of concealment
only for high values of the fine. Instead, with communication conditional on
warnings, firms do that for all values of the fine. Hence, when fines are low,
firms sacrifice relatively too much in the later setup, as they sacrifice high sale
revenues in exchange of avoiding little detection costs. The opposite holds when
fines are high.27
Two final comments are in order. First, in the interest of simplicity the
analysis above assumed that the collusive agreements with communication in
26Actually, with communication conditional on warnings, low fines are a necessary (and
sufficient) condition for the program to improve deterrence.
27When fines are high, firms sacrifice relatively too little when communication is condi-
tional on warnings: firms achieve zero detection costs when communication is conditional on
warnings, but they can only aspire to a reduction of these in the basic model.
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all periods (basic model) and with communication conditional on warnings were
mutually exclusive. However, nothing prevents these agreements from coexist.
If this were the case, at stage 0 firms would decide whether to form a cartel
and, if so, which collusive agreement to follow. This decision over the collusive
agreement allows firms to reduce the negative effect of the warning program:
firms would choose following the collusive agreement of the basic model when
fines are low, and the one with communication conditional on warnings when
these are high. In this case, the program may not improve deterrence never.
My second comment is related to the assumption of evidence lasting for one
period. Relaxing this assumption, such that evidence lasts for several periods,
does not invalidate the results from the basic model, however, it invalidates
those from the alternative setup developed in this subsection. With evidence
lasting for several periods, a collusive agreement in which firms communicate
and collude only when they do not receive a warning does not present any
advantage for them: firms would sacrifice high net sale revenues for nothing,
the evidence would be still there. Note that this second comment reduces the
relevance of the former one.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper is a first step in understanding the impact of disclosing private infor-
mation on inspections on the sustainability of collusion. In particular, I analyze
whether the disclosure of information on the likelihood of current inspection
can improve deterrence, as well as possible side-effects of this policy on the
productive efficiency of surviving cartels.
In my model cartel firms devote costly effort to productive activities and
to concealment, as the former reduces marginal costs from production and the
latter reduces the probability of detection. Since effort is costly, is limited; thus
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firms have to decide on how to allocate it among productive efficiency and con-
cealment. When fines are low, productive efficiency is relatively more important
than concealment, thus firms allocate all effort to productive efficiency. Instead,
when fines are high, concealment is the relatively most important activity, and
firms allocate all effort to it.
In this context, a fine increase can have two opposite effects on welfare, while
it can improve welfare through fewer cartels, it can also reduce it through more
inefficient surviving ones. This analysis favors large fines such that no cartel
survives, however, in practice this policy is not always credible or possible to
apply.
In this context, I show that the disclosure of private information on the
likelihood of current inspections can improve social welfare. When the AA
introduces a warning program, firms are prevented from (i) devoting costly
effort to concealment anytime that they do not receive a warning, and (ii) an
unprofitable effort allocation towards productive efficiency each time that they
receive a warning. Both effects raise profits from collusion, facilitating collusion.
However, since deviants also benefit from these effects, incentives to deviate are
also enhanced, making collusion harder to sustain. I show that when both fines
and inspections are high, the latter effect prevails and the program improves
deterrence. Also, since for high fine values cartels are highly inefficient, fewer
cartels implies a welfare gain beyond higher deterrence.
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Appendix
 Proposition 1: Equilibrium in pure strategies
Let’s first prove that there is no Nash Equilibrium (NE) with ai = aj .
Assume pi < pj . Since i has the lowest price, it serves all demand. But,
this implies that one of the firms is not optimizing. Indeed, firm i serving
demand and both firms optimizing implies: ai = qi = 2 and aj = qj = 0, which
contradicts the initial statement.
Assume pi = pj = p, then firms split demand in halves, qi = qj = 1.
Optimization implies ai = aj = 1, and profits Πi = p − (β − 1) − 12 , i = 1, 2.
Assume firm i slightly reduces its price: it gets all demand, qi = 2, and makes
effort ai = 2. In this context, i’s profits are Πi = [pi − − (β − 2)] 2− 2,  > 0,
greater than before for low . As there is a profitable deviation to the candidate
outcome, this can not be a NE.
Hence, if there exists an equilibrium, it must be at ai 6= aj .
Let’s prove that there is no NE with ai 6= aj and pi 6= pj .
Assume pi < pj , then firm i serves all demand, qi = 2 and qj = 0. The
optimality condition implies ai = 2 and aj = 0. Notice that firm i can increase
profits with a slight increase in its price. In fact, i’s most profitable deviation is
to charge pi = pj . But, then, firm j would find it profitable to reduce its price
below pi. This process repeats itself anytime pi 6= pj . The outcome pi 6= pj
with ai 6= aj is not stable and, therefore, can not be a NE.
Let’s prove that there is no NE with ai 6= aj and pi = pj 6= p∗ = β − 1.
Assume pi = pj > p
∗ = β − 1 and ai < aj , then firm i serves all demand,
qi = 2 and qj = 0. The optimality condition implies ai = 2 and aj = 0. Since
i’s profits are positive for pi > p
∗ = β−1, nothing prevents j to reduce its price
and get all demand. But this is a contradiction with the initial statement of
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equal prices.
Assume pi = pj < p
∗ = β − 1 and ai > aj . Firm i obtains negative profits
for p < p∗ = β − 1, so it won’t charge a price below p∗. But, this contradicts
the initial statement.
Finally, let’s prove that ai 6= aj with pi = pj = p∗ = β − 1 is a NE.
Assume ai > aj , then firm i serves all demand and obtains profits Πi =
(p∗ − β + 2) 2 −2 = 0. Since j does not produce, neither makes effort, it obtains
zero profits too. As both firms are maximizing profits: ai = qi = 2 and aj =
qj = 0. If i reduces its price, it obtains negative profits. If, instead, i increases
its price, j charges p∗ and serves all demand. In this case, we are back to the
initial statement with one firm serving demand and both firms making zero
profits. As there is no profitable deviation from the candidate outcome, this is
a NE.
Mixed-strategy Equilibria
Each firm’s payoff is given by:
Πi = (pi − ci) qi − a
2
i
2
Let p
i
and pi denote the infimum and supremum, respectively, of the sup-
port of firm i’s strategy.
Assume ai > aj , then ci < cj = c.
First, note that p
i
= p
j
≥ c. This follows from the facts that pi ≥ ci, and
that profits are strictly increasing in the firm’s price whenever it is the lowest.
Then observe that firm i obtains zero profits if pi > pj . The same is true
if p
i
= p
j
< pi = pj = p and either no one plays p with positive probability
or if some firm does (there is at most one), it is firm j. It follows that at least
one firm earns zero profits in any mixed-strategy equilibrium. As ci < c, this
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is not firm i, which can always guarantee positive profits by pricing below c;
so pi ≤ pj . Further more, pi = c, since otherwise firm j could obtain positive
profits by undercutting.
Consequently, if ai > aj , such that ci < cj = c, there exist mixed-strategy
equilibria in which firm i charges a price pi = c with probability 1 and firm j
mixes price over the range [c, p′) for any p′ ∈ (c, v], according to some strategy
Fj(p) = Pr (pj ≤ p) that satisfies Fj(p) ≥ p−cp−β+ai , so as to deter firm i from
raising its price. Given firm j’s strategy, firm i’s profits from deviating and
charging a price p > c = β is [1− Fj(p)] (p− β + ai) 2− a
2
i
2 ≤ (c− β + ai) 2−
a2i
2 .
Given above strategies, firms’ optimal effort levels are ai = 2 and aj = 0,
being profits Πi = 2 and Πj = 0.
Note that while outputs and costs of the set of mixed-strategy equilibria
are identical to those of the pure-strategy equilibrium, profits are not. Note fur-
ther that while the pure-strategy equilibrium involves firm j playing a weakly-
dominated strategy, in any mixed-strategy equilibrium firm j plays an undomi-
nated strategy almost surely.
Now, assume ai = aj = a, then ci = cj = β − a, and min {pi, pj} = β − a,
since otherwise either firm could obtain positive profits by undercutting. It
follows that there does not exist a mixed-strategy equilibrium in this case.
 Lemma 1: (Collusion) Recalling equation 3.3, firm’s optimal behavior
is given by: ai + zi = qi, for i = 1, 2. Since q
c
i = 1 and zi ∈ {0, 1}, there are two
alternative effort allocations: (ai, zi) = {(1, 0) , (0, 1)}.
(i) Assume i sets (ai, zi) = (1, 0). If j sets (aj , zj) = (1, 0), its profits
are pic(1, 0) = pc − β + 1/2 − ρF . If j deviates and sets (aj , zj) = (0, 1), j
reduces its net sale revenues (as its marginal cost would be high) in exchange of
no reduction in its expected detection costs, as both firms should devote effort
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to concealment to reduce the cartel probability of detection. Thus, setting
(ai, zi) = (1, 0), i = 1, 2, is a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Assume now that i sets (ai, zi) = (0, 1). If j sets (aj , zj) = (0, 1),
it contributes to reduce the cartel probability of detection, and obtains profits
pic(0, 1) = pc − β − 1/2 − ρϕ (2− ϕ)F . If j deviates and sets (aj , zj) = (1, 0),
its net sale revenues are higher, but so are its expected detection costs (as the
cartel probability of detection goes up). j’s profits in this case are: pic(1, 0) =
pc − β + 1/2− ρF . There exists FE ∈ <+ such that: for F < FE , j maximizes
profits with an effort allocation (aj , zj) = (1, 0), and for F > FE , j maximizes
profits with an effort allocation (aj , zj) = (0, 1). Thus, setting (ai, zi) = (0, 1)
for F > FE , i = 1, 2, is a Nash equilibrium.
For F > FE there are two equilibria, one in which firms maximize produc-
tive efficiency, and other in which they maximize concealment. Since the latter
yields higher profits, this is the one that takes place: firms set (ai, zi) = (1, 0)
for F < FE , and (ai, zi) = (0, 1) otherwise, i = 1, 2.
 Lemma 2: Assume i deviates: i has two units of effort to allocate among
productive efficiency and concealment (condition 3.3).
For F < FE , j sets (aj , zj) = (1, 0), and i’s best response is to set (ai, zi) =
(2, 0): any deviation from this effort allocation implies lower net sale revenues
in exchange of no reduction in its expected detection costs (as both firms should
devote effort to concealment to reduce the cartel probability of detection).
For F > FE firm j sets (aj , zj) = (0, 1). If i sets (ai, zi) = (2, 0), its profits
are pid (2, 0) = 2 (pc − β) + 2 − ρF . If i sets (ai, zi) = (1, 1), its profits are
pid (1, 1) = 2 (pc − β)−ρϕ (2− ϕ)F . Comparing profits: i maximizes profits by
setting (ai, zi) = (2, 0) for F ∈ (FE , 2FE), and (ai, zi) = (1, 1), otherwise.
 Proposition 2: Follows from setting pc = v in ICC and solving for ρ.
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 Lemma 3: Firm’s optimal behavior is given by: ai + zi = qi, where
qi = 1. Assume W = 0. Since no inspection takes place, zi = 0 and, therefore,
ai = 1, i = 1, 2. Now, assume W = 1. This case corresponds to the benchmark
case but for ρ = 1. Following Lemma 1, firms set (ai, zi) = (1, 0) for F < FN =
FE(ρ = 1) and (ai, zi) = (0, 1) otherwise, i = 1, 2.
 Lemma 4: Same proof as for Lemma 3, but for ρ = 1.
 Lemma 5: G0 and G1 are the gains from deviation for W = 0 and
W = 1, respectively:
G0 = p
c
0 − β +
3
2
Firms maximize productive efficiency under collusion and under deviation. Thus,
expected detection costs under both collusion and deviation, are equal and,
therefore, G0 is independent of F .
G1 =

pc1 − β + 32 if : F < FN
pc1 − β + 52 −
[
1− ϕ (2− ϕ)F ] if : F ∈ (FN , 2FN )
pc1 − β + 12 if : F > 2FN
For F < FN , firms maximize productive efficiency under collusion and under
deviation. Thus, G1 is independent of F . For F ∈ (FN , 2FN ), productive
efficiency is maximized under deviation, but concealment under collusion. Ex-
pected detection costs are higher under deviation and, therefore, G1 is download
sloping in F . For F > 2FN , it is devoted one unit of effort to concealment under
both collusion and deviation; thus, G1 is independent of F .
If firms charge pc0 = p
c
1, G0 ≥ G1, ICC0 is more restrictive than ICC1, as
the continuation value of profits does not depend on the current value of W .
 Lemma 6: Holds from partial derivatives of ICC0 and ICC1 with
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respect to current prices, pc0 and p
c
1 respectively.
ρ < ρ0 =
2δ − 1
δ
ρ > ρ1 =
1− δ
δ
 Lemma 7: Perfect collusion: perfect collusion is sustainable if and
only if ICC0 holds. Setting p
c
0 = p
c
1 = v in ICC0 and solving for ρ: perfect
collusion is sustainable if and only if:
ρ < ρPC =

(2δ−1)(v−β)+2δ−3/2
δF if : F < FN
(2δ−1)(v−β)+2δ−3/2
δ[1+ϕ(2−ϕ)F ] if : F > FN
Imperfect collusion:
(i) For ρ > ρ0, a reduction in p
c
0 facilitates collusion, as it relaxes the most
restrictive incentive compatibility constraint (ICC0). Define p
′ as the highest
price compatible with ICC0(p
′, v), so that it is the price at which this constraint
holds with equality. Substituting pc1 by v in ICC0, equating this condition to
zero and solving for pc0:
pc0 = p
′(v) = p′ =

β− 32+δ(ρv−2β+2−ρF )
1−2δ+δρ if : F < FN
β− 32+δ(ρv−2β+2−ρ−ρϕ(2−ϕ)F)
1−2δ+δρ if : F > FN
Substituting pc0 and p
c
1 by p
′(v) and v, respectively, in ICC1, and solving for ρ:
imperfect collusion at prices (pc0, p
c
1) = (p
′, v) is sustainable if and only if:
ρ < ρIC =

(2δ−1)(v−β)+2δ−3/2
δF if : F < FN
(2δ−1)(v−β)+4δ−5/2−(2δ−1)F(1−ϕ(2−ϕ))
2δ+δF [2ϕ(2−ϕ)−1] if : F ∈ (FN , 2FN )
(2δ−1)(v−β)−1/2
δFϕ(2−ϕ) if : F > 2FN
Important: the condition above is relevant only when imperfect collusion
at prices (pc0, p
c
1) = (p
′, v) is profitable, which requires:
1. ρ > ρl = max
{
ρ0 , v − β + 32 − F
}
, for F < FN .
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2. ρ < ρh = min
{
ρ0 , v − β + 32 − F
}
, for F > FN .
Comparing ρIC and ρPC :
For F < FN , ρPC = ρIC .
For F > FN , ρPC > ρIC for ρ < ρ0, and ρPC < ρIC otherwise. This
is so since: (i) ρPC and ρIC are upward sloping in δ, with
∂ρPC
∂δ <
∂ρIC
∂δ , (ii)
ρPC(δ
0
PC) = 0 and ρIC(δ
0
IC) = 0 for δ
0
PC < δ
0
IC , and (iii) ρPC = ρIC = ρ0. Note
that for sustainability purposes, it is only relevant that ρPC > ρIC for ρ < ρ0.
(ii) For ρ ∈ (ρ1, ρ0), reductions in pc0 and pc1 facilitate collusion. Define
(p′′, p′′′) as the highest vector price at which ICCW holds with equality such
that p′′ < p′′′ < v, i.e., is the vector price at which G0 = G1. To obtain p′′ and
p′′′, substitute pc0 by p
′′ and pc1 by p
′′′ in ICCW . Then, from ICC0 holding with
equality, solve for p′′(p′′′):
p′′(p′′′) = p′ =

p′′′ if : F < FN
p′′′ + 1− F [1− ϕ (2− ϕ)] if : F ∈ (FN , 2FN )
p′′′ − 1 if : F > 2FN
Plugging p′′(p′′′) into ICC1, equating this constraint to zero and solving for ρ:
imperfect collusion at prices (pc0, p
c
1) = (p
′′, p′′′) is sustainable if and only if:
ρ = ρIC2 =

(2δ−1)(p′′′−β)+2δ−3/2
δF if : F < FN
(2δ−1)(p′′′−β)+4δ−5/2−(2δ−1)F(1−ϕ(2−ϕ))
2δ+δF [2ϕ(2−ϕ)−1] if : F ∈ (FN , 2FN )
(2δ−1)(p′′′−β)−1/2
δFϕ(2−ϕ) if : F > 2FN
for p′′′ < v.
Straightforward, for p′′′ = v, p′ = p′′; therefore, ρIC2 = ρIC for p′′′ = v,
and ρIC2 < ρIC for p
′′′ < v.
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 Proposition 3: Holds from Lemma 6 (and Corollary 1) and firms’
profit-maximization behavior.
 Proposition 4: Cartel’s sustainability condition without warnings:
ρ < ρE =

(2δ−1)(v−β)+2δ−3/2
δF if : F < FE
(2δ−1)(v−β)+2δ−5/2
F [δ (1−ϕ(2−ϕ))] if : F ∈ (FE , 2FE)
(2δ−1)(v−β)−1/2
δFϕ(2−ϕ) if : F > 2FE
Cartel’s sustainability condition with warnings (perfect collusion):
ρ < ρPC =

(2δ−1)(v−β)+2δ−3/2
δF if : F < FN
(2δ−1)(v−β)+2δ−3/2
δ[1+ϕ(2−ϕ)F ] if : F > FN
For ρ < 1/2, FN < 2FN < FE < 2FE , and for ρ > 1/2, FN < FE < 2FN <
2FE .
For F < FN , ρE = ρPC .
For F ∈ (FN , FE), simple algebra shows that ρE < ρPC for F > FN , which
is true by initial condition.
For F > FE , it is useful to notice that: (i) ρE and ρPC are upward sloping
in δ, with ∂ρE∂δ >
∂ρPC
∂δ , and (ii) ρE(δ
0
E) = 0 and ρPC(δ
0
PC) = 0 for δ
0
PC < δ
0
E .
ρPC and ρE intersect at ρ
∗ ∈ (0, 1) for v > v∗. For v < v∗, ρ∗ > 1; w.l.o.g.
I consider ρ∗ = 1 in this case. Thus, for ρ < ρ∗, ρE < ρPC , and for ρ > ρ∗,
ρE > ρPC .
 Firm-specific inspections and warnings (Proofs for Lemmas 8-10
and Proposition 5).
Solution for the benchmark case (without warnings)
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The firm’s problem is to choose price and effort levels that maximize:
Πi = [pi − (β − ai)] qi − (ai + zi)
2
2
− ρ (ϕi + ϕj − ρϕiϕj) F
Solving, firm’s optimal behavior is given by: ai + zi = qi, with zi ∈ {0, 1},
i = 1, 2.
Collusion: Under collusion, qci = 1, thus there are two alternative effort
allocations: (ai, zi) = {(1, 0) , (0, 1)}.
(i) Assume i sets (ai, zi) = (1, 0). If j sets (aj , zj) = (1, 0), its profits are
pic(1, 0) = pc − β + 1/2 − ρ (2− ρ)F . If j sets (aj , zj) = (0, 1), its profits are
pic(0, 1) = pc − β − 1/2− ρ [1 + ϕ (1− ρ)]F . There exists FH ∈ <+ such that:
for F < FH , j maximizes profits with an effort allocation (aj , zj) = (1, 0), and
for F > FH , j maximizes profits with an effort allocation (aj , zj) = (0, 1). Thus,
setting (ai, zi) = (0, 1) for F < FH , i = 1, 2, is a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Assume now that i sets (ai, zi) = (0, 1). If j sets (aj , zj) = (0, 1),
its profits are pic(0, 1) = pc − β − 1/2 − ρϕ (2− ρϕ)F . If j sets (aj , zj) =
(1, 0), its profits are pic(1, 0) = pc − β + 1/2− ρ [1 + (1− ρ)ϕ]F . There exists
FT ∈ <+ such that: for F < FT , j maximizes profits with an effort allocation
(aj , zj) = (1, 0), and for F > FT , j maximizes profits with an effort allocation
(aj , zj) = (0, 1). Thus, setting (ai, zi) = (0, 1) for F > FT , i = 1, 2, is a Nash
equilibrium.
Since FT =
1
ρ(1−ϕ)(1−ρϕ) <
1
ρ(1−ϕ)(1−ρ) = FH , for F ∈ (FT , FH) there
are two equilibria: one in which firms maximize productive efficiency, and other
in which they maximize concealment. With a little bit of algebra one can proof
that the latter yields higher profits. Thus, firms set (ai, zi) = (1, 0) for F < FT ,
and (ai, zi) = (0, 1) otherwise, i = 1, 2.
Deviation: Assume i deviates: qdi = 2.
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For F < FT , j sets (aj , zj) = (1, 0). If i sets (ai, zi) = (2, 0), its profits
are pid (2, 0) = 2 (pc − β) + 2 − ρ (2− ρ)F . If i sets (ai, zi) = (1, 1), its profits
are pid (1, 1) = 2 (pc − β)− ρ [1 + ϕ (1− ρ)]F . Comparing profits, i maximizes
profits by setting (ai, zi) = (2, 0).
For F > FT firm j sets (aj , zj) = (0, 1). If i sets (ai, zi) = (2, 0), its
profits are pid (2, 0) = 2 (pc − β) + 2 − ρ [1 + ϕ (1− ρ)]F . If i sets (ai, zi) =
(1, 1), its profits are pid (1, 1) = 2 (pc − β) − ρϕ (2− ρϕ)F . Comparing profits:
i maximizes profits by setting (ai, zi) = (2, 0) for F ∈ (FT , 2FT ), and (ai, zi) =
(1, 1), otherwise.
Incentive compatibility constraint under perfect collusion:
For F < FT , (a
c
i , z
c
i ) = (1, 0) and
(
adi , z
d
i
)
= (2, 0). Thus, ICC is:
v − β + 3
2
≤ δ
1− δ
[
v − β + 1
2
− ρ (2− ρ) F
]
For F ∈ (FT , 2FT ), (aci , zci ) = (0, 1) and
(
adi , z
d
i
)
= (2, 0). Thus, ICC is:
v − β + 5
2
− ρ [1− ϕ (1− ρϕ)] F ≤ δ
1− δ
[
v − β − 1
2
− ρϕ (2− ρϕ) F ]
Finally, for F > 2FT , (a
c
i , z
c
i ) = (0, 1) and
(
adi , z
d
i
)
= (1, 1). Thus, ICC is:
v − β + 1
2
≤ δ
1− δ
[
v − β − 1
2
− ρϕ (2− ρϕ) F ]
Introducing warnings
Firm i’s problem is to choose price and effort levels that maximize:
Πi = [ pi − (β − ai) ] qi − (ai + zi)
2
2
− [Wi ϕi (1− ρϕj) + ρϕj ] F
Solving, firm i’s optimal behavior is given by: ai+ zi = qi, with zi ∈ {0, 1},
i = 1, 2.
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Collusion: Under collusion, qci = 1, thus there are two alternative effort
allocations: (ai, zi) = {(1, 0) , (0, 1)}.
Assume Wi = 0. Since i is not warned, zi = 0. Thus, (ai, zi) = (1, 0) and
i’s expected profits are:
pici,Wi=0 (1, 0 | Wj) = pc − β + 1/2− ρϕjF
Now, assume Wi = 1. With probability ρ, firm j is warned too (Wj = 1),
and thus i behaves as in the setup with industry-specific policies when W = 1;
i.e., firm i behaves as Lemma 3 states for W = 1.
With probability 1 − ρ, firm j is not warned (Wj = 0). In this case, any
reduction in the cartel probability of detection depends on i’s effort devoted to
concealment. If i sets (ai, zi) = (1, 0), its profits are:
pici,Wi=1 (1, 0 | Wj = 0) = pc − β + 1/2− F
and if i sets (ai, zi) = (0, 1), its profits are
pici,Wi=1 (0, 1 | Wj = 0) = pc − β − 1/2− ϕF
Comparing profits: i maximizes profits by setting (ai, zi) = (1, 0) for F < FK =
1
1−ϕ , and (ai, zi) = (0, 1), otherwise.
Deviation: Assume i deviates: qdi = 2.
Assume Wi = 0. Since the cartel probability of detection does not depend
on i’s effort allocation, i sets
(
adi , z
d
i
)
= (2, 0).
Now, assume Wi = 1. With probability ρ, Wj = 1. In this case, i behaves
as in the setup with industry-specific policies when W = 1; i.e., firm i behaves
as Lemma 4 states for W = 1.
With probability 1 − ρ, Wj = 0. In this case, any reduction in the cartel
probability of detection depends on i’s effort devoted to concealment. If i sets
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(ai, zi) = (2, 0), its profits are:
pidi,Wi=1 (2, 0 | Wj = 0) = 2 (pc − β) + 2− F
and if i sets (ai, zi) = (1, 1), its profits are
pidi,Wi=1 (1, 1 | Wj = 0) = 2 (pc − β)− ϕF
Comparing profits: i maximizes profits by setting (ai, zi) = (2, 0) for F < 2FK ,
and (ai, zi) = (1, 1), otherwise.
Incentive compatibility constraint under perfect collusion: With a
little bit of algebra, ICC is:
For F < FK :
v − β + 3
2
≤ δ
1− δ
[
v − β + 1
2
− ρ (2− ρ) F
]
For F ∈ (FK , FN ):
v − β + 3
2
≤ δ
1− δ
[
v − β + 1
2
− ρ (1− ρ)− ρ (2− ρ) [ρ+ (1− ρ)ϕ]F ]
Finally, for F > FN :
v − β + 3
2
≤ δ
1− δ
[
v − β + 1
2
− ρ− ρϕ (2− ρϕ) F ]
Effects of warnings on deterrence and firms’ productive efficiency:
(i) For F < FK , the warning program has no effect on deterrence, neither
on cartel’s productive efficiency.
(ii) For F ∈ (FK , FN ), the warning program facilitates collusion and creates
productive inefficiencies on cartels.
(iii) For F ∈ (FN , 2FK), the warning program facilitates collusion and
creates productive inefficiencies on cartels if FT > 2FK or if FT < 2FK and
F < FT .
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(iv) For F ∈ (2FK , 2FN ), the warning program facilitates collusion and
creates productive inefficiencies on cartels if FT > 2FN or if FT ∈ (2FK , 2FN )
and F < FT .
(v) For F > 2FN , the warning program facilitates collusion if (a) FT > 2FN
and F < FT , or (b) FT < 2FN and F < 2FT . In case (a) the program also
creates productive inefficiencies on cartels. Finally, it can holds (c) FT < 2FN
and F > 2FT . In this case, there exists ρ
∗ such that: for ρ < ρ∗, the program
facilitates collusion, but for ρ > ρ∗, the program improves deterrence.
 Lemma 11: Recalling equation 3.3, firm’s optimal behavior is given by:
ai + zi = qi, for i = 1, 2. Under collusion (i.e., for W = 0): (i) q
c
i = 1, and (ii)
there are not detection costs. Therefore, (aci , z
c
i ) = (1, 0).
 Lemma 12: Assume i deviates: i has two units of effort to allocate
among productive efficiency and concealment (condition 3). Since deviation
can occur only in periods in which firms are not warned, detection costs are
zero. Therefore,
(
adi , z
d
i
)
= (2, 0).
 Proposition 6: Cartel’s sustainability condition without warnings:
ρ < ρE =

(2δ−1)(v−β)+2δ−3/2
δF if : F < FE
(2δ−1)(v−β)+2δ−5/2
F [δ (1−ϕ(2−ϕ))] if : F ∈ (FE , 2FE)
(2δ−1)(v−β)−1/2
δFϕ(2−ϕ) if : F > 2FE
Cartel’s sustainability condition with warnings (perfect collusion):
ρ < ρPC =
(2δ − 1) (v − β) + 2δ − 3/2
δ (v − β + 1/2− pi∗i )
where pi∗i is firm i’s profits under competition: pi
∗
i = 0 if firms play in weakly-
dominated strategies, and E [pi∗i ] = 1 if firms play in undominated strategies.
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Comparing ρIC and ρPC : there exists F
∗ ∈ <+ such that for F < F ∗,
ρE > ρPC , and for F > F
∗, ρE < ρPC .
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Chapter 4
Rewarding whistle-blowing
in a principal-agent model
4.1 Introduction
Rewards in whistle-blowing legislation imply a serious challenge to the eco-
nomic theory of enforcement. While they can improve deterrence on corporate
crime, they can also create a non desired“hunt bounty”environment inside firms
that distorts employees’ attention from production towards activities related to
gathering crime evidence. In this paper I develop a model that captures the im-
plications of rewarding whistle-blowers on deterrence and on optimal contracts
among non-offenders.
A whistle-blower is an individual who provides credible information related
to some corporate misconduct to the pertinent authority.1 The act of whistle-
blowing is not meant to cause harm to the organization. Rather, it is meant to
1The term whistle-blowing originated from the practice of English policemen who blew their
whistle when they observed the happening of some crime. The blowing of whistle alerted other
law enforcement officers and the general public that a crime was being committed.
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facilitate the public exposure of acts that occur within firms in detriment of the
interest of the firm itself or social welfare.
To encourage whistle-blowing on corporate crimes, the USA legislation of-
fers rewards to whistle-blowing. The False Claim Act (1986 and subsequent
reforms), the IRS Whistle-blower Reward Program (2006), and the recent Dodd-
Frank Act (2010), are the three main pieces of legislation governing rewards to
whistle-blowing. These pieces of legislation differ in the crime of concern and
the extent of applicability, but they have a common objective: to incentivize
employees endowed with information to report corporate crimes.2
By considering rewards as a mechanism that creates a decision problem for
employees on how to allocate effort among productive activities and activities
related to gathering crime evidence, I develop a model that analyzes the im-
plications of rewarding whistle-blowers on deterrence and on optimal contracts
among a principal and an agent that are not crime offenders.
In the model, there is a principal who owns a firm with two employees. One
employee can get personal gains from committing corporate crime, but to do so,
he has to devote costly effort. The other employee can gather crime evidence
and report it to the authority in exchange of a reward, but to do so, he has
to take effort from productive activities to locate it into activities related to
gathering crime evidence, as his effort is constrained.3
2The False Claims Act (FCA) fights fraud against the USA federal government. The FCA
makes it a crime for any person or organization to submit a record or claim for payment
for services, property or other items to the government, knowing that the information is not
true. Rewards oscillate between 15 and 30 percent of funds reimbursed to the government as
a result of the investigation.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)
rewards private reports on securities violations, including violations of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA), that result in monetary sanctions greater than 1 million. The reward
oscillates between 10 and 30 percent of the total recovery (i.e., the additional tax, penalty
and other collected amounts).
The IRS Whistle-blower Reward Program rewards private reports on international financial
crimes, including tax-fraud, money laundering, and the flow of narcotics and terrorist funding.
Detailed information on these pieces of legislation is available at:
http://www.justice.gov/
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf
http://www.irs.gov/compliance/article/0
”
id=180171,00.html
3One can think of a manager as an offender, who works as many hours as required/desired;
and a secretary as the other employee (the potential whistle-blower), who has a fixed amount
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Effort devoted to gathering crime evidence increases the probability of crime
detection, but it also reduces the probability of crime existence (as the gains
from crime are decreasing in the probability of detection) and, consequently,
the probability of obtaining the reward too. Hence, the non-offender employee’s
effort allocation depends on: (1) reward levels, (2) his effort disutility, (3) the
opportunity cost of gathering crime evidence in terms of the salary loss from less
effort devoted to production, and (4) how his effort devoted to gathering crime
evidence affects the probability of crime existence and that of crime detection.
There are two other important elements in the model. First, the principal
observes effort devoted to production, but not so effort devoted to commit crime
or to gathering crime evidence. As a result, he can not design a contract over
effort devoted to commit crime or to gathering crime evidence. Second, crime
creates an externality to the principal, positive or negative, which makes him
interested in the existence of crime or in its deterrence.
I demonstrate that while rewards can improve deterrence, they can also dis-
tort the optimal contract between the principal and the agent. With rewards,
the principal overpays effort devoted to production when he gets high positive
externalities from crime, as he wants to bias the agent’s effort allocation away
from crime detection. Similarly, the principal underpays effort devoted to pro-
duction when he gets high negative externalities from crime. There are two
extreme cases, one in which the principal hires the agent only for his activities
related to gathering crime evidence, and other in which, to reduce the probabil-
ity of crime detection, he does not hire the agent. The latter one implies that
rewards create a total loss of welfare.
By extending the analysis to private reward programs (i.e., inside-firm pro-
grams that reward the private exposure of the corporate crime), I demonstrate
how these can substitute whistle-blower programs with a beneficial effect for the
of hours per working day. Assuming that both are fully efficient in their work, working hours
and effort match perfectly. Hence, while the effort is limited for the secretary, it is not so for
the manager (the offender).
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principal and deterrence.
4.2 Related Literature
The literature on whistle-blowing can be classified into two main strands: one
that conceives whistle-blowers as individuals with altruistic concerns,4 and an-
other that conceives whistle-blowers as self-interested individuals, who decide
on whether to whistle the blow depending on an expected reward.
In this paper, I follow the latter conception. Equally important, I assume
that whistle-blowers and firm owners do not take part in the crime.5 Together,
these assumptions define a working framework appropriate for the analysis of
many corporate crimes (e.g, collusion at managerial level, the non compliance
with safety regulations, environmental crimes), but, to the best of my knowledge,
still not explored in the literature. Nevertheless, some of my results are in line
with those already found in the literature regarding rewards to whistle-blowing.
Within a setup in which offender principals bribe whistle-blowers and hold
their under-performance to avoid possible crime reports, Friebel & Guriev (2011)
demonstrate that rewards to whistle-blowing may have undesired welfare effects.
When rewards are not high enough to prevent crime, they increase losses from
under-performance and bribes, as the opportunity cost of silence is increasing in
rewards. Only reward levels that make bribes unprofitable improve deterrence,
since crime concealment depends directly on bribes. Aubert, Kovacic & Rey
(2006) analyse the same problem in a collusive game. But, in this context, even
low reward levels improve deterrence, since the decision on whether to form a
cartel can be highly sensible to the lower profits from collusion associated to
bribes and employees’ under-performance.
4Miceli and Near (1988), Dworkin and Near (1997), Miceli, Near, Rehg & Van Scotter
(2001) and (2008), Miceli (2004), among others.
5This assumption implies that (i) whistle-blowers are not regretful offenders, neither accept
a bribe for their silence, and (ii) firm owners are not crime offenders, neither encourage crime
actively.
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My results are close to these in the sense that with rewards the agent’s
payment from work may be higher than that without rewards, as the principal
may want to distort the agent’s attention away from crime detection. But in my
setup, this is not associated to a contract outside the law or under-performance,
as the higher payment attempts to focus the agent’s attention in productive
activities and, in none of the cases, allows for work inefficiencies. I also find that
high rewards can improve deterrence, but mostly if the principal is interested on
it, which is exactly the opposite setup of Friebel et.al (2011) and Aubert et.al
(2006). On the contrary, as in my setup the principal can dispense with the
whistle-blower, the combination of high rewards and a principal against crime
deterrence implies no contract between the principal and the agent, and thus a
total loss of welfare.
Within the literature of rewards to whistle-blowing stands out the liter-
ature of leniency programs, that analyzes the effects of offering amnesties to
crime offenders in exchange of their collaboration in the detection of crime.
This literature can be classified in two main strands: one that focuses on indi-
vidual wrongdoers that commit occasional crimes, and another that focuses on
corporate wrongdoers that systematically commit the same crime, particularly
collusion.
Regarding leniency and occasional crimes, Kaplow & Shavell (1994), Malik
(1993) and Innes (1999) stand out. Assuming high fines under crime detection,
Kaplow & Shavell (1994) discuss the beneficial effects of leniency programs for
deterrence in environmental crimes, to which Malik (1993) adds their beneficial
effects associated to lower auditing costs in regulation. Inees (1999) extends
these works by studying prospective ex-post benefits from remediation, as the
clean-up activity is a central component of environmental law enforcement. Iness
demonstrates how clean-up benefits and fine amnesties after self-reporting can
be equivalent policies to deter environmental crimes.
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The literature on leniency in collusion is extensive.6 Motta and Polo (2003)
is the first paper explicitly addressing the effects of leniency programs on collu-
sion in a dynamic analytical framework. They demonstrate that these programs
make enforcement more effective, but may also induce collusion since amnesties
decrease the expected cost of the misbehavior. In the optimal policy, the for-
mer effect dominates and leniency programs improve deterrence. Their main
contribution in this paper lies in that leniency improves deterrence even in the
case where the leniency application is made after an investigation has started.
Harrington (2008) extends Motta and Polo (2003) with the additional novel fea-
ture of reports along the equilibrium path: in cartels under investigation, firms
may rush non-cooperatively to report information under a sufficiently generous
leniency program (effect named Race to the Courthouse). Equilibrium reports
during prosecution take place when the realization of the probability of a suc-
cessful conviction is high. Spagnolo (2000) and Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2001,
2006) highlight the possibility that smart wrongdoers can use leniency as a
threat against deviation, which allows them to sustain cartels that would not
be sustainable in the absence of leniency programs. Hence, moderate forms of
leniency may have the counterproductive side effect of facilitating illegal trans-
actions.
Despite the fact that I consider positive rewards instead of amnesties, my
paper differs from these mainly in that I disaggregate in two the figures of the
crime offender and the whistle-blower, none of them the firm owner. This, to-
gether with a firm owner that may be interested or not in crime, allows me to
analyze private incentives to execute and deter crime beyond the firm’s costs
associated to detection (e.g., fines, clean-up activities, etc.), as well as how these
incentives are affected by the behavior of the other members of the firm. In this
context, rewards to whistle-blowing entail a wide range of effects on deterrence,
where both deterrence effects mentioned above are possible: a deterrence im-
6For an extensive analysis of the literature of leniency in collusion, please refer to Spagnolo
(2008).
90
ESSAYS ON CARTEL BEHAVIOR AND DETERRENCE POLICY
provement, mostly when the principal is interested in that; and a deterrence
loss, otherwise. As final comment, I want to add that my paper is pioneer in
getting into the firm’s ‘black-box’ to seek the efficiency effects that rewarding
non-offender whistle-blowers has in optimal contracts.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows, I introduce the model in Section
3. In Section 4, I solve it for the case in which there are no rewards (benchmark
case), and in Section 5, I solve the case with rewards. In Section 6, I consider the
implications of rewards on deterrence and on the principal’s utility. In Section
7, I extend the analysis for the case in which the principal can introduce a
private reward program regardless of the existence of a whistle-blower program.
I conclude in Section 8.
4.3 The Model
A firm operates in a competitive market. In the firm, there is a principal, the
owner of the firm, and two employees. The principal designs the contracts that
govern the relationship between the firm and each employee, and the employees
execute productive activities following these contracts. In particular, contracts
are defined on the basis of employees’ efforts devoted to production, which are
fully observable.
One employee can devote effort to commit corporate crime, which yields
him private gains g. The crime creates hard evidence that can be found through
an inspection. The other employee, instead, can not commit corporate crime,
neither get any direct payoff from it. But, given crime, he can find evidence of
it if he devotes effort to look for it.
Along this paper, I refer the former employee as ‘the offender’ and the latter
employee as ‘the agent’.
Effort is costly. Effort devoted to production is observable, but not effort
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devoted to commit crime or to the gathering of crime evidence.
To fight crime, the anti-crime authority has two instruments:
• Inspections: given crime, it is detected with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1].
• Whistle-blower program: offers a reward R to employees who present ev-
idence of corporate crime, excluding offenders. It rewards only if the
inspector fails in detecting crime.7
If crime evidence is found, the firm and the offender pay corporate and individual
fines F and f , respectively.
Finally, crime entails a direct payoff G to the principal, which can be posi-
tive or negative, G ∈ <.
In this framework, I assume that the principal can identify which employee
can commit corporate crime, i.e. he can identify which job positions give an
employee the attributes required to commit crime. But, he can not directly
observe whether there is crime in the firm, neither gather evidence of it. I
also assume that it is profitable for the principal to hire the offender employee,
despite the possibility of a corporate crime.
Regarding the agent and the offender’s activities, I assume that the of-
fender’s activities related to production and crime are not related. However,
the agent’s activities related to production and the gathering of crime evidence
are technological substitutes.
Hence, in this model, the principal decides whether to hire the agent, and if
so designs a contract for him.8 The offender decides whether to commit crime,
and if so how much effort devote to it. Finally, the agent decides whether to
7These assumptions are in line with the USA legislation of rewards to whistle-blowing.
8The agent’s effort devoted to productive activities is the only item of interest for the
purpose of a contract, since the principal (i) always hires the offender, and (ii) does not have
an instrument to distort the offender’s willingness to commit crime (as the offender’s effort
devoted to commit crime is independent of his effort devoted to productive activities).
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gather crime evidence, and if so how to allocate effort among production and
the gathering of crime evidence.
I define z, e1, e2 ∈ [0, 1], effort devoted to commit crime, to productive
activities and to gathering crime evidence, respectively.
At this point it is important to define two probabilities: The probability of
crime existence Pc, and the probability that the agent finds crime evidence given
that there exists crime Pe. I assume Pc = z, so that the higher the offender’s
effort devoted to commit crime, the higher the probability of crime existence.
Regarding Pe, I assume Pe = e2, so that, given crime, the higher the agent’s
effort devoted to gathering crime evidence, the higher the probability that he
finds it.
Finally, I assume that the agent can not falsify evidence of crime.
The timing of the game is as follows: At date 0 the principal decides whether
to hire an agent from a competitive market for agents. If so, he decides on the
contract to offer him.
For the contract, I consider a linear payment scheme for productive effort
e1: w (α, β) = α+ βe1, where α ∈ < and β ≥ 0.
In the absence of a contract, the agent has zero utility, the principal hires
only the offender and the game ends. If instead there is a contract, at date 1
the agent and the offender simultaneously decide on effort levels. At date 2,
production, crime activities and activities related to gathering crime evidence
are executed. At this time, an inspector visits the firm. The inspection ends
with a report supporting or rejecting crime. If the agent has found evidence, he
also submits a report with crime evidence to the anti-crime authority. At date
3, the principal gets a payoff Y (e1) = ye1 (with y > 0) from production and
pays w(α, β) to the agent. Besides, given crime, the principal and the offender
get payoffs G and g, respectively. If the inspector or the agent report crime
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Figure 4.1: Time-structure of the model
evidence, the firm and the offender pay F and f , respectively. The agent gets
the reward if he is the only one to report crime evidence.
In this setup, the agent’s utility function is:
U(e1, e2) = (α+ βe1)− (e1 + e2)
2
2
+ z (1− ρ) e2 R
The first term in the RHS is the agent’s utility from effort devoted to production;
the second term, his disutility from effort; and the third term, his utility from
effort devoted to gathering crime evidence. This last term is composed of the
probability of crime existence z, times the probability of the agent being the
only one to report crime evidence, (1− ρ) e2, times the reward R. I assume
R ≤ F .9
The offender’s utility function is:
O(z) = z { g − [ ρ+ (1− ρ) e2] f } − z
2
2
The first term in the RHS is the offender’s expected utility from crime. Outside
brackets, his effort devoted to commit crime. In brackets, his net gains from
crime, that depend on the agent’s effort devoted to gathering crime evidence.
The second term is the offender’s disutility from effort.
9The upper-bound R = F is consistent with a reward program funded by fines, in line with
the USA whistle-blower legislation.
94
ESSAYS ON CARTEL BEHAVIOR AND DETERRENCE POLICY
Finally, the principal’s utility function is:
V (α, β) = ye1 − (α+ βe1) + z { G− [ρ+ (1− ρ) e2] F }
The first two terms in the RHS are the principal’s net utility from the agent’s
productive activities, and the last term his externalities from crime.
4.4 The Case of No Rewards to Whistle-Blowing
As a benchmark case, assume no rewards to whistle-blowing. Without rewards,
the agent has no incentives to devote costly effort to the gathering of crime
evidence (e2 = 0). Hence, given crime, the probability of crime detection is ρ.
Solving by backward induction, at date 1 the agent and the offender choose
the levels of effort e2 and z, respectively, that maximize their utilities:
max
e1
U(e1) = α+ βe1 − e
2
1
2
max
z
O(z) = z ( g − ρ f ) − z
2
2
For expository reasons, throughout the paper I set g = f = 1 10, so that the
offender’s problem simplifies to:
max
z
O(z) = z (1− ρ)− z
2
2
(4.1)
Lemma 16 Without rewards to whistle-blowing, effort devoted to crime is zB =
1− ρ, and effort devoted to production is eB1 = min {β, 1}.
Effort levels zB and eB1 equate the agent and the offender’s marginal utility
and marginal disutility, respectively. The supra-index B denotes the Bench-
marck case.
10This simplification does not restrict the results of the paper.
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At date 0, the principal chooses a contract w(α, β) that maximizes his
utility and is incentive compatible and acceptable to the agent:
max
α,β
V (α, β) = ye1 − (α+ βe1)
s.t. e1 ∈ argmax
e′1
{
α+ βe′1 −
e′21
2
}
(IC)
α+ βe1 − e
2
1
2
≥ 0 (PC)
The (IC) and the (PC) are the agent’s incentive compatibility and partici-
pation constraints, respectively.
Proposition 12 Without rewards to whistle-blowing, the optimal contract w
(
αB , βB
)
is given by a marginal payment on productive effort given as follows:
βB =

y if : y ≤ 1
1 if : y > 1
and αB such that the principal gets all the agent’s surplus.
Corollary 6 Without rewards to whistle-blowing, the agent exerts effort eB1 =
min {y, 1} at the optimal contract.
Without rewards to whistle-blowing, the principal offers an efficient con-
tract that pays effort depending on the marginal productivity from work and
in which the agent makes the effort level that equates his marginal utility and
marginal disutility from effort. This contract is independent of z.
4.5 Rewarding Whistle-Blowing
Rewards to whistle-blowing induce the agent to devote costly effort to the gath-
ering of crime evidence. Given crime, this effort raises the probability of de-
tection and, therefore, reduces the offender’s willingness to commit crime. The
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latter, in return, reduces the agent’s incentives to gather crime evidence, since
the probability of crime existence is downward sloping in effort devoted to com-
mit crime. It follows that, with rewards, efforts devoted to commit crime and
to gathering crime evidence depend on each other.
For the principal, rewards to whistle-blowing imply a shift in utility from
changes in his net externalities from crime and in the optimal contract. The
former change arises from (now) endogenous probabilities of crime existence and
condemnation. The latter change arises from the property of technical substi-
tutability in the agent’s effort: with rewards, the agent may wish to substitute
effort devoted to productive activities by effort devoted to activities related to
gathering crime evidence.
In what follows I solve the optimal contract between the principal and the
agent in two steps. First, I solve the agent’s and the offender’s simultaneous
effort decisions. Second, I solve the principal-agent problem given those effort
decisions (i.e., I solve the optimal contract for e1).
4.5.1 The Agent’s and Offender’s Simultaneous Effort Choices
At date 1, the agent choses the levels of efforts e1 and e2 that maximize his
utility taking z as given:
max
e1,e2
U(e1, e2) = α+ βe1 − (e1 + e2)
2
2
+ (1− ρ) z e2 R (4.2)
And the offender chooses the level of z that maximizes his utility taking e2
as given:
max
z
O(z) = z {1− [ρ+ (1− ρ) e2]} − z
2
2
(4.3)
Lemma 17 With rewards to whistle-blowing, there exist β0 ∈ [0, 1), β1 =
min {β1a, β1b} ∈ [0, 2), with β0 < β1, and Rˆ = 1(1−ρ)2 , such that:
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(i) For β < β0 : (e1, e2) = (0 , β0) and z = (1− ρ) (1− β0).
(ii) For β ∈ [β0, β1]: e1, e2, z ∈ [0, 1], with e1 and z upward sloping in β and e2
downward sloping in β:
e2 = β − e1 = 1− β
(1− ρ)2R (4.4)
z = (1− ρ) (1− e2) = β
(1− ρ)R (4.5)
(iii) For β > β1 and
- R < Rˆ : (e1, e2) = (min {β, 1} , 0) and z = (1− ρ).
- R > Rˆ : (e1, e2) = (1 , β1b − 1) and z = (1− ρ) (2− β1b).
Boundaries β0 and β1 are upward sloping in R.
11
For all values of the parameters β and R, the offender’s effort devoted to
commit crime is given by the probability of not being discovered, neither by the
inspector (1− ρ), nor by the agent (1− e2). Thus, the higher the agent’s effort
devoted to gathering crime evidence, the lower the offender’s effort devoted to
crime.
What about the agent’s effort allocation? For β < β0, the e2’s marginal
contribution to the agent’s utility is higher than the e1’s marginal contribution,
as the agent is paid (relatively) little for each unit of effort devoted to production.
Hence, he only devotes effort to gathering crime evidence. How much effort? It
depends on R: the higher the level of R, the higher the e2.
For β ∈ [β0, β1] the agent allocates effort among production and the gath-
ering of crime evidence. Equation (4.4) states the agent’s effort allocation in
11In particular:
β0 =
(1− ρ)2R
1 + (1− ρ)2R < 1 β1b = 2β0 β1a = (1− ρ)
2R
Whether β1a higher (lower) than β1b depends on the policy instruments R and ρ: β1a < β1b
⇐⇒ R < Rˆ = 1
(1−ρ)2 .
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terms of the e1’s and the e2’s marginal contributions to the agent’s utility. Each
level of effort is positively related to its own marginal contribution and nega-
tively related to that of the other one. In terms of β, this implies that the agent
substitutes e2 for e1 as β increases (i.e., the higher the value of β, the more
biased is the agent’s effort allocation towards productive activities), and vice
versa. Note that the agent’s total effort is positively related to β (e1 + e2 = β),
so that total effort increases with β.
Equation (4.5) states the offender’s effort devoted to commit crime in terms
of e2, first, and in terms of β and R, second. The higher is the agent’s relative
payment from gathering crime evidence (i.e., the lower the ratio β/R), the more
biased is the agent’s effort allocation towards this activity, and so the lower is
the offender’s effort devoted to crime.
Finally, for β > β1, the agent maximizes effort devoted to production, as
he is paid a high amount for it. What about effort devoted to gathering crime
evidence? The agent devotes effort to this activity if and only if the reward
is high enough, R > Rˆ. Hence, for high reward values, the agent devotes one
unit of effort to productive activities and effort to gathering crime evidence
depending on R: the higher the reward, the higher the agent’s effort devoted to
gathering crime evidence. Instead, for low reward values, the agent only devotes
effort to productive activities (at most one unit).12
Note that for β > β1 the offender’s effort devoted to commit crime is
maximum, as the agent minimizes effort devoted to gathering crime evidence.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the agent’s effort allocation for different values of
β for y ≤ 1 and the case values R < Rˆ and R > Rˆ, respectively.
12For explanatory purposes, and w.l.o.g., I assume y ≤ 1 in all explanations throughout this
section, although the general results hold for all values of y.
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e1, e2
e1
e1(β1a)
0 β1bβ0 β
e2
β1=β1a
β0
1
Figure 4.2: The agent’s effort allocation in terms of β for y ≤ 1 and low values of the
reward (R < Rˆ).
1
e1, e2
e1
0
β0
β1 =  β1bβ0
β1b -1
β
e2
1
Figure 4.3: The agent’s effort allocation in terms of β for y ≤ 1 and high values of
the reward (R > Rˆ).
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4.5.2 The Principal-Agent Problem
At date 0, the principal chooses a contract w(α, β) that maximizes his utility
and is incentive compatible to the agent and acceptable to both:
max
α,β
V (α, β) = ye1 − (α+ βe1) + z { G− [ρ+ (1− ρ) e2] F }
s.t : (e1, e2) ∈ argmax
e
′
1,e
′
2
α+ βe′1 −
(
e
′
1 + e
′
2
)2
2
+ (1− ρ) ze′2R
 (ICa)
z = (1− ρ) (1− e2) (ICo)
α+ βe1 − (e1 + e2)
2
2
+ (1− ρ) ze2R ≥ 0 (PCa)
ye1 − (α+ βe1) + z { G− [ρ+ (1− ρ) e2] F } ≥ (1− ρ) ( G− ρF ) (PCp)
The (ICa) and the (ICo) are the agent and the offender’s incentive com-
patibility constraints, respectively; and the (PCa) and the (PCp) are the agent
and the principal’s participation constraints, respectively.
Regarding the (PCp), the principal may be better off by not hiring the
agent. In his decision, he compares the payoffs he gets from not hiring the agent
(RHS) and from hiring him (LHS). The principal hires the agent if, in doing
that, he gets the highest payoff.
In what follows I solve the principal-agent problem for the optimal effort
choices obtained in Section 5.1. To do it, I solve first the optimal contract for
a ‘semi-constrained’ problem without the (PCp). I denote this problem the
Semi-Constrained Principal-Agent (SCPA) problem. Second, I check whether
the (PCp) holds at the optimal contract of the SCPA problem.
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Solving the SCPA Problem
Plugging equations (4.4), (4.5) and the (PCa) binding into the principal’s ob-
jective function and solving for β, the interior solution for β is given by:
β∗ = ϕ
{
y + k
[
(1− ρ) (G− F ) + (1− ρ)2R
] }
(4.6)
The coefficient k measures the principal’s capability to distort the agent’s
effort allocation through β, k = −∂e2∂β /∂e1∂β = 11+(1−ρ)2R . The coefficient ϕ is a
multiplier with ∂ϕ∂R < 0 and limR→∞ ϕ = 1.
13
Equation (4.6) states the agent’s marginal payment for e1 in terms of both
effort’s (e1 and e2) marginal contributions to the principal’s utility. In braces,
the first term is the e1’s marginal contribution to production (y). The higher
the e1’s marginal contribution to production the more interested is the principal
in e1, and so the higher the β he is willing to pay for it.
The second term in braces is the e2’s marginal contribution to the princi-
pal’s utility given G, F and R. This term can be positive or negative. Inside
brackets: The higher is the payoff G, the higher is the principal’s benefit from
crime, and so the higher the β he is willing to pay to reduce e2. The higher is
the corporate fine F , the lower is the principal’s benefit from crime, and so the
lower the β he is willing to pay to increase e2. Finally, the higher is the reward
R, the higher is the level of e2 the agent is willing to make, and so also the higher
are the probability of detection and the β the principal has to pay to reduce e2.
Outside brackets, the coefficient k measures the principal’s capability to distort
the agent’s effort allocation through β: the higher is the reward, the lower is
the principal’s capability to govern over the agent’s effort allocation ( ∂k∂R < 0).
Note that the effect of rewards is ambiguous: while a reward increase induces
the principal to increase β to discourage e2, it also induces him to reduce β, as
for high reward levels he can not govern over the agent’s effort allocation.
13Particularly: ϕ =
R[1+(1−ρ)2R]
(1−ρ)2R2+2(R−F ) , positive for R > Rh =
√
1+2F (1−ρ)2−1
(1−ρ)2 .
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Proposition 2 characterizes β∗ in terms of G, and Corollary 2 states the
comparative statics of β∗ with respect to R.
Proposition 13 (Interior solution) There exists G, such that effort devoted to
production is underpaid with respect to the benchmark case (β∗ < y) if and only
if G < G.
Corollary 7 (i) There exists G, with G > G, such that a reward increase rises
β∗ if and only if G < G.
(ii) β∗ approaches y as R goes to infinity.
For the intuition behind these results, consider a reward increase: if G < G,
crime is so ‘bad news’ to the principal that he underpays e1 to bias the agent’s
effort allocation towards activities related to gathering crime evidence. But,
as R goes up, the agent gets incentives from outside the firm to do so and, to
restore incentives, the principal increases β.
If, instead, G > G, crime is so ‘good news’ to the principal that he overpays
e1 to bias the agent’s effort allocation away from crime detection. As R goes up,
the agent gets incentives from outside the firm to gather crime evidence so, to
restore incentives, the principal increases β. However, successive increases in R
make this strategy increasingly costly to the principal and so, for a high enough
value of R, he finds himself better off by resigning to it and focusing only on
the incentives on e1. In terms of Corollary 2, for G > G we only observe the
negative relationship between β and R. This is due to the fact that for G > G,
β is too high and it is not profitable for the principal to increase it further.
The second point of Corollary 2 is straightforward now: the higher the
value of R, the lower the principal’s capability (and possibly interest as well) to
govern over the agent’s effort allocation through β. So, regardless of the value
of G, β∗ approaches its value for the benchmark case (y) for high values of R.
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In the light of these results, it will be useful to define β’s interior solution
in terms of R:
Corollary 8 There exist R0, R1, with 0 ≤ R0 ≤ R1, such that: R ∈ [R0, R1]
⇔ β∗ ∈ [β0, β1].
CORNER SOLUTIONS: For R /∈ [R0, R1], there is no optimal contract
profitable to both principal and agent, with β∗ and e1, e2 ∈ (0, 1). Nevertheless,
both parties can still find it profitable to celebrate a contract:
• For R > R1 (i.e., β < β0), the principal hires the agent only to gather
crime evidence. Therefore, he sets β = 0.14
• For R < R0 (i.e., β > β1), the principal hires the agent for his productive
activities, regardless of his possible activities related to gathering crime
evidence.15 For low reward levels (R < Rˆ), the agent does not devote
effort to gathering crime evidence, thus the principal will try to achieve
productive efficiency: β = e1 = min {y, 1}. However, this will be only
possible if y > β1. Thus, in this corner solution, the principal sets: β =
min {max {β1a, y} , 1} (remember that for R < Rˆ, β1 = β1a).
Instead, for high reward levels (R > Rˆ), the agent devotes effort to gath-
ering crime evidence and maximizes effort devoted to work (e1 = 1). An
increase of β beyond β1 has no impact on e1, as e1 has already taken its
maximum value, thus the principal sets β = β1 = β1b (remember that for
R > Rˆ, β1 = β1b).
Summing up, the contract that solves the SCPA problem is the ‘candidate
contract’ for the optimal contract. For medium/low reward values, this contract
allows activities related to gathering crime evidence to co-exist with productive
14For β < β0, the corner solution is (e1, e2) = (0 , β0). As e2 does not depend on the
particular value that β takes in the interval [0, β0), w.l.o.g. β can be set equal to zero.
15For R < R0 effort e2 is minimized. Particularly, when R < Rˆ, e2 = 0.
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Figure 4.4: Candidate marginal payment to productive effort for y ≤ 1 and G > G
(highlighted). Boundaries β0 and β1 in solid lines, and the interior solution β
∗ in
dashed line. Productive effort is efficiently paid for low reward values and overpaid for
medium/high reward values. For sufficiently high reward values (R > R1), β = 0.
activities (e1 > 0, e2 ≥ 0). Instead, for high reward values, this contract allows
only for activities related to gathering crime evidence (e1 = 0 and e2 > 0). Full
productive efficiency can be achieved for reward values close to zero, otherwise
productive effort is overpaid or underpaid with respect to the benchmark case
(Figures 4.4 and 4.5).
The Principal’s Participation Constraint and the Optimal Contract
Under what conditions is the candidate contract an optimal contract? Plugging
the candidate contract w (α, β) of the SCPA model and the optimal effort levels,
obtained in Section 5.1, in the (PCp), we obtain the following:
Proposition 14 With rewards to whistle-blowing, there exist Rˆ, G0, G1, Ga <
Gb, and yˆ, such that the principal hires the agent if and only if:
(i) R ∈ [R0, R1] and y > yˆ, or if y < yˆ but G /∈ (Ga, Gb);
(ii) R > R1 and G < G0; and
(iii) R < min
{
R0, Rˆ
}
, or if R ∈ (Rˆ, R0) and G < G1.
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Figure 4.5: Candidate marginal payment to productive effort for y ≤ 1 and G < G
(highlighted). Boundaries β0 and β1 in solid lines, and the interior solution β
∗ in
dashed line. Productive effort is efficiently paid for low reward values and underpaid
for medium/high reward values. For sufficiently high reward values (R > R1), β = 0.
Proposition 3 says that there is a contract in three cases. First, when the
agent is not interested in gathering crime evidence. This is the benchmark case,
that arises for very low reward values
(
R < min
{
R0, Rˆ
})
.
Second, when the agent’s productive activities are profitable enough to
compensate the principal’s losses from the activities related to gathering crime
evidence. This case arises for intermediate reward values and a high enough e1’s
marginal productivity (R ∈ [R0, R1] and y > yˆ, or if y < yˆ and G > Gb).16
Third, when the agent’s activities related to gathering crime evidence are
profitable to the principal. This case completes Proposition 3 and arises when
crime creates negative externalities to the principal, or if positive, too little.17
16For R ∈ [R0, R1], the principal knows that if he hires the agent, this will allocate effort
among production and the gathering of crime evidence. For high values of y, hiring the agent
is profitable to the principal regardless of e2. For low values of y, instead, this is so if and
only if G /∈ (Ga, Gb). A low payoff from crime (G < Ga), makes deterrence desirable to
the principal, hence he hires the agent regardless of the detrimental effect that e2 has on
production. A high payoff from crime (G > Gb), instead, makes deterrence not desirable to
the principal, but such a high payoff allows him to set β high enough to reduce e2 in such a
way that hiring the agent is still profitable.
17This case contemplates three sub-cases: for R > R1, the principal hires the agent to make
activities related to gathering crime evidence. Such a contract takes place if and only if the
principal’s payoff from crime is low enough (G < G0).
For R ∈ [R0, R1] and y < yˆ, the agent allocates effort among production and the gathering
of crime evidence. Such a contract takes place if and only if the principal’s payoff from crime
is low enough (G < Ga).
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Proposition 4 defines the principal-agent contract in the presence of re-
wards.
Proposition 15 With rewards to whistle-blowing, the principal-agent contract
w (α, β) is given by a marginal payment on productive effort given as follows:
(i) For R ∈ [R0, R1]: β is defined as in equation (4.6).
(ii) For R > R1: β = 0.
(iii) For R < R0 and
- R < Rˆ: β = min
{
max
{
β1a = (1− ρ)2R, y
}
, 1
}
, or if
- R > Rˆ: β = β1b =
2(1−ρ)2R
1+(1−ρ)2R
and α such that the principal gets all the agent’s surplus.
Introducing rewards to whistle-blowing affects the optimal contract between
the principal and the agent in two ways: the decision on whether to celebrate the
contract (Proposition 3), and if so, the values α and β that define it (Proposition
4).
Without rewards, there is always a contract, defined over the agent’s marginal
productivity from effort devoted to productive activities. With rewards, instead,
the existence of contract depends on the level of the reward, on the principal’s
externalities from crime and, only in third place, on the agent’s marginal pro-
ductivity from effort devoted to productive activities. Together, high rewards
and high externalities from crime, create an environment in which hiring the
agent is too costly for the principal. A low marginal productivity from effort
devoted to production aggravates the situation. Therefore, we should expect no
contract between the principal and the agent in these cases.
For R < R0, the agent maximizes effort devoted to production and devotes effort to gath-
ering crime evidence depending on the value of R. If R < Rˆ, his effort devoted to gathering
crime evidence is zero, as the reward is too low (benchmark case). But, if R > Rˆ, his effort
devoted to gathering crime evidence is positive. In this case, there is a contract if and only if
the principal’s payoff from crime is low enough (G < G1).
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In the cases in which there is still a contract, productive efficiency can be
achieved for reward values close to zero. Otherwise, productive effort is overpaid
or underpaid with respect to the benchmark case.
4.6 Implications of Rewarding Whistle-Blowers
4.6.1 Deterrence
Through rewards to whistle-blowing, the anti-crime authority distorts the prob-
ability of crime existence: without rewards, this probability is Pc(e2 = 0) =
(1− ρ), with rewards, it is Pc(e2) = (1− ρ) (1− e2). Corollary 4 follows imme-
diately:
Corollary 9 The introduction of rewards to whistle-blowing improves deter-
rence if and only if, after rewards, there is a contract and e2 > 0.
What if, given e2 > 0, there is a reward increase?
Lemma 18 (Assume e2 > 0) A reward increase assures an improvement in
deterrence for:
(i) low (high) reward values, and
(ii) intermediate reward values and high values of G.
For low and high values of R, the agent chooses effort devoted to gathering
crime evidence based solely on the value of R. In particular, the higher the
reward, the higher his effort devoted to this activity. Therefore, unless e2 is
already 1 (its maximum value), a reward increase improves deterrence.
Instead, for intermediate reward values, the agent considers both R and
β, to choose how much effort to devote to gathering crime evidence. In this
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case, a reward increase can have two counter-effects on e2: whereas it directly
encourages e2, it may also discourage e2 (indirectly) through its impact on β.
To see this, consider the case in which crime is not desired by the principal
(i.e., G is low). In this case, a reward increase is ‘good news’ to him: as e2 is
encouraged by the public authority, he can restore productive efficiency with a
higher β. But, in return, the higher β induces the agent to reduce e2. Hence,
the reward increase improves deterrence if and only if the increase in e2 due to
the higher R more than compensates its subsequent reduction due to the higher
β. Thus, for ∂β∂R > 0 (which holds for low values of G), the deterrence effect of
a reward increase is ambiguous.
However, for ∂β∂R < 0 (which holds for high values of G), it is assured a gain
in deterrence after a reward increase, as e2 goes up due to the higher R and the
lower β.
As a final comment, note that ∂β∂R < 0 implies that (i) e1 is overpaid, as the
principal gets high externalities from crime, and (ii) the principal can not use
β to bias the agent’s effort allocation away from crime detection, as he can not
increase β more. In this scenario, too much incentives towards the gathering of
crime evidence (i.e., successive reward increases), can put the existence of the
contract at risk, as the principal may find himself better off by not hiring the
agent and keeping crime in the firm. Therefore, the anti-crime authority should
be cautious on the level of the reward, such that encouraging whistle-blowing
without risking the existence of the contract.
4.6.2 The Principal’s Utility with Rewards
The introduction of rewards to whistle-blowing is profitable for the principal if
his utility with rewards is higher than that without rewards; i.e., if the following
condition holds:
V (α(R), β(R)) ≥ y
2
2
+ (1− ρ) (G− ρF ) (4.7)
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The LHS is the principal’s utility in the presence of rewards and the RHS
his utility for the benchmark case. Note that condition (4.7) is similar to (PCp)
described in Section 5.2, but for the additional term y
2
2 in the RHS. This term
states the principal’s net utility from hiring the agent in the absence of re-
wards.18 This similarity suggests that the introduction of rewards implies a
gain in utility for the principal if and only if those conditions for which (PCp)
holds are strong enough to ensure compliance in excess over y
2
2 .
Lemma 19 The introduction of rewards implies a gain in utility for the prin-
cipal if and only if rewards do not discourage the principal from hiring the agent
and crime is highly detrimental for the principal (i.e., G is low enough).
When rewards discourage the principal from hiring the agent, the principal
obtains a net payoff from crime (1− ρ) (G− ρF ) with and without rewards.
However, without rewards he also obtains a positive payoff from the agent’s
work
(
y2/2
)
. Undoubtedly, the principal is better off without rewards.
When rewards do not discourage the principal from hiring the agent, his
net payoffs from crime and from the agent’s work differ on whether there are
rewards or not. In this case, the introduction of rewards implies a gain in utility
for the principal if these allow him to reduce an undesired (and unprofitable)
crime for him; i.e., if G is low enough.
At this point, it is worth to mention two cases in which the principal is
indifferent regarding the introduction of rewards.19 First, when rewards are
very low. In this case, the agent is not interested in gathering crime evidence
and the principal can offer an efficient contract almost always. Provided the
18Without rewards, the principal always hires the agent. From Proposition 1 and Corollary
1, the principal’s utility for the benchmark case is: U = y
2
2
+ (1− ρ) (G− ρF ) if y ≤ 1, and
U = y− 1
2
+(1− ρ) (G− ρF ) if y > 1. Following the analysis in previous sections, and w.l.o.g.,
I assume y ≤ 1 in condition (4.7) and in the explanations that follow it , although the general
results from this section hold for all values of y.
19These cases correspond to scenarios for which (PCp) holds with inequality and condition
(4.7) holds with equality.
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efficient contract, the principal is indifferent to the introduction of rewards.20
Second, when the principal’s net gains from crime are high enough to bias the
agent’s effort allocation away from crime detection. In this case, the principal
can set α and β such that inducing the agent an effort allocation close to that
for the benchmark case (e2 → 0 and e1 → eB1 ). Provided this contract (although
not efficient as productive work is overpaid), the principal is indifferent to the
introduction of rewards.21
A second issue to discuss refers to how a reward increase affects the prin-
cipal’s utility. Assuming that it is profitable for the principal to hire the agent,
what if rewards go up?
Lemma 20 (Assume contract) A reward increase makes the principal’s utility
to go up if the agent’s activities related to gathering crime evidence are profitable
to the principal.
For low reward values (R < R0), the principal hires the agent for his pro-
ductive activities, regardless of e2, and the agent devotes effort to gathering
crime evidence depending on R: the higher the reward, the higher this effort
level. In this scenario, a reward increase implies a gain in utility for the principal
if and only if he is interested in crime detection.
For high reward values (R > R1), the principal hires the agent for his
activities related to gathering crime evidence. In this case, a reward increase
always implies a gain in utility for the principal, as e2 is upward sloping in R.
For R ∈ [R0, R1], the agent devotes effort to production and to the gather-
ing of crime evidence, and the principal underpays/overpays productive effort.
20For R < min
{
R0, Rˆ
}
, the optimal contract is given by β = min {max {β1a, y} , 1} and α
such that the principal gets all the agent’s surplus. At this contract, (e1, e2) = (β, 0). The
principal is indifferent regarding the introduction of rewards if these do not prevent him to
offer the agent the efficient contract: β = e1 = y if y ≤ 1, or β = e1 = 1 if y > 1.
21High values of G allow the principal to overpay work such that inducing e2 → 0 and
e1 → eB1 . Since α is set such that the principal get’s all the agents surplus, the principal
retrieves any overpayment and his utility from hiring the agent is that for the benchmark
case.
111
Mar´ıa C. Avramovich
In this scenario, a reward increase has two effects on the principal’s utility.
First, a utility gain through a higher productive efficiency, as β approaches y
with successive increases in R (Corollary 2). Second, a utility change due to a
higher/lower net payoff from crime: an increase in R distorts the agent’s effort
allocation and, through it, the probability of crime existence. When crime is
undesired by the principal (G is low), higher values of R imply less crime and
the principal’s net payoff from crime goes up. In this case, an increase in R
raises the principal’s utility undoubtedly. However, when crime is desired by
the principal (G is high), the effect of higher values of R in the principal’s net
payoff from crime is, a priori, unknown (it depends on the parameters of the
model); and therefore so is the final effect on the principal’s utility.
4.7 Private Reward Programs
Private Reward Programs (PRPs) work as Whistle-Blower Programs (WBPs):
both reward whistle-blowers to encourage the exposure of corporate crime. How-
ever, PRPs avoid the detection costs associated to the public exposure of the
wrongdoing, as the whistle-blow is private to the firm. Instead, PRPs have to
afford the payment of rewards.
To introduce PRPs in the model, I assume that these and WBPs are equally
efficient in deterring crime. This assumption implies that the offender’s behavior
with respect to crime does not depend on the formal system used by the agent
to report the evidence, but, as I have assumed so far, on how much effort the
agent devotes to gathering crime evidence.
In this context, the principal chooses whether to create a PRP that rewards
r > 0 to the agent for the private exposure of the corporate crime and offer him
a contract w (α(r), β(r)); or, instead, to offer the agent a contract (α(R), β(R)),
without PRP (r = 0).
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The agent and the offender’s effort choices: With PRPs, the
agent and the offender’s effort choices are as described for WBPs (Section 5.1),
as PRPs and WBPs are equally efficient in deterring crime. One simply has to
consider r instead of R.
The principal-agent problem: The principal’s problem consists on
whether to introduce a PRP and, if so, on defining the value of r.
Assuming the existence of a WBP, this problem is described as follows:
max
α,β,r
V (α, β, r) = ye1 − (α+ βe1) + z ( G− ρF ) + z (1− ρ) e2 r
s.t : (e1, e2) ∈ argmax
e
′
1,e
′
2
α+ βe′1 −
(
e
′
1 + e
′
2
)2
2
+ (1− ρ) ze′2r
 (ICa)
z = (1− ρ) (1− e2) (ICo)
α+ βe1 − (e1 + e2)
2
2
+ z (1− ρ) e2 r ≥ 0 (PCa)
ye1 − (α+ βe1) + z ( G− ρF ) + z (1− ρ) e2 r
≥ max { V (α(R), β(R)) , (1− ρ) (G− ρF ) } (PCp)
The principal’s outside option is his highest possible payoff for r = 0.
In the case in which there is no WBP the problem is described alike, but for
the RHS of (PCp) which is given by the principal’s net payoff for the benchmark
case:22 y
2
2 + (1− ρ) (G− ρF ).
Solving, the optimal contract goes as follows:
22Following the analysis in previous sections, and w.l.o.g., I assume y ≤ 1 in (PCp) for the
benchmark case, although the general results from this section hold for all values of y.
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Proposition 16 The principal creates a PRP that offers r > 0 to the agent for
the private report of crime evidence if and only if:
(i) (Assuming no WBP) crime is highly detrimental for him (G is low enough).
(ii) (Assuming WBP) crime is highly detrimental for him (G is low enough)
and public rewards are not high enough (R is low).
This contract is given by β = 0 and α (r) < 0 such that the principal gets all the
agent’s surplus.
Corollary 10 With PRPs, (e1, e2) =
(
0 , (1−ρ)
2r
1+(1−ρ)2r
)
and z = (1− ρ) (1− e2).
Proposition 5 states that low externalities from crime can incentivize the
principal to introduce a PRP in the absence of a WBP, and in its presence if
the public reward is not high enough. These cases correspond to those in which
the principal hires the agent only for his activities related to gathering crime
evidence.
Regarding the size of the reward, note that the principal can set r as high
as he desires, as he retrieves all reward payments through α anyways. This
analysis suggests very high values of r, as the probability of crime existence
(and so also the expected detection costs) is downward sloping in r.23
Finally, note that the introduction of a PRP implies that deterrence and the
principal’s utility are maximized. The latter result is intuitive: the introduction
of a PRP is voluntary, thus if the principal introduces it, it must be because
this implies a gain in utility for him. For the second result consider a WBP
that offers R. Furthermore, assume that the parameters of the model are such
that the principal hires the agent to gathering crime evidence. Hence, e2 and
deterrence are maximum: e2 =
(1−ρ)2R
1+(1−ρ)2R and z =
(1−ρ)
1+(1−ρ)2R , the higher is R,
23With PRP, the principal’s utility at the optimal contract is upward sloping in r. Please,
see the Appendix for details.
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the higher is e2 and the lower is z. In this context, if the principal finds it e2
to low, he can introduce a PRP that offers r > R to induce the agent to exert
more effort. Therefore, for any given R, the introduction of a PRP implies an
increase in e2 and, consequently, higher deterrence.
4.8 Conclusion
Whistle-blowers play an important role in fighting fraud by companies and the
government, including fraud against the government. To encourage whistle-
blowing, the USA legislation offers rewards to whistle-blowing on corporate
crimes. What are the implications of rewarding whistle-blowing on the contract
between a firm’s owner and a non-offender employee? And on deterrence? Are
rewards desirable for firm owners? If so, under which conditions?
This paper gives an answer to these questions by developing a model that as-
sumes: (i) rewards create a decision problem to a non-offender employee on how
to allocate effort among productive activities and activities related to the gath-
ering of crime evidence, (ii) effort devoted to gathering crime evidence affects
the probability of crime existence which, in return, affects the expected payoff
from rewards, (iii) effort devoted to production is observable (so that production
can be contracted upon it), but efforts devoted to gathering crime evidence and
committing crime are not, (iv) the principal is not the crime offender, but gets
externalities (positive or negative) from crime, and (v) the principal can not
design a law-enforceable contract with the offender to encourage/prevent crime.
Regarding the implications of rewarding whistle-blowing on contracts, two
results stand out. First, effort devoted to production is overpaid (underpaid)
if the principal wants to bias the agent’s effort allocation towards (away from)
productive activities. The principal wants to bias the agent’s effort allocation
towards productive activities when he gets high positive externalities from crime.
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To this end, he overpays productive activities, as this discourages the agent
from gathering crime evidence. Alternatively, the principal wants to bias the
agent’s effort allocation towards crime detection when he gets low externalities
from crime (negative or positive but low). To this end, he underpays productive
activities. As an extreme case, the principal hires the agent only for his activities
related to crime detection.
Second, rewards may imply no contract between the principal and the agent.
Consider the case in which the principal overpays productive activities to bias
the agent’s effort allocation away from crime detection: for high reward values,
the required overpayment can be unprofitable for the principal, especially if the
agent’s marginal productivity from work is low. As a consequence, the principal
may find himself better off by not hiring the agent, even if in the absence of
rewards he would have done it.
In the light of these results, the introduction of rewards improves deterrence
if and only if rewards do not discourage the principal from hiring the agent and
e2 > 0.
What is the effect of a reward increase in deterrence? And in the principal’s
utility? Regarding deterrence, there is an improvement in deterrence following a
reward increase if crime detection is desired by the principal (i.e., if the principal
gets high negative externalities from crime), or if the principal’s externalities
from crime are high enough to sustain hiring the agent in a scenario in which
the agent’s effort allocation is biased towards crime detection. With respect to
the effect on the principal’s utility, there is a gain in utility following a reward
increase if crime detection is desired by the principal.
Finally, I also demonstrate that for low enough crime externalities, it is in
the principal’s interest to create a reward-program private to the firm, regardless
of the existence of a whistle-blower program. A program of this type arises when
crime is highly detrimental to the principal and, if there exists a whistle-blower
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program, when also the public reward is not high enough to deter crime as much
as the principal would like. Moreover, I demonstrate that the use of a private
reward-program implies maximum deterrence.
Summing up, whistle-blower programs can improve deterrence, but at the
expense of productive efficiency. The loss in efficiency is lower when the principal
gets low (negative) externalities from crime, as it is associated only to less effort
devoted to productive activities – and not also to the possibility of no-contract.
Nevertheless, in this case, the principal may also have private incentives to
create a private reward program, with higher benefits for him and for crime
deterrence. In the light of this result, this paper favors the use of whistle-blower
programs to deter crimes that work in favor of the interest of the principal (e.g.,
tax-frauds, collusion, environmental crimes, etc.) and when the agent’s work is
highly important to the firm (in terms of the model, when the agent’s marginal
productivity from work (y), is high), such that the principal finds it too costly
to dispense with the agent’s activities (e.g., accountants, middle or low-level
managers, executive secretaries, etc.)
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Appendix
Lemma 1: From the partial derivative of O(z) with respect to z: zB = 1−ρ.
Since O(z) is concave in z, zB = argmax {O(z)}.
From the partial derivative of U(e1) with respect to e1: e
B
1 = min {β, 1},
for β ≥ 0 and e1 ∈ [0, 1]. Since U(e1) is concave in z, eB1 = argmax {U(e1)}.
Proposition 1: Follows from (i) agent’s optimal effort allocation eB1 (Lemma
1), and (ii) α such that the principal gets all the agent’s surplus.
Lemma 2: The FOC from the offender’s problem is:
∂O
∂z
= 1− [ρ+ (1− ρ) e2]− z (4.8)
The FOCs from the agent’s problem are:
∂U
∂e1
= −e1 − e2 + β (4.9)
∂U
∂e2
= −e1 − e2 + (1− ρ) zR (4.10)
From (4.8), the best response e2(z) of the offender is: e2(z) = 1 − z1−ρ ,
and from (4.9) and (4.10), the best response e2(z) of the agent is:
e2(z) =

min {1,max {(1− ρ) zR− 1, 0}} if : z < β(1−ρ)R
[min {1,max {(1− ρ) zR− 1, 0}} , min {(1− ρ) zR, 1}] if : z = β(1−ρ)R
min {(1− ρ) zR, 1} if : z > β(1−ρ)R
Solving, the equilibrium is:
(e2, z) =

(β0 , (1− ρ) (1− β0)) if : β < β0(
1− β
(1−ρ)2R ,
β
(1−ρ)R
)
if : β ∈ (β0, β1)
(e2 , z) if : β > β1
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where β0 =
(1−ρ)2R
1+(1−ρ)2R , β1 = min
{
β1a = (1− ρ)2R , β1b = 2β0
}
, and:
(e2, z) =

(0 , 1− ρ) if : β1 = β1a
(β1b − 1 , (1− ρ) (2− β1b)) if : β1 = β1b
Finally, at the equilibrium, e1 is:
e1 =

0 if : β < β0
β + β
(1−ρ)2R − 1 if : β ∈ (β0, β1)
e1 if : β > β1
where: e1 = min {β, 1} if β1 = β1a , and e1 = 1 if β1 = β1b.
Proposition 2: β∗ is linearly related to G and y. Thus, there exists a
unique G such that β∗ > y if and only if G > G.
Proposition 3: Rewrite the (PCp) as:
X = ye1 − (α+ βe1) + z { G− [ρ+ (1− ρ) e2] F } − (1− ρ) ( G− ρF ) ≥ 0(4.11)
The (PCp) holds if and only if X ≥ 0.
(i) Assume R ∈ [R0, R1]. Substituting the interior solution of the SCPA’s
contract in (4.11), simple algebra shows that X is a polynomial of degree 2 in
G, with positive coefficient in the quadratic term, and Xmin ≥ 0 if and only if
y ≥ yˆ = (1−ρ)2R2 . For y < yˆ, the roots of the polynomial are Ga and Gb, with
Ga < Gb, such that X ≥ 0 if and only if G /∈ [Ga, Gb].
(ii) Assume R /∈ [R0, R1]. Efforts at the corner solution are independent of
G. For R > R1 and R ∈ (Rˆ, R0), X is linear and downward sloping in G. Thus,
there exists a unique value of G such that X > 0 if and only if G is below this
value. Denote these critical values by G0 and G1 for R > R1 and R ∈ (Rˆ, R0),
respectively.
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For R < min
{
R0, Rˆ
}
, X ≥ 0 for all values of G.
Proposition 4: Follows from Lemma 2, Corollary 3 and Proposition 3.
Lemma 3: There is a deterrence effect from a reward increase if and only
if ∂e2∂R > 0.
Assume R /∈ [R0, R1]: e2 ∈ {0, β0, β1b − 1}, where 0 < β0 < β1b − 1 and
∂β0
∂R ,
∂β1b
∂R ≥ 0. Thus, ∂e2∂R ≥ 0.
Assume R ∈ [R0, R1]: e2 = 1 − β(1−ρ)2R , with β upward or downward
sloping in R.
Taking the partial derivative of e2 with respect to R:
∂e∗2
∂R
=
1[
(1− ρ)2R
]2
[
β (1− ρ)2 − ∂β
∂R
1
(1− ρ)2R
]
The first term in brackets is the direct effect of a higher reward in e2, which is
always positive: A reward increase encourages e2. The second term in brackets
is the indirect effect, which can be positive, negative or zero, depending on how
the reward increase distorts β.
For high values of G, ∂β∂R < 0, thus
∂e2
∂R > 0. For low values of G, instead,
∂β
∂R > 0, thus the effect of a reward increase on e2 depends on the parameters
of the model.
Lemma 4: Rewrite condition (4.7) in the text as:
W = ye1 − (α+ βe1) + z { G− [ρ+ (1− ρ) e2] F } − (1− ρ) ( G− ρF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
X
−y
2
2
≥ 0(4.12)
The introduction of rewards improves the principal’s utility if and only if W ≥
0. Following notation in Proposition 3: W = X − y22 , W and X have the
same functional form with respect to G. In addition, W and X have the same
coefficients with respect to G, but for the independent term, which is lower for
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W . Then:
(i) Assume R ∈ [R0, R1]. Substituting the interior solution of the SCPA’s
contract in (4.12), W is a polynomial of degree 2 in G with positive coefficient
in the quadratic term and Wmin < Xmin. In addition, simple algebra shows
that Wmin < 0, with roots GWa and GWb, GWa < GWb. Note that GWa <
Ga < Gb < GWb, as the polynomial W equates the polynomial X, but for the
fact that the former has a lower independent term. Hence: given contract, the
introduction of rewards improves the principal’s utility for G /∈ [GWa, GWb], and
reduces the principal’s utility for G ∈ [Ga, GWa]
⋂
[Gb, GWb].
(ii) Assume R /∈ [R0, R1]. In the corner solutions, efforts are independent
of G. For R > R1 and R ∈ (Rˆ, R0), W is linear and downward sloping in G.
Thus, there exists a unique value of G such that W > 0 if and only if G is
below this value. Denote these critical values by GW0 and GW1 for R > R1 and
R ∈ (Rˆ, R0), respectively.
For R < min
{
R0, Rˆ
}
, W ≤ 0 for all values of G.
Lemma 5: There is a gain in utility from a reward increase if and only if
∂V
∂R ≥ 0.
For R > R1, the principal hires the agent only for his activities related to
gathering crime evidence ( ∂V∂e2 > 0). The agent devotes effort to gathering crime
evidence depending on the reward value: the higher the reward, the higher the
effort level (∂e2∂R ≥ 0). Straightforward, ∂V∂R ≥ 0.
For R < R0, the principal hires the agent for his productive activities,
regardless of e2. The agent devotes effort to gathering crime evidence depending
on the reward value: the higher the reward, the higher the effort level (∂e2∂R ≥ 0).
Two possibilities arise:
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• For R < Rˆ: e2 = 0 and e1 = β1a > y, with ∂e1∂R ≥ 0. ∂V∂R = ∂e1∂R (y − β1a) ≤
0. A reward increase does not distort e2, but discourages e1 with respect
to its efficient level. There is a loss in utility following a reward increase.
• For R > Rˆ: e1 = 1 and e2 = β1b − 1, with ∂e2∂R ≥ 0. In this case, there
exists G˜ < G1 such that:
∂V
∂R ≥ 0 ⇔ G < G˜.
For R ∈ [R0, R1], the agent devotes effort to production and to the gath-
ering of crime evidence. A reward increase has two effects in the principal’s
utility: a distortion in utility due to β approaching y, and a distortion in utility
due to that an increase/reduction in e2 changes his net payoffs from crime.
∂V ∗
∂R
=
∂β∗
∂R
(y − β∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Efficiency Effect
− ∂e
∗
2
∂R
[
y +
(y − β∗)
k
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Crime Net Payoff Effect
The Efficiency Effect is positive but for G ∈ {G,G} (where it is negative), and
the sign of the Crime Net Payoff Effect is assured to be positive for a high enough
crime externality (G > Gˇ). Hence, ∂V∂R ≥ 0 if G > max
{
G, Gˇ
}
. Otherwise, the
ultimate effect of an increase in R in the principal’s utility depends on the
parameters of the model.
Proposition 5: The principal introduces a PRP if and only if the payoff
he obtains with it is higher than the one he obtains without it.
With PRP, the SCPA can be set as:
max
β,r
V (β, r) = ye1 − (e1 + e2)
2
2
+ (1− ρ) (1− e2) (G− ρF )
with FOCs:
∂V
∂β
= y
∂e1
∂β
− (e1 + e2)
(
∂e1
∂β
+
∂e2
∂β
)
− (1− ρ) (G− ρF ) ∂e2
∂β
(4.13)
∂V
∂r
=
∂e2
∂r
[−y − (1− ρ) (G− ρF )] (4.14)
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Condition (4.14) is positive for G ≤ Gr = ρF − y(1−ρ) . This implies that: (i) the
principal’s utility is increasing in r for G ≤ Gr, and (ii) given a contract with
PRP, the higher the r the higher the principal’s utility.
For the rest of the proof I assume G < Gr, such that the principal finds it
profitable to introduce a PRP.
From above comments and (4.13), the principal maximizes profits in a can-
didate contract with PRP with β∗ = 0 and r → ∞. Following our assumption
in the main text, α is set such that the principal gets all the agents surplus.
For this candidate contract, e∗1 = 0 and e
∗
2 =
(1−ρ)2r
1+(1−ρ)2r . The principal’s
payoff is:
V ∗PRP =
(
1− ρ− (1− ρ)
3
r
1 + (1− ρ)2 r
)
(G− ρF )− (1− ρ)
2
r
1 + (1− ρ)2 r
Principal’s participation constraint:
(i) Assume there is no WBP: the principal’s outside option is V0 = (1− ρ) (G− ρF )+
y2
2 . Since V
∗
PRP and V0 are linear in G, there exists Gcrit such that the principal
introduces the PRP if and only if G is low enough, i.e., G < min {Gr, Gcrit}.
(ii) Assume there exists a WBP: the principal’s outside option is max {VWBP , V00},
where VWBP = V (α(R), β(R)), and V00 = (1− ρ) (G− ρF ). Since V00 is linear
in G, for V00 > VWBP the proof follows as in (i). Instead, when VWBP > V00
three cases are possible.
(a) Assume R > R1. At the optimal contract with WBP: e
∗
1 = 0 and
e∗2 =
(1−ρ)2R
1+(1−ρ)2R . In this context, VWBP is linear in G and the proof follows as
in (i).
(b) Assume R < R0. At the optimal contract with WBP, e
∗
1 is maximum
and e∗2 is minimum:
- For R0 < Rˆ: (e1, e2) = (min {max {β1a, y} , 1} , 0).
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- For R0 > Rˆ: (e1, e2) = (1 , β1b − 1).
In this context, VWBP is linear in G and the proof follows as in (i).
c) Assume R ∈ (R0, R1). Note that if VWBP is the outside option, it
is because VWBP > V00. In this context, assume V00 > V
∗
PRP . Using argu-
ments in (i), this inequality holds when G is high. Thus, for high values of G,
VWBP > V
∗
PRP , and the principal does not introduce a PRP. On the contrary,
for low enough values of G, V ∗PRP > V00, and thus the principal may find it prof-
itable to introduce a PRP. In this context, assume that the principal does not
introduce a PRP: he obtains a positive payoff from the agent’s activities related
to production and some payoff from his activities related to gathering crime
evidence. However, if he introduces a PRP, he only obtains payoff from the
latter (i.e., the principal sacrifices his payoff associated to production in favor
of maximum deterrence). By a revealed preference argument, if the principal
introduces a PRP it must be because his utility increases with higher deter-
rence. In other words, if the principal introduces a PRP it must be because
his externalities from crime G are so low (negative), that maximum deterrence
increases his utility.
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